THE MISSION OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AS SACRAMENT: THE AUTHENTICATION AND RECOGNITION OF THE ECCLESIA IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

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Abbreviations

Enchiridion Symbolorum	:	DS
Hearers of the Word	:	HW.
Theological Investigations	:	TI.
The Documents of Vatican Council II	:	Vat. II

THE MISSION OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AS SACRAMENT: THE AUTHENTICATION AND RECOGNITION OF THE ECCLESIA IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The visible church[1] is considered as having a role in the establishing of the ecclesia in the world[2]. What is implied in this statement is that the church is an observable phenomenon which supplies the parameters for assessing the presence of the Christ event in this world. This would be so even if one contends that these parameters are not absolute in that they cannot be simply identified with the initiative proceeding from the Christ event[3]. If, then, the ecclesia is understood to be the concrete, manifest reality of the presence of God among men, or of the Christ event appearing in its visibility among men, the role of the visible church -- as being itself ecclesia -- must be significant.

It has been the practice of the church to understand its role as being that of an instrument, or rather an agent, in the establishing of the ecclesia. The implication of this statement is that the church sees itself as effecting a new reality in a situation (the world of persons), by celebrating the baptismal rite. By this celebration, a new reality obtains[4], and the result is that the ecclesial element is extended. This rite is seen as the instrumental cause, in the classical sense, in the establishing of the ecclesia. It would be correct to say that the church establishes the ecclesia -- other things being equal -- by requiring non-christians to undergo a traditional and historically conditioned initiation.

The aim of this dissertation is to suggest that the role of the church in the establishing of the ecclesia may also be characterized as one of 'recognizing', in addition to or, better still, prescinding from that of being 'instrumental cause' in the post-reformation sense, the presence of the Christ event in the non-christian world. This role of recognizing would be realized in the church's searching for parameters within which the Christ event would be found, and, having discovered these parameters, proclaiming them as attesting to the presence of the ecclesia.

While it is possible to characterize the church in different ways, it seems appropriate enough for us to understand the church as 'mission' in its task of establishing the ecclesia[5]. Further, it is a mission carried out incarnationally[6].

And because the mission is incarnational, it seems proper to understand it as sacramental[7]. To the extent that the church is seen as symbolizing the spiritual in the material, it is sacramental[8].

However, the church's sacramental role had been envisaged at a time when the ultimate assumptions of mankind were supposed to be the same among all peoples, and the christian message was content to base itself on those assumptions[9]. Today, the legitimacy of varied and at the same time 'ultimate' assumptions of diverse peoples is countenanced. Can the church as sacramental, and with the background of one set of ultimate assumptions, symbolize the spiritual in the material, to a people who possess yet another set of ultimate assumptions? Can the church meaningfully recognize the parameters of the Christ event without nullifying the other set of ultimate assumptions? In effect, the steps involved in the process of 'recognizing' will have to treat of

these problems.

The reflections offered in the course of our explorations would help theology to provide a backdrop for the missionary activity of the church in India. The type of activity characterizing the church's mission is very much the child of the theological presuppositions which the christian church countenances[10]. It is these theological presuppositions which need to be examined if a renewed, constructive missionary activity ~~is~~ to obtain, and the church's missionary activity be made more relevant.

By referring to the church as mysterium[11], with the word's rich biblical and patristic connotations, Vatican Council II was able to liken the church to a 'sacrament' rather than to the 'juridical society' notion that traditionally characterized it[12]. To describe the church as 'a sign and instrument, that is, of communion with God and of unity among all men'[13] was the council's way of asserting two things: first, that such a characterization of the church was founded on tradition, and second, that the task of the church was to be spelt out in terms of sacramental reality[14]. Theology was asked, in effect, to focus on Christ, the Light of the nations, and to show how the church could sacramentalize the Christ event in the world at large. The task would include both the perceiving of the Christ event already active in the world, and the being able to recognize this activity on the part of the church.

In this essay, we hope to explore the aspects under which the church appears as the sacrament of the world. In such an exploration, the implicit mission of the church would surely be revealed, and given

the aim of this essay, this mission would be viewed in its significance for non-christian peoples.

The sense of 'church' will be that as understood by the Roman Catholic Church of its own community. The reason for restricting the meaning of 'church' is, paradoxically, in the interests of ecumenism. Such an understanding of church will prevent facile assumptions from being made about, and will avoid wrong meanings from being imputed to, other churches. Secondly, in terms of the task that the church has in recognizing parameters, the following considerations assume particular importance: not only must there be a consciousness of the parameters in the church itself as a whole, but there would be a need to recognize these same authoritatively when discovered elsewhere[15]. Since the magisterial utterances of the Roman Catholic Church belong to the constitutive structure of the church[16], the possibility exists of demonstrating that a magisterial pronouncement affirming the existence of such parameters in non-christian communities is ipso facto a recognition by the Roman Catholic Church of an extended, but all the same authentic, ecclesia. Mutatus mutandis, the development of the arguments in the thesis could be true for other churches. They, too profess faith in Jesus Christ and understand their task as one of continuing his mission in the world.

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In order to explore the meaning of the church as the sacrament of the world and reveal its significance for the church's mission to the non-christian peoples, we shall examine two aspects of the church's reality which are crucial to its function: the proclamation of the

eschatological Kingdom of God and the manner in which this proclamation is present in the world. These two aspects will be treated of in the first and second part of this essay. In the third and final part, we hope to use the findings resulting from our elaboration of these two aspects, to indicate how the church, after first being able to recognize the eschatological in itself, could also recognize it in other communities outside of itself. It will also be suggested that the christianizing mission of the church will be realized not so much in its instrumental capacity where the stress would be in terms of input, but rather in its capacity to recognize the Christ event already present in the non-christian communities. To this end, the essay will consist of the following parts:

I The Kingdom of God as eschatological.

II The Kingdom of God as ecclesial.

III The Mission of the church as sacrament.

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FOOTNOTES

1 By 'church' is meant the roman catholic church. The meaning of church is restricted in its use for methodological purposes. The reasons for this will be given later.

2 ecclesia: This is not to be identified with the 'invisible church'. Rather, it refers to persons who encounter the Christ event in community. The 'ecclesia' signifies the situation of persons who are constituted into a community of faith because of the Christ event. The 'church', while realizing the concept of the 'ecclesia' in herself and being conscious of the same, is the definitive sign of the Christ event in community. The church is understood to be the 'ecclesia', but as visible and definitive of the Christ event in a community of faith.

3 'initiative proceeding from the Christ event': unless one does void the content of the incarnational reality in the Christ event, both the aspects under which the church has been considered in the past: 'proclamation' and 'sacrament' may be seen as functions that combine in the building up or constituting of the church, and thus, proleptically, of the 'ecclesia' as visible reality in the world.

4 The assumption is that "...ea ipsa novae Legis sacramenta a sacramentis antiquae Legis...differre,..." (DS 1602), and our task is to examine this differre in terms of 'recognizing'.

5 A. P. Flannery, O. P. (gen. edit.), The Documents of Vatican II, Copyright 1975 by Costello Publishing Company, Inc. and Rev. Austin Flannery, O. P. A Pillar Book, published by arrangement with Costello Publishing Company, Inc. First printing, November 1975. All rights reserved. Pillar Books is a division of Pyramid Communications, Inc., 919 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022, U.S.A. Printed in the U.S.A., p. 351, Lumen Gentium, no. 3: "To carry out the will of the Father Christ inaugurated the kingdom of heaven on earth and revealed to us his mystery; ...the church -- that is, the kingdom of Christ -- although present in mystery, grows visibly through the power of God in the world."

6 Karl Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," p. 113: "...it still remains true that the Logos became man, that the changing history of this human reality is his own history: our time became the time of the eternal, our death the death of the immortal God himself. And no matter how we distribute the predicates which seem to contradict one another and some of which seem to be incompatible with God, dividing them up between two realities, the divine Word and created human nature, we still may not forget that of of these, the created reality, is that of the Logos God himself."

[7] K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, translated by W. J. O'Hara. Original edition "Kirche und Sakrament"; copyright 1963 by Herder, Freiburg. English copyright 1974 by Search Press and Verlag Herder KG, 1974. Seventh impression 1974. Published Search Press Ltd., 2-10 Jerdan Place, London SW6 5PT. Burns and Oates, London. Printed by Fletcher and Son Ltd., Norwich, in Great Britain, p. 18: "From Christ the Church has an intrinsically sacramental structure. Historically visible in space and time, with its double aspect as people of God and as juridical and social organization of this people, the church is the body and bride of Christ who abides in the Church as the presence in the world of God's historical and eschatological promise of himself..."

[8] For the present we shall characterize 'sacramental' as implying the use of observable, material objects in symbolizing the spiritual.

[9] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. XI, 'Reflections on Methodology in Theology', p. 71: "...as little as thirty years ago the state of Catholic theology was that of a system closed in upon itself in such a way that any further developments that took place within it took place according to laws which were both already given within it and also already known to the upholders of the system..."

[10] On the 17th September, 1562, during the twenty-second session of the Council of Trent, the following was decreed: "Etsi Missa magnam contineat populi fidelis eruditionem, non tamen expedire visum est Patribus, ut vulgari lingua celebraretur." (DS 1749) (sic!) A community of faith was called to worship in a language it did not understand.

[11] Vatican II's Lumen Gentium, nos. 1-8. B. Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, translated by Matthew J. O'Connell. From the original Portuguese A Eclesiologia do Vaticano II, published in 1971 by Editora Vozes Limitada, Petropolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Copyright 1974 by Franciscan Herald Press, 1434 West 51st Street, Chicago, Illinois 60609. Made in the U.S.A. P. 14: "The purpose of the new title was to direct attention, right from the beginning, to the Church 'as object of faith', and not simply to the Church in its external manifestation."

[12] John XXIII had made a specific request that Card. Ottaviani's schema be redrafted so that the constitution on the church would not be scholastic in character. Confer H. Vorgrimler (gen. edit.), translated by Lalit Adolphus, Kevin Smyth and Richard Strachan, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, Vol. I (including: Dogmatic Constitution on the Church), "Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil, Dokumente und Kommentare, Part I, Herder, Freiburg, 1966), Copyright 1967, Herder K. G. Burns and Oates/Herder and Herder. Printed in W. Germany be Herder.

[13] Vatican II's Lumen Gentium, no. 1.

[14] Vatican II's Lumen Gentium, No. 1. "...she (the Church) here proposes, for the benefit of the faithful and of the whole world, to set forth, as clearly as possible, and in the tradition laid down by earlier Councils, her own nature and universal mission."

[15] This authority would be in virtue of the members of the church as a whole and also 'ex sese' - to echo DS 3074.

[16] K. Rahner (editor), Encyclopedia of Theology, The Concise Sacramentum Mundi, p. 873r: "...the magisterium is the concrete form in which the guidance of the Spirit, as the Spirit of Christ who gives the Christ-event historical presence, maintains historical continuity with Jesus Christ." ("Magisterium", K. Rahner)

CHAPTER TWO

The Kingdom of God as eschatological

Introduction

For the christian, the Christ event is definitive[1]. It includes the passing away of one covenantal relationship as found in the Old Testament, and the beginning of a new one in Jesus Christ. This new beginning implies the proclamation of the Kingdom of God. Among other things, the Kingdom of God denotes the eschaton, the closing of a series so that from the time of the eschaton there can be no similar or equivalent event[2]. For the christian, the Christ event is eschatological[3].

Without necessarily agreeing with Bultmann's reasons for Paul's proclamation of Christ[4] it is clear that the Christ event is the final resolution of God's mystery hidden in time[5], and that it is this mystery that brings salvation to persons in this world[6]. Having said this, however, it must be conceded that the meaning of 'Kingdom of God' with its eschatological significance is difficult to understand. In the New Testament writings, as well as in the tradition of the church, the phrase 'eschatological Kingdom of God' has many varied meanings that are recognized by theology[7].

The next step in this essay will be to attempt a meaning for this phrase that will both stand up to theological scrutiny, and yet allow us to predicate it correctly in different situations[8]. To accomplish this will be the task of this section. To this end we shall survey some of the meanings that attach to 'Kingdom of God' and 'eschatological'. Having done this we shall propose some considerations and draw

suitable conclusions.

I. The Kingdom of God

A. A note on the meaning of the term: Kingdom of God

The term 'Basileia tou theou' has usually been translated as 'Kingdom of God'[9]. In English, the phrase conjures up a vision of a stable institution of persons under laws, territorial extent, and of course, a king presiding with authority[10]. In this vision, the English phrase conceals the functioning aspect of the king, an aspect which is crucial in the biblical understanding of the term as we hope to illustrate in the sections to come. In the following section we present a short survey of the meanings applying to the phrase 'Basileia tou theou'. The biblical meaning of the term always appears in the concrete, but the concrete image of the term is never an exhaustive realization of the 'Basileia tou theou'[11]. The image will always suggest a background to which access is had only through the image that obtains at that particular time and place in history.

B. The Kingdom of God in the Old Testament[12]

It was in its history that Israel experienced the power of Yahweh[13]. Yahweh's kingdom realized itself in the salvation history of the people of Israel[14].

Norman Perrin believes that the roots of the Kingdom of God lie in the ancient Near Eastern myth of the kingship of God[15]. That kingship was celebrated in a myth, and each year it was enacted cultically. In the enactment god "acted as king as he renewed the fertility of the earth; his people experienced him as king as he entered once more into their lives"[16]. Psalms 93/1-2 and 97/1-2 indicate that Israel too

understood her god in a similar way[17], that is as someone who was experienced in his deed.

Von Rad calls attention to certain confessional formulae "such as designate Jahweh as the one who called the patriarchs and promised them the land, etc. Alongside these brief formulae, which are content with a minimum of historical subject matter ... there were very certainly soon ranged confessional summaries of the saving history, covering by now a fairly extensive span of the divine action in history"[18].

C. The Kingdom of God in the New Testament

In the New Testament the word Basileia is used more than one hundred and fifty times[19]. In this section we hope to detail some of the many ways in which the Kingdom is understood[20].

1. The Parables of the Kingdom

Our intention is not to supply a critical study of scripture scholars who have treated of the parables concerning the Kingdom of God but rather to note what they have said concerning the 'Kingdom' parables. We refer, in the first place, to C. H. Dodd who argues "that the burden of their message is that the great crisis, the coming of the Kingdom, is something present in the ministry of Jesus. In the Hid Treasure and the Costly Pearl (Matthew 13:44-46) the possession of the highest good, the Kingdom of God, is a present opportunity. The Tower-builder and the King going to War (Luke 14:28-33) challenge men to take great risks with open eyes, in view of the presence of the crisis"[21].

With reference to A Jülicher, Perrin lauds his efforts which showed that the parables were to provide instruction about the Kingdom. They were not to be taken as allegories, as was done by Augustine[22].

Joachim Jeremias' contribution to an understanding of the parables lies in his concern to let the parables mediate the message of Jesus to the hearer. The merit of Jeremias' research into the background of the parables was that he made the message of Jesus speak to the person of today[23]. Before we attempt to gather the main themes of the Kingdom of God parables and point out their salient features, we shall briefly address ourselves to a few 'kingdom' sayings.

2. Sayings about the Kingdom

It is a claim made by Norman Perrin himself that the sayings in Luke 11:20, 17:20-21 and Matthew 11:12 are 'kingdom' sayings[24]. In Luke 11:20, "we should recognize that Jesus is deliberately evoking the myth of the activity of God on behalf of his people, and claiming that the exorcisms are a manifestation of that activity in the experience of his hearers ... The saying is a challenge to the hearers to take the ancient myth with renewed seriousness, and to begin to anticipate the manifestation of the reality of which it speaks in the concrete actuality of their experience"[25]. In Luke 17:20-21, Jesus is telling his hearers not to interpret the Kingdom of God solely in terms of the expected signs, but rather to recognize it as the Kingdom already engaging them in existential reality[26]. "In Luke 11:20-21 the use of the Kingdom of God evokes the myth of the eschatological activity of God and interprets the exorcism of Jesus as a manifestation of that activity. In Matt. 11:12 the use of Kingdom of Heaven (=God) evokes the myth of the eschatological war between God and the powers of evil and interprets the fate of John the Baptist, and the potential fate of Jesus and his disciples, as a manifestation of that conflict"[27].

Main themes of the Kingdom of God

Here, we shall attempt to make summary statements about the Kingdom of God so that its characteristics might appear more clearly.

1. The Kingdom of God is depicted as making radical demands on persons (Matthew 5/44: "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you"; 6/33: "...seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well"). These radical demands have as their objective not an impersonal goal but God and one's neighbour (Matthew 22/37-40: "...You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbour as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets")[28].

2. With special reference to Luke 17/20-21, we may say that the demands of the Kingdom of God are "ἐντὸς ὑμῶν", signifying thereby that not only in rules, regulations and prescriptions of the law is the Kingdom of God signified, but in the individual's experience as a whole[29].

3. The connection between Jesus and the Kingdom of God is not incidental. Apart from him the Kingdom loses its crucial reality. This is because in accepting the person of Jesus, one also accepts the Kingdom[30]. All that happens in Jesus' life, all that he stands for, as also what his followers profess, proclaim the message of the Kingdom and -- here we anticipate in part what will be the thrust of the section on the 'eschatological' -- make it an issue for persons[31].

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II. The Eschatological

In the previous section dealing with the Kingdom of God, we detailed some of the characteristics that we felt would make the Kingdom of God possess a definite form. This form derived from the parables and sayings concerning the Kingdom in the New Testament[32]. It was seen that the notion of the Kingdom was prevalent in the Old Testament too, especially in the fact that Yahweh's historical and saving deeds were done on behalf of his people[33]; that it was the functional aspect of the Kingdom of God that asserted itself in the history of the chosen people, and that this functional aspect was discoverable in the communications of God through the Law and the Prophets[34].

In the message of Jesus, the Kingdom of God takes on a uniqueness, especially in relation to the Kingdom as it was proclaimed before Jesus. The uniqueness lies in the fact that in the person of Jesus the Kingdom of God is manifested eschatologically[35]. It will be the task of this section to explicitate the significance of the eschatological Kingdom of God as proclaimed by Jesus in the New Testament writings. It is not as though we were trying to prove that the Kingdom of God as manifested in the New Testament can be or is eschatological. Rather, given the fact that such is the case, we intend spelling out the implications of such an assertion, and then draw relevant conclusions.

We shall not attempt to discuss the scriptural sense of the terms used in the New Testament to denote an eschatological reality; nor shall we attempt to pronounce on the merits of one meaning of escha-

tology as compared to those of another. Scriptural exegesis and scriptural hermeneutics are beyond the scope of this essay. But we hope to illustrate, in terms of what we have noted about the Kingdom of God and in terms of what is interpreted as its eschatological significance in the New Testament, that the functional dynamic of the eschatological Kingdom of God as understood in this essay is valid[36]. The method of illustration we shall be employing is of making statements about the eschatological significance of the Kingdom of God and documenting them from admittedly reputable sources.

A. The Eschatological in the New Testament[37]

The term eschaton is used in a material sense in Matthew 5/26 and Luke 12/59. In these references, eschaton would mean the quantity that would be required to complete the total amount. Eschaton also has a spatial reference, as is seen in Act 1/8 and 13/47. Eschaton also signifies the end in a temporal sequence, as in Mark 12/22 and Matthew 27/64[38].

In general, we may say that the term eschaton suggests the closing of a series -- particularly in a temporal sequence -- and argues an absence of equivalent events in relation to itself. However, the different uses made of this term in the New Testament makes it difficult for us to ascribe one definite meaning to it[39]. The sense of finality which eschaton conjures up still needs a further category to decide the manner in which it becomes operative in the New Testament.

B. Various interpretations of New Testament Eschatology

G. C. Berkouwer understands eschatology as dealing with an assortment of christian doctrines. He insists, however, that the realities referred to by these doctrines be not viewed as in themselves meaningful

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to christian living, but rather be seen as ancilliary to the Christ event which is the definitive happening that encompasses these realities[40].

For Rudolf Bultmann, eschatology becomes, in effect, an a-temporal event. The faith event in a person who believes is not shown to be derived from the Jesus who suffered and died and is risen, but is situated in the self-understanding of a person who sees in the person of Jesus -- and the person does this by faith -- God's decisive act of salvation[41]. It is not clear how Bultmann reconciles man's self-understanding which is understood as a-temporal with the decisive and manifest act of God in Jesus which is historical. For Bultmann, then, eschatology tends to be apocalyptic in its occurrence[42].

Oscar Cullmann's understanding of eschatology is influenced by his conceiving of redemption within history[43]. For Cullmann, eschatology is not something added on to the history of the world but is something that is the ultimate fulfillment of history, to wit, the Christ event[44]. This event is the mid-point of history. Even though Cullmann allows for a future in which the fullest manifestation of eschatology is to be realized, the decisiveness of that future has already been cast in the Christ event, the mid-point in time[45].

For Jürgen Moltmann, the eschatological Kingdom of God is discerned in the Promise-Fulfillment pattern[46]. In this pattern, however, eschatology is seen as the object hoped for in christianity, and in effect the hope that such an object inspires[47]. The promise becomes the coming of a not yet existing reality from the future; yet it relates to the existing and given reality as an <u>inadequato rei et intellectus</u>[48]. The promise keeps men on the move as long as the

intellectus has not yet found its answer in reality. Moltmann sees himself as differing from Pannenberg in that Pannenberg applies the eschatology patterned on Promise and Fulfillment to universal history[49]. For Pannenberg, eschatology is the final manifestation of the God who was already latent in history all along.

When we consider the meanings that the Roman Catholic Church attaches to the term 'eschatological', we may be surprised by the number of doctrines it covers[50]. Traditionally, the 'eschata' signified the following: God's administering retribution and bringing the world to a consummation. This included the fact of man's death (DS 1512), the particular and the general judgment (DS 857, 1002, 1304-1306), beatitude (DS 1306), the coming of Christ (DS 852), and the resurrection. While these doctrines are rooted in dogma and emphasize the ethical existence of the christian, the particularity with which they are often spelt out in catholic theology obscures the Christic dimension, and makes of them mere adjuncts of an existence proper to this world -- very much like the ends or objectives of the "perfect society"[51], rather than symbols of the Christ event in its fullness.

Since the church understands itself as the definitive presence of the Christ event in the world, and since the church exists in space and time, that is, it is experienced in the lives of persons as objective, its understanding of the eschatological seems best expressed in the notion of the 'already' and the 'not yet'. The notion of realized eschatology along with that of salvation history would most closely correspond to the terms 'already' and 'not yet'[52].

We may say that it was during and because of the different phases of church history that varied meanings attached themselves to the term

'eschatological'[53]. Secondly, while Jesus did use Jewish notions to speak eschatologically, he did not restrict himself to them[54]. Finally, belief in the Christ event meant that the believer had to respond to the divine mission of that Jesus who could promise the reign of God, because it was already fulfilled in himself[55].

C. The Eschatological as the definitive phase ushering in the new

Our brief survey of the meaning of eschatology in the New Testament as understood by some scholars as also in the doctrines of the church indicates that no single meaning satisfies all possibilities. Before we attempt to construct a model of the eschatological that would fit the requirement of our 'functional dynamic'[56] we shall summarize the understandings of eschatology under three headings and offer a brief critique[57].

1. Thoroughgoing Eschatology

In essence, this heading assumes a temporal sequence of events that was envisaged by Jesus which would result in the establishment of the Kingdom of God. However, because Jesus began to be aware that the result was not forthcoming (confer Matthew 10), he acted in a way -- by bringing about his own death -- that he hoped would usher in the eschatological Kingdom of God. Albert Schweitzer, the principal exponent of this view, interpreted the aftermath of Jesus' death as the efforts of his disciples to continue the spirit of Jesus, and this they did by sketching out an ethical existence that would characterize the Christ spirit[58].

Thoroughgoing eschatology assumes that the Kingdom of God is still to come and that an ethical way of life best realizes Jesus' eschatological hopes[59]. This view of eschatology assumes that Jesus was not its

realization but one who wished to bring it about. This view does not seem to give much importance to the Easter event[60].

2. Realized Eschatology

Those who belong to this school hold that eschatological reality has been realized in its ultimate significance[61]. This is taken to mean that the Kingdom of God is realized during the earthly life of Jesus, and that consequently Jesus was the realization of the Kingdom of God. C. H. Dodd's Realized Eschatology was later modified to 'eschatology in the process of realizing itself'. J. Jeremias' sich realisierenden Eschatologie[62] expresses the modified view of C. H. Dodd. The school of historical theology, i.e. (Salvation History), would be in essential agreement with this view of eschatology, but as we suggested earlier their preoccupation is with the objective context of salvation[62a]. This objective context is the stage for salvation and because of its nature postulates a future still to be completed (Pannenberg, Moltmann)[63]. The Roman Catholic view would seem to be closest to this view of eschatology.

Realized Eschatology is able to invest man's life with hope because it takes history seriously and allows -- by definition -- a progress. How infectious a history with hope can be seen from E. Bloch's treatment of the 'Novum'[64].

3. Existential Eschatology[65]

The main proponent of this school is Rudolf Bultmann, who in reality takes up Martin Kähler's idea of the kerygmatic Christ and fuses it with the existential understanding of man on the lines of

Heideggerian philosphy[66]. In Bultmann's understanding, the eschatological event of the Christ happening is meaningful to modern man only when modern man is aware of his propensity to death[67] and through a grace event understands that he has been saved by God's definitive and eschatological act of salvation in the person of Jesus. In this understanding of eschatology, the Kingdom of God would exist in man's self-understanding, i.e. in his acceptance of salvation that has no essential external correspondence. Man's decision wrought by the grace event -- the faith event, that is -- is the only register that the existential eschatological view admits[68].

The proponents of the New Hermeneutic, while following Bultmann's lead, spell out the context in which the decision of man is made[69]. Rather than the faith event, they would call the complex in which man's decision is made, a Word event or Language event where a word or language is "performative" and not a mere vehicle for transmitting meanings[70]. The context of man's decision, they argue, is linguistic in that a person's life (ontological status) and the phenomenon of language are mutually related[71]. The Word of God is that language event which lights up, fashions and authenticates a person's life in reference to the eschatological Kingdom of God. This it does through the 'sermon'[72]. Ebeling and Fuchs are the main proponents of the New Hermeneutic.

D. A brief critique on Thoroughgoing, Realized and Existential Eschatology

None of the three types of eschatology mentioned is fully satisfactory in relation to the Kingdom of God. Thoroughgoing Eschatology begins with a supposition that makes one particular understanding of a scriptural text crucial (Matthew 10/23)[73]. Why should that text be

crucial[74]? Other scriptural texts support the view that Jesus saw himself as one in whom the Kingdom of God was realized eschatologically[75]. The assumption of an ethical way of life, the Interimsethik, brings in its wake the problem of continuity: By themselves, ethical rules or regulations make for a particular way of life. But should one characterize the rules or regulations as christian, one would have to establish a link between these and Jesus Christ. Interimsethik does not concern itself with such a link since it assumes that the realization of the Kingdom of God will be apocalyptic. Jesus is seen to be one who was unsuccessful in bringing about the eschatological phase of God's reign.

In Realized Eschatology, it is not clear what one is to understand as 'historical'[76]. Given the fact that God has intervened in man's history in an eschatological way, and given the fact that this determinative eschatological action is proper of the Kingdom of God in the New Testament, where, we can ask, does history show to modern man without ambiguity the eschatological Kingdom of God? Further, it would seem that if the eschatological Kingdom of God is being progressively realized or manifested in man's history, the absoluteness of the Christ event requires to be re-interpreted accordingly[77].

Finally, Existential Eschatology's recognizing the eschatological Kingdom of God in terms of man's self-understanding places importance on the faith event. In this case, however, what occurs in a person's decision admits of no external register to validate the presence of the eschatological Kingdom of God. A self-authenticating criterion can neither be affirmed or denied by an external source. If it is said that the followers of the New Hermeneutic have sought to remedy the situation by

viewing the faith event as a word event -- the word supplying the linguistic context -- it may be asked to what extent is the context definitive for the word event to occur? And then, what would be the ontological status of the dynamic that operates between the word and the context, or between the proclamation that takes place and the personal appropriation of that proclamation, since this implies the realization of the eschatological Kingdom of God?

At the end of this brief critique, what can certainly be said is that the eschatological Kingdom of God cannot be reduced to a neutral, abstract or free-floating principle of action, if it claims to derive from the historical Christ event. Such a principle of action could be ethical, but there is little reason to believe that it would qualify for the title of christian.

E. The Eschatological Kingdom of God as symbolic

Influenced by Paul Ricoeur, and with reference to Philip Wheelwright, Norman Perrin has seen fit to consider the Kingdom of God as symbol[78]. By making use of the symbol, Perrin is able to tie in the various biblical descriptions of the Kingdom of God in the Old and New Testaments and thus construct a continuity of sorts for the proclamation of the Kingdom[79]. At the same time, because he opts for the tensive meaning of the symbol as opposed to the steno[80] -- though he does not deny the steno meaning in the bible -- the challenge that the Kingdom of God implies is never irreformably fixed. And because the tensive symbol can function without being limited by a mythical framework -- Perrin has Bultmann in mind -- the eschatological proclamation of the Kingdom of God in the New Testament is predicable with variations[81].

Perrin's insight is of special importance to our essay, for by enunciating the eschatological Kingdom of God as a tensive symbol and not a steno-symbol[82], Perrin is saying that the symbol points beyond itself while yet allowing its structure to preserve its dynamic identity[83].

F. The Main Features of the Eschatological

Our study of the New Testament meaning of the word "eschatological" reveals that a univocal interpretation of the term is not warranted. Here, we merely note the main features which have been uncovered in our consideration of the New Testament data.

1. It would be safe to say that one cannot treat of a christian eschatology which had no reference to the person of Jesus. It is Jesus who lets us know the eschatological expectation to come; it is he in whom we see eschatology being realized, and finally, it is in Jesus that God's eschatological saving act is discerned and then received existentially, in faith.

2. Because the eschatological presages a definitive phase it makes for a sense of urgency[83a]. This urgency obviously applies to the need for persons to allow God's Rule in their lives.

3. To allow God's rule in one's life supposes making a decision for God, in that the proclamation of the Kingdom of God in the parables and sayings, especially those of Kingdom, provokes a decision, demands ethical conduct, and encourages persons to embrace the future in hope.

4. Finally, since the Kingdom of God was what Jesus proclaimed, and the eschatological is comprehended only when it is related to Jesus, (refer 1), the term that is most suitable for 'eschatological' to qualify is 'Kingdom of God'.

The following section will reflect on the eschatological Kingdom of God, and will propose the conclusions of this chapter.

G. Reflection on the Echatological Kingdom of God

The New Testament allows us to see the radical nature of the christian proclamation and in the course of this chapter we have noted this radical proclamation under the terms 'Kingdom of God' and 'eschatological'. Juxtaposed, both these terms bring home to us the ultimacy of the Christ event as seen by the apostolic community, in that a person finds his total realization/salvation in the Christ event by accepting the Kingdom of God with its eschatological thrust. It is this acceptance of the Kingdom of God with its eschatological thrust that will be the subject of our reflection, and we shall do this by way of two observations.

1. The Eschatological Kingdom of God denotes a critical moment in person's life

While a person possesses the freedom to accept or refuse salvation proceeding from God in Jesus Christ, he lacks the ability to offer himself an alternate salvation[84]. In terms of a person's transcendental nature, the only possibility of self-realization or salvation lies in the response of the person to such an offer of salvation[85]. The uniqueness of this offer as also its possibility of saving combine to produce a "critical moment"[86] in a person's life vis-à-vis the Christ event[87]. Such an offer is also definitive in that a person has the potential for receiving God's initiative and being transformed by it in his own history. By implication, the serious possibility of refusal must exist[88].

Because of the definitive nature of this saving possibility in the

life of a person, as well as the far-reaching consequences of the decision of the person in question, we may legitimately characterize the "critical moment" as pertaining to the eschatological Kingdom of God.

2. The critical moment pertaining to the Eschatological Kingdom of God is concrete

In responding to the offer proceeding from the Christ event, it is not so much a part of a person or of a faculty by itself that is affected by the Christ event. It is the total person that is affected. And it is in terms of the total person's being affected in that critical moment that the decision made by him has to be concrete. Being concrete means that the decision is made in "space and time", in a communitarian context, is observable[89]. If the person's decision for the Christ event is not to be solipsistic in its verification, there must be an externality possessed by that person which faithfully registers the total integration of the person in the Christ event. This register is meaningless in an apocalyptic context where apocalyptic is opposed to the historical (Thoroughgoing eschatology). The same applies to the existentialist understanding in that there is no dynamic from the self-understanding to the decision (Existential eschatology). In the area of Realized eschatology this can be possible if there is a fixed tradition in terms of which the register can be described and posited. What is implied is a forum in which the eschatological decision of the person is discoverable, and once discovered, recognized.

Having made these two observations, we address ourselves to a question: if the eschatological context denotes a critical moment in a person's life and this moment needs to be signified concretely, where,

we may ask, could we perceive the presence of the eschatological Kingdom of God? Or, where would a stable medium be found that would allow us to predicate about the eschatological Kingdom of God authentically? Such an element cannot be the cause for a stripping down of all eschatological initiatives proceeding from the Christ event into a single type. Such a stripping down would contradict what has already been ascertained about the eschatological Kingdom of God not being "a neutral, abstract or free-floating principle of action" (p. 22). Such a principle of action cannot mediate the Christ event which has to do with grace and engages a person in his individual experience. Besides, God's freedom would be set at naught. At the same time, however, this is a freedom that is realized in a definite way in the person of Jesus Christ, i.e. 'in space and time'.

The problem then arises: Is there a medium stable enough in terms of man's reality or total situation, that would allow the eschatological Kingdom of God to manifest itself in its true nature? Such a stable medium would prevent the eschatological's becoming a mere principle of action, e.g. existential self-understanding or a philosophy of life to be worked out by the person alone, e.g. a fideistic or traditionalist context[90]. Yet such a stable element must not limit the types of initiative of the Christ event through which the eschatological Kingdom of God reaches out to man and challenges him in his situation. It must preserve the freedom inherent in the Christ event. In this way the eschatological Kingdom of God present in the Christ event will be able to proclaim the Lordship of Christ in man's history. At this point of the essay, it must be conceded that this is a question that must be acknowledged.

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III. Conclusions

1. It is possible to consider the eschatological Kingdom of God as symbolic in the tensive sense, as N. Perrin has done, since such an understanding admits of a constant and a variable element. It must be noted that both these elements are discernible in the tradition of a people. Outside of such a tradition there is no guarantee that the symbol would remain consistent[91]. The eschatological thrust plays a crucial role in preserving the symbol.

2. Because of what we have noted in our reflection (confer pp. 24-26) it is not possible to opt for a mere private manifestation of the eschatological Kingdom of God which would "strait-jacket" the Christ event. A parametrical notion[92] of the eschatological Kingdom of God would allow us to preserve its dynamic identity. Such a notion would satisfy theological scrutiny and yet make it possible for us to predicate it correctly in different situations.

Chapter Two will elaborate on the stable element or medium that would best allow the eschatological Kingdom of God to realize itself.

FOOTNOTES

[1] W. Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, translated by Lewis L. Wilkens and Duane A. Priebe, The Westminster Press, 1968, p. 192: "In Jesus himself the ultimate destiny of man for God, man's destiny to be raised from the dead to a new life, had been fulfilled."

S. Ogden, The Reality of God, p. 203: "The real meaning of the exclusiveness of Jesus Christ's lordship is not that divine lordship is exercised solely in that particular life, but rather that wherever such lordship is exercised -- and that, naturally, is everywhere: 'through whom are all things' -- it can take no other form than the same promise and demand re-presented for us in Jesus."

[2] G. Kittel (editor), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. II, p. 697.

[3] K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, translated by Richard Strachan, 1965, "Eschatology", p. 149: "It is not an anticipatory reporting of events that are to happen 'later' but the prospective view -- necessary for man with his spiritual freedom of decision -- from his present situation in saving history, governed by the event of Christ, to the final fulfillment of this his own existential situation, which is already eschatologically determined."

Here, we merely wish to stress the finality of the eschatological which may or may not be restricted to a temporal series as such.

[4] R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, translated by Kendrick Grobel, Vol. I, Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1951, p. 189, "...of decisive importance in this connection is the fact that Paul's theology proper, with its theological, anthropological, and soteriological ideas, is not at all a recapitulation of Jesus' own preaching nor a further development of it, and it is especially significant that he never adduces any of the savings of Jesus' on the Torah in favor of his own teaching about the Torah. The concept, Reign of God, which was basic for the message preached by Jesus has lost its dominant position in Paul and occurs only at Rom. 14:17; I Cor. 4:20; 6:9f.; 15:50; Gal. 5:21... neither does Paul's description of the essence of salvation as 'the righteousness of God' have a parallel in Jesus' preaching."

For Rudolf Bultmann, Paul was converted through the kerygma alone, and this meant that "he was willing to acknowledge in the cross of Christ God's judgment upon his self-understanding up to that time". (Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, p. 187)

[5] Ephesians, I, 9.

6 J. A. Fitzmeyer, "Pauline Theology", (79:33-34), Jerome Biblical Commentary, p. 807: "...in presenting the gospel as 'mystery', Paul implies that it is never fully made known to men by the ordinary means of communication. As something revealed, it is apprehended only by faith; and even when revealed, the opacity of divine wisdom in it is never completely dispelled for men. Mysterion is an eschatological notion derived from Jewish apocalyptic sources, and its application to the gospel gives the latter a nuance that euaggelion alone would not have -- for it is something that is fully comprehended only in the eschaton.

As used by Paul, especially in Col and Eph, mysterion begins with (these) presuppositions of Jewish apocalyptic literature, but creation, history of the world, and the eschaton are now all involved in the great 'mystery of Christ', which brings salvation to all men."

7 J. C. Brauer, "Kingdom of God", A Handbook of Christian Theology, A Meridian Book, N. Y., 1974, p. 197: "The Kingdom of God is one of the most fruitful yet controversial concepts in Christian theology. It is clear in the New Testament that the concept signifies the kingly rule, the sovereignty, or the rule of God. Its basic intention is to affirm the fact that God reigns in all aspects of personal and social life. ...the New Testament asserted that in a new and peculiar way the kingdom of God had already come."

8 e.g. communities that are considered non-christian, because their members have not been baptized by water.

9 R. Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom, translated by John Murray, Herder KG, 1963, p. 354: "In general it is preferable to refer to the 'reign' or 'rule' of God rather than the 'kingdom of God'. The translation 'kingdom of God' is required only for certain metaphorical expressions: for instance, 'to enter into the kingdom of God', 'to sit at table in the kingdom of God'. But there is a theological basis for speaking of the perfect cosmic basileia as the 'kingdom of God'..."

In the New Testament we have the Earthly Basileia (LK 10/12, 15; Mt 4/8), the Basileia of Christ (Mt 13/41; Lk 1/33) and the Basileia of the Father (Mt 6/10; Lk 12/32). Refer G. Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. I, pp. 580-582.

10 R. Schnackenburg, God's Rule and kingdom, p. 354: "We should on no account call basileia in its present form 'kingdom of God' because in English this suggests something objectively completed and realized."

[11] N. Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1976, p. 55: "The Kingdom of God is the power of God expressed in deeds; it is that which God does wherein it becomes evident that he is king. It is not a place or community ruled by God; it is not even the abstract idea of reign or kingship of God. It is quite concretely the activity of God as king."

While access to the Kingdom, e.g. the invitation to it and the response that is called for, is etched out in concrete, human terms, the Kingdom itself is never identified with that image, without qualification.

[12] In this section, we shall be following Norman Perrin's ideas as expressed in Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom (1976).

[13] R. Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom, p. 13: "These texts (Exodus 15/11-13, 18; Numbers 23/21ff; Isaiah 63/3-29; Jeremiah 2/5ff; Micah 6/4) show us that Israel experienced Yahweh's kingship in the historical action of its God. This is no 'kingdom' and no 'sphere of dominion' but a kingly leadership and reign which develops from Yahweh's absolute power and shows itself in the guidance of Israel."

[14] G. Von Rad, 'Melek and Malkûth in the O.T.', from G. Kittel's Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament, pp. 4-14, "I. Kingship of People and City...The King...must of course, in Israel be pre-eminently the object of the gracious promises of Yahweh...the king remains human: the O.T. knows nothing of any deification of the King, such as was the kernel of the court-styles of Babylon and Egypt. 2. The Redeemer King. ...It is not David who will build a house for Yahweh -- Yahweh will build David a house, and the latter's kingship is to last for ever...Here was the great promise...if the present situation did not correspond, then it was carried forward into the future. 3. Yahweh as King... the concept of Yahweh's kingship gets drawn into the stream of eschatology, towards which it had always shown a propensity: it is hoped that Yahweh will show Himself as King hereafter. 4. Malkûth. Its initial meaning is kingship; its use in the sense of royal sovereignty, in relation to the concrete sphere of power, is a simple inflection from the root meaning...political kingship."

[15] N. Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, The Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1976, pp. 18f.

[16] ibid. p. 17.
W. Pannenberg observed that Yahweh as such is not experienced by Israel except in history.

W. Pannenberg (editor), Revelation as History, translated by David Granskon, The Macmillan Company, N. Y., 1968, p. 8: "...the self-revelation of God must somehow be confirmed on the basis of the biblical witnesses if it is to be theologically justifiable. ...The Greek terms rendered by 'to reveal' do not in any passage of the New Testament have God as an unqualified object. God continually reveals 'something' or 'someone', never precisely 'himself'. Such a formulation is to be found for the first time in Ignatius (magn 8.2). An investigation of the Hebrew terms that are rendered 'to reveal' does not result in anything essentially different."

17 Op. Cit., p. 19: "The conception of a Salvation History, and the practice of its confessional recitation at a festival at one or more of the amphictyonic sanctuaries antedates...the myth of God as king and its celebration in the temple at Jerusalem... What is important is that Israel inherited two traditions which concerned themselves in a very special way with the activity of God. One, the ancient Near Eastern myth, celebrated the activity of God in the act of creation, and in the annual renewal of the world; the other celebrated the activity of God at crucial moments in the history of his people."

18 G. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, translated by D. M. G. Stalker, 1962, Vol. I, Harper and Row, N. Y., p. 121. Also, p. 122: refer confessional formula taken from Deuteronomy 26/5-9.

19 B. M. Metzger, Lexical Aids for Students of New Testament Greek, Theological Book Agency, Princeton, 1969, p. 10.

20 N. Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, p. 54: "The central aspect of the teaching of Jesus was that concerning the Kingdom of God... Jesus appeared as one who proclaimed the Kingdom; all else in his message and ministry serves a function in relation to that proclamation and derives its meaning from it. The challenge to discipleship, the ethical teaching, the disputes about oral tradition or ceremonial law, even the pronouncement of forgiveness of sins and welcoming of the outcast in the name of God -- all these are to be understood in context of the Kingdom proclamation... Jesus is the Proclaimer of the Kingdom of God."

21 N. Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1963, pp. 61-62.

22 N. Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, p. 96. "Jülicher saw the parables of Jesus as essentially instructional in nature; what did they give instruction about? The answer to that question is obvious: Jesus' understanding of the Kingdom of God. The parables tell us how Jesus thought of the Kingdom of God, 'wie Christus das Reich Gottes sich gedacht hat'. Given this understanding of the Kingdom of God, and..., the understanding of the parables as vivid and simple pictures designed to illuminate the Kingdom as matter then it follows...that the parables will offer

their hearers general moral and spiritual instruction. And, so they do, through all the six hundred pages of the second volume of Jülicher's work."

[23] J. Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, (revised edition, 1963), translated by S. H. Hooke, Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., p. 9, (foreword) "my own contribution is the attempt to arrive at the earliest attainable form of Jesus' parabolic teaching. Only the Son of Man and his word can invest our message with full authority."

[24] N. Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, p. 53. The proverbial sayings (pp. 48-51), the most radical sayings (pp. 51-52), the eschatological reversal sayings (p. 52), and the conflict sayings (pp. 52-53) "all are forms of proclamation: they are designed to jolt the hearer out of an effort to make a continuous whole out of existence in the world and into a judgement upon that existence; they are forms of Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God."

[25] Op. Cit., p. 43.

[26] ibid., p. 43-45.

[27] ibid., p. 46.

[28] R. Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom, pp. 104-5: "The Sermon on the Mount develops and illustrates the radical moral demands that God's kingly rule makes on men and sums them up with the simplicity of genius in the great commandment of love of God and neighbour. We...merely remark how it illuminates the ethical character of God's reign and the demands it makes here and now."

[29] ibid., pp. 112-113: "In this ethical teaching Jesus is distinguished from the Pharisee experts on many points. He could not adopt their way of speaking of 'taking on oneself the rule (kingdom) of God', in spite of the lofty meaning they attached to it. It was too closely linked with the yoke of their commandments and human prescriptions. For him the reign of God was revealing its presence differently, as grace and salvation. But he emphasized as they did, and not less seriously and consistently, the demands that God's eschatological kingdom makes on mankind."

[30] W. G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulfillment, translated by Dorothea M. Barton, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 154-155: "It is by what Jesus teaches and does, by his loving desire to help as well as by his message of divine forgiveness and purpose, above all by his going to the cross and his certainty of the resurrection, that the meaning of the words 'Kingdom of God is at hand' can be understood (cf Matt. 11.4ff; 12.28; 13.16f; Mark 2.5ff; Luke 17.25; I Cor. 11.25). Only by the whole of Jesus message about God taken together, and by the interpretation of the meaning he attached to his person can the intrinsic meaning of his eschatological message be fully

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understood. ...its meaning...lies just in this, that in Jesus the Kingdom of God came into being and in him it will be consummated."

31 Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, pp. 194-195: "The Kingdom sayings challenge Jesus' hearers to recognize the Kingdom of God as a reality in the exorcisms, to recognize that the ancient myth of the activity of God as king can now be realized in their experience in various ways and to recognize that the fate of the Baptist, and the potential fate of Jesus and his followers, are to be understood as a manifestation of the reality of God acting as king."

32 We readily agree that our examination of the 'notes' of the Kingdom of God as proclaimed in the New Testament -- mainly by Jesus, is far from exhaustive. This is not a study of the biblical derivatives which are to be found in the notion: Kingdom of God. What we hoped to show was that the notion of the Kingdom of God is complex. Further, even though we find references to the Kingdom in the message of Jesus, these references do not add up to a completed and fully filled out description of the Kingdom. The fact that the Kingdom engages a person in his experience is perhaps the reason why it is difficult to ascribe a concrete, once-for-all form to the Kingdom.

It is our hope that when we have spelled out the eschatological significance of the Kingdom of God, the contours of the Kingdom will be more pronounced and therefore more discernible.

33 G. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. II, translated by D. M. G. Stalker, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1965, p. 358: "This saving history has its beginning in Israel; it is characterized by the revelation that God is at work in acts of election and in the making of covenants which long precede any action of man's will. This self-revelation of God thus 'comes about in history', and it does so in the form of words and acts of God which are accordingly pinpointed in the history of each case as events of a special kind."

ibid., p. 368: "There never was such a thing as a 'religion of the people of Israel', i.e. an integrated abstract complex of all her ideas about the relationship between God and man, beginning with creation, taking in sin and redemption, and ending with eschatology... When the Old Testament is allowed to speak for itself, in the end it always confronts us with an event, an act of God either past or future."

34 Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, p. 24: "...what is important is the impact of these historical events upon the use of the symbol Kingdom of God with its evocation of the myth of God active as king on behalf of his people in the world. ...what happened was that prophets arose who interpreted these events in such a way that the myth maintained its force. The catastrophes were the judgment of God upon his people and their kings for not remaining true to him; the temporary reprieves were signs that God was still active on behalf of his people. Above all the prophets used the ancient symbolism to express the hope for a new act of God as king on behalf

of his people, an act whereby he would deliver them from their new captivity to Assyria or Babylon as once he had delivered them from Egypt (Is 33/22; 52/7-11)."

35 R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, p. 4: "The dominant concept of Jesus' message is the Reign of God. Jesus proclaims its immediately impending irruption, now already making itself felt. Reign of God is an eschatological concept. It means the regime of God which will destroy the present course of the world, wipe out all the contra-divine, Satanic power under which the present world groans -- and thereby, terminating all pain and sorrow, bring in salvation for the People of God which awaits the fulfillment of the prophets' promises."

36 By 'functional dynamic' we mean the particular title through which the eschatological Kingdom of God is meaningful. By the end of this section we hope to invest this title with more particularity so that the functional dynamic will be more specific.

37 We add this footnote in the hope that when the New Testament notion of eschatology is sketched, this notion will be seen as not unknown in the Old Testament.

G. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. II, p. 116: "...within the horizons of eschatology as elsewhere, Israel's ideas about saving history must be given back their proper place and their due weight. It is impossible to understand the eschatological message of the prophets in the light of any kind of mythological or specifically cultic complexes of ideas, or in that of disappointed hopes. It can only be understood from the point of view of the distinctive character of Israel's thought about history..."

S. Mowinckel, He That Cometh, translated by G. W. Anderson, 1954, p. 153: "The essential content and theme of the future hope of eschatology is the faith which grew out of history and was corroborated by history, faith in a living God who has a purpose and a goal in all that happens...Israel's unique conception of God as the God of history is the root of eschatology."

38 G. Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. II, εσχάτου, p. 697.

39 G. Bornkamm understands the eschatological nature of the Kingdom of God as follows: "...in Jesus' preaching, speaking of the present means speaking of the future, and vice versa. The future of God is salvation to the man who apprehends the future as God's present, and as the hour of salvation. The future of God is judgment for the man who does not accept the 'now' of God but clings to his own present, his own past, and also to his own dreams of the future... God's future is God's call to the present, and the present is the time of decision in the light of God's future." (Jesus of Nazareth, translated by Irene and Fraser McLuskey with James M. Robinson, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1960, p. 93).

W. G. Kümmel sees Jesus proclaiming the Kingdom of God "in order to make it clear to men that they are living now in the last days... The message of the imminent coming of the Kingdom of God is therefore intended to confront men with the end of history as it advances towards the goal set by God." (Promise and Fulfillment, p. 152).

G. Von Rad, Old Testament Tehology, Vol. II, p. 114: "The proper definition of 'eschatological' is still anything but settled even today."

40 G. C. Berkouwer, The Return of Christ, translated by Lewis B. Smedes, Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1972, p. 9: "Eschatology deals with God's final definitive acts towards his creation, the last days, the promise of the future, and the expectation and hope occasioned by this promise. It does not deal with unrelated, independent events that are yet to take place; instead, it focuses on the concentration of all these events in the promise of him who is the last."

41 R. Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, p. 42: "...the apostolic preaching which originated in the event of Easter is itself a part of the eschatological event of redemption. The death of Christ, which is both the judgment and the salvation of the world, inaugurates the 'ministry of reconcilation' or 'word of reconciliation' (2 Cor 5.18f). This word supplements the cross and makes its saving efficacy intelligible by demanding faith and confronting men with the question whether they are willing to understand themselves as men who are crucified and risen with Christ." (H. W. Bartsch (editor), Kerygma and Myth).

C. E. Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics, Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis, 1974, p. 10: "The eschatological future, which Bultmann acknowledges with Schweitzer as inherent in the message of Jesus, becomes only a decisional possibility in every existential moment."

42 K. Rahner, TI, 1966, Vol. IV, 13. "The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions", p. 337: "...we may say that biblical eschatology must always be read as an assertion based on the revealed present and pointing towards the genuine future, but not as an assertion pointing back from an anticipated future into the present. To extrapolate from the present into the future is eschatology, to interpolate from the future into the present is apocalyptic."

For Bultmann, the faith event leaves the present untouched. Confer footnote 68.

43 O. Cullman, Christ and Time, translated by Floyd V. Filson, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1950, pp. 28-29: "We here seek to show by pure historical study that the specifically 'Christian kernel', as we derive it from all the Primitive Christian sources, really stands or falls with redemptive history."

ibid., p. 209: "Fundamentally, therefore, nothing exists that stands outside of the redemptive history of Christ. There is in the New Testament no dualism between a realm where God is Lord and a realm in which Christ is Lord. The pagan state does not know that it belongs to the Kingdom of Christ."

44 O. Cullmann, Salvation in History, SCM Press Ltd., Great Britain, 1967, p. 27: "The new Testament proclamation does in fact demand a decision, but it does so because it places our existence in a situation belonging inseparably to a divine salvation history which is in the first instance independent of us."

It may be said that Cullmann concerns himself more with the context in which salvation occurs than with the personal appropriation of that salvation.

45 O. Cullmann, Salvation in History, p. 172: "The new element in the New Testament is not eschatology, but what I call the tension between the decisive 'already fulfilled' and the 'not yet completed', between present and future. The whole theology of the New Testament, including Jesus' preaching, is qualified by this tension."

46 J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, translated by James W. Leitch, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1967, p. 85: "Promise announces the coming of a not yet existing reality from the future of the truth...it does not merely anticipate and clarify the realm of coming history and the realistic possibilities it contains... It does not illuminate a future which is always somehow already inherent in reality. Rather 'future' is that reality which fulfills and satisfies the promise because it completely corresponds to it and accords with it."

47 ibid., p. 16: "...eschatology means the doctrine of the Christian hope, which embraces both the object hoped for and also the hope inspired by it. From first to last,... Christianity is eschatology, is hope. The eschatological is not one element of Christianity, but it is the medium of Christian faith as such..."

48 ibid., p. 102: "It is from promise that there arises that element of unrest which allows of no coming to terms with a present that is unfulfilled.

49 ibid., p. 79: "...the basic Old Testament insight that 'history is that which happens between promise and fulfillment' -- the insight from which Pannenberg and Rendtorff set out -- is ultimately abandoned in favour of an eschatology which is expressed in terms of universal history and which proves itself by reference to 'reality as a whole' in an effort to improve on Greek cosmic theology."

50 H. Denzinger (DS), p. 922, where the phrase Deus Retribuens et Consummans is the heading under which all that pertains to eschatological reality is grouped.

[51] DS 3171: "Similiter intelligi debet, Ecclesiam societatem esse, non minus quam ipsam civitatem, genere et iure perfectam..."

[52] A. Dulles, "The Church as Eschatological Community", pp. 69-70: " A fully realized eschatology would best harmonize with the doctrine that the Church as we experience it is already the eschatological community. An exclusively futurist eschatology, on the other hand, would imply that the Church as we know it cannot be eschatological except as it preaches and looks forward to the coming consummation. If, finally, the eschaton is already partly realized, the Church may best be conceived as the place where the provisional divine irruption into human history is confessed and celebrated, and where men strive to subject themselves more perfectly to God's lordship in Jesus Christ." (J. Papin (editor), The Eschaton: A Community of Love, Abbey Press, Saint Meinrad, 1971).

[53] H. Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament, translated by John Bowden, SCM Press Ltd., N. Y., 1969, p. 310: "If the passage of time is itself a factor in the development of eschatology, there cannot be a uniform New Testament, or even Christian, eschatology. It is therefore senseless to play off the various eschatological sketches against each other, e.g. Paul against Luke. Their solutions are not arbitrary, but each belongs to its period. They must be understood in their context within the history of the church and of theology, as sketches of the horizon against which the church saw itself at a particular time and which constantly shifted both in time and in history."

[54] W. G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulfillment, p. 141: "It is...completely certain that Jesus' eschatological message cannot be regarded simply as a particular form of Jewish apocalyptic, and also that it does not detach itself completely from the expectations for the future of the contemporary Jewish eschatology by reason of its interpretation concerned only with the present."

[55] ibid., pp. 153-154: "...Jesus linked the present in a quite peculiar way to the future by speaking of his return as judge and by making the attitude of men to the earthly Jesus the criterion for the verdict of Jesus, the eschatological judge. This in itself turns Jesus' presence into a real eschatological present. Jesus gives its full meaning to this eschatological character of the present primarily through the numerous statements in which he declares the coming Kingdom of God to be realizing itself already in his person, his actions, his message. Jesus can proclaim the approaching Kingdom of God with unique authority and can send out a summons for decision concerning this βασιλεια."

[56] Confer p. 15, footnote 36.

[57] H. Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament, p. 308: "The interpretation of eschatology has led to the following positions in scholarship.

1. Thoroughgoing eschatology: the whole development is determined by the failure of the parousia to materialize. As a result, the church was forced to establish itself in the world by reflection and organization.

2. Realized eschatology (C. H. Dodd): futuristic eschatology is a secondary stage.

3. The outlines of a salvation-historical interpretation of the New Testament (O. Cullmann and others)".

We call attention to the fact that we have substituted 'Existential eschatology' for no. 3.

58 A. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, translated by W. Montgomery, London, p. 369: "Jesus' purpose is to set in motion the eschatological development of history...to introduce the supra-mundane phase of the eschatological drama."

ibid., p. 397: "Jesus means something to our world because a mighty force streams forth from Him and flows through our time also. This fact can neither be shaken nor confirmed by any historical discovery. It is the solid foundation of Christianity. The mistake was to suppose that Jesus could come to mean more to our time by entering it as a man like ourselves."

59 N. Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus, p. 30: "...the ethical teaching is concerned only to show what is involved in true repentence, and is valid only for the short time that will remain between the proclamation of the coming of the Kingdom with the consequent call for repentance, and the actual coming of the Kingdom. It is, in Schweitzer's phrase, an Interimsethik."

60 Even in The Son of Man in the Synoptic Tradition, translated by Dorothea M. Barton, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1965, where H. E. Tödt indicates that "the old task of expounding the relationship between Jesus' gospel and the gospel of Jesus is thus set anew, as is the task of investigating how the different post-Easter Christologies which appear side by side in different thought-worlds are correlated" (p. 296), he allows that "the post-Easter faith realized that Jesus was vindicated by God himself, who had invalidated all contradiction by men...Jesus was now recognized as possessing full authority." (p. 293)

61 Confer C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom, Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961.

62 Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, translated by S. H. Hooke from the 6th german edition, 1962. Revised edition. Copyright 1963 SCM Press Ltd. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Printed in the U.S.A. p. 230: "In attempting to recover the original significance of the parables, one thing above all becomes evident: it is that all the parables of Jesus compel his hearers to come to a decision about his person and mission. For they are all full of 'the secret of the Kingdom of God' (Mark 4.11), that is to say, the recognition of 'an eschatology that is in process of realization'."

[62a] Confer our comment to the quotation from Cullmann's Salvation in History, footnote 44.

[63] J. Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit, translated by Margaret Kohl, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1977, J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb,(gen. editors), New Frontiers in Theology, Vol. III. Theology as History, edited by W. Pannenberg. Harper and Row, N. Y., 1967.

[64] W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, translated by George H. Kehm, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1972, Vol. II, "The God of Hope", pp. 234-249. Here Pannenberg discusses Ernst Bloch's Das Prinzip Höffnung (1959).

[65] According to Conzelmann's classification of eschatologies, Bultmann and his adherents with their understanding of the 'faith event' should be classified with the 'thoroughgoing eschatologists'. However, existentialism along with the theology of the New Hermeneutic forbid such classification. Our reasoning is as follows: we observed that the 'faith event' of Bultmann is a-temporal (p. 16) so that it could occur in the 'now'. What Bultmann refuses to concede is any historical precedent that makes the 'now' capable of rational scrutiny. By this fact he refuses to align himself with an understanding of eschatology that will occur in the future, i.e. in time to come.

The theologians of the New Hermeneutic essentially belong to the Bultmann school. They, however, emphasize the linguistic mode of expression so that they, in effect, supply a context in which the 'faith event' occurs (placing a football before a player to find out whether or not he plays football) and this indicates a similarity with the context that historical theology supplies. Here, admittedly, the emphasis is on the existential act of decision, the faith event.

For the above mentioned reasons, we feel justified in classifying eschatology in the three groups, as we have done.

[66] R. Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", p. 28: "...Heidegger can summon us to the resolve to exist as selves in the face of death because he opens our eyes to our situation as one of 'thrownness' (Geworfenheit) into Nothing." (Kerygma and Myth)

For Bultmann, however, "...as a result of his self-assertion man is a totally fallen being. He is capable of knowing that his authentic life consists in self-commitment, but is incapable of realizing it because however hard he tries he still remains what he is, self-assertive man. So in practice authentic life becomes possible only when man is delivered from himself. It is the claim of the New Testament that this is exactly what has happened. This is precisely the meaning of that which has happened in Christ. At the very point where man can do nothing, God steps in and acts -- indeed he has acted already -- on man's behalf." (ibid. p. 31)

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[67] M. Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1962, p. 425: "...it seems that by casting light upon temporality as the primordial condition for the possibility of care, we have reached the primordial Interpretation of Dasein which we require. We have exhibited temporality with a view to Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole... Our analysis of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has revealed that in care is rooted an equiprimordial connectedness of death, guilt, and conscience."

[68] R. Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", p. 44: "It is precisely its immunity from proof which secures the Christian proclamation against the charge of being mythological. The transcendence of God is not as in myth reduced to immanence." (Kerygma and Myth)

[69] E. Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", pp. 138-139: "...I can really understand a person only when I know where he must carry on his life so as to live. Even his inclinations reflect this structure. If I want to know whether someone is a football player, I have only to bring a football near him. Then I can tell at once whether he is a football player or not. This is existence. Man always has something outside himself and always lives 'with' something that so determines him that his life cannot be fully grasped without this something (e.g. the football). And in this sense faith lives with God and from God. Without God one does not understand a believer. One must understand what he finds in God, why he holds to God. Then one understands the believer and his faith. Neither conscience nor self-examination suffices to understand one who is a believer in the New Testament sense. One must know what this believer finds in God. And it is of this that the New Testament provides information." (J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, (New Frontiers in Theology, Vol. II, The New Hermeneutic.)

[70] Robert Funk sums up Eberhard Jungel's view on the significance of the New Hermeneutic as follows: "...the parable 'collects' Jesus, his relation to God, his eschatology, his ethic, and the hearer into a language event which is the kingdom; the kingdom comes to speech in the parable as parable. The kingdom comes to speech as parable because it is in this way that nearness of the kingdom of God's future can be brought into relation to man's present without the loss of the distinction, yet in parable the former can qualify the latter." (Robert Funk, Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1966, p. 129)

G. Ebeling, The Nature of Faith, translated by Ronald G. Smith, The Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1961, p. 87: "The phrase 'communication of faith' therefore does not mean mere communication about faith, instruction about the intellectual contents of faith, but it is intended to express the communication of faith as an event in the event of speech."

[71] Man's decision is possible on the basis of the hermeneutical principle of the word event, that is, 'man as conscience' (The New Hermeneutic, "Word of God and Hermeneutic" by G. Ebeling, Harper and Row, N. Y., 1964, p. 110). ibid., p. 103: "Word is, taken seriously, happening word. It is not enough to inquire into its intrinsic meaning, but that must be joined up with the question of its future, of what it effects. For ultimately the questions as to the content and the power of words are identical. Word is therefore rightly understood only when it is viewed as an event which -- like love -- involves at least two. The basic structure of word is therefore not statement -- that is an abstract variety of the word event -- but appraisal, certainly not in the colorless sense of information, but in the pregnant sense of participation and communication."

G. Ebeling, Word and Faith, translated by James W. Leitch, The Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1963, p. 411: "What is said of the world and God has to authenticate itself by showing that it is aimed at the conscience and therefore brings man to expression in his human nature."

[72] G. Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", p. 109: "...the sermon... is itself proclamation in the present -- and that means, then, that the sermon is EXECUTION of the text... It is proclamation of what the text has proclaimed." (The New Hermeneutic)

[73] J. A. T. Robinson, The Human Face of God, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1973, p. 84, n 80: "Schweitzer's interpretation... depends on Matthew's attachment of it to a portion of the Markan apocalypse which he has transferred to the mission of the Twelve- 'an entirely arbitrary combination of the sources'."

[74] N. Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus, 1963, pp. 32-34, including Adolf Jülicher's comment on the theory of Schweitzer (p. 33).

[75] W. G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulfillment, p. 142: "(Mark 8.38; Matt 19.28; Luke 12.32)...Jesus connects the present, being by its very nature an eschatologically fulfilled present, with the expected future, because the encounter with the man Jesus in the present demands a decision which will be the determining factor for the eschatological verdict of Jesus when he comes as Son of Man."

[76] V. A. Harvey, in The Historian and the Believer, The Macmillan Press, N. Y., 1969, reviews the attempts to trace history in terms of Hard Perspectivism and Soft Perspectivism (pp. 209, 231) and points out what perspectives include: (p. 241) "Perspectives are field-encompassing. They contain factual judgments, value-judgments, estimates of importance, metaphysical beliefs, assumptions about human nature, as well as procedural rules."

W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, translated by George H. Kehm, The Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1970, Vol. I, p. 90: "The Historical process -- and this means the one course of events with which historiographical inquiry has also to do -- is essentially a process of the transmission of tradition." (Kerygma and History)

We believe that Pannenberg will be hard put to, to explain what the content of 'tradition' is and the context in which it is transmitted.

77 P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 Vols., The University of Chicago Press, 1967. Also, New Being: A Study on the Relationships between conditioned and unconditioned being according to Paul Tillich by Kenan Osborne (1969, Netherlands).

78 N. Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, p. 29: "Philip Wheelwright's definition of a symbol: 'A symbol, in general, is a relatively stable and repeatable element of perceptual experience, standing for some larger meaning or set of meanings which cannot be given, or not fully given, in perceptual experience itself."

P. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, translated by Emerson Buchanan, 1969, pp. 14-18. P. 15: "...symbolic signs are opaque, because the first, literal, obvious meaning itself points analogically to a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in it... This opacity constitutes the depth of the symbol, which, it will be said, is inexhaustible."

We do not plan an extensive treatment of the symbol as such; we shall indicate the scope of its meaning in our essay, as it occurs.

79 N. Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, p. 32: "In the first place, 'Kingdom of God' is a symbol with deep roots in the Jewish consciousness of themselves as the people of God. Then, secondly, it functions within the context of the myth of God active in history on behalf of his people; indeed by the time of Jesus it had come to represent particularly the expectation of a final, eschatological act of God on behalf of his people. Thirdly, it could be understood and used either as a steno -- or as a tensive symbol, to use a modern but nonetheless appropriate distinction."

80 ibid., p. 30: "A symbol can have a one-to-one relationship to that which it represents, such as the mathematical symbol pi, in which case it is in Wheelwright's terms, a 'steno-symbol', or it can have a set of meanings that can neither be exhausted nor adequately expressed by any one referent, in which case it is a 'tensive symbol'."

81 ibid., pp. 58-59: "As Bultmann likes to put it: the Proclaimer became the Proclaimed. If we wished to use theological language then we could say that as Jesus proclaimed the Kingdom as eschatological event, so earliest Christianity proclaimed him as eschatological event. ...earliest Christianity used the symbol Son of Man to evoke the myth of apocalyptic redemption where Jesus had used the symbol Kingdom of God to evoke the myth of the activity of God."

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Perrin concurs with H. E. Tödt's conclusions in The Son of Man in the Synoptic Tradition.

82 ibid., p. 56: "...Jesus used Kingdom if God as a tensive symbol, and ...the literary forms and language he used were such as to mediate the reality evoked by that symbol."

83 ibid., p. 78: "...if Kingdom of God is a tensive symbol in the proclamation of Jesus then the mythology of Jesus has not been discredited by the subsequent course of history... A tensive symbol can never be regarded as referring only to one concrete event, as being exhausted by a failure in the case of one supposed referent."

83a Refer to page 18, C.

84 K. Rahner TI, 1966, Vol. V, 6. "Christianity and the non-christian religions", p. 124: "Christ and his salvation are not simply one of two possibilities offering themselves to man's free choice; they are the deed of God which bursts open and redeems the false choice of man by overtaking it."

85 We have in mind the efforts of K. Rahner to apply the transcendental method to thomistic philosophy as seen in his two works: Spirit in the World, translated by William Dych, 1968 and Hearers of the Word, translated by Michael Richards, 1969.

86 "critical moment": it may be understood as the options that a man exercises during the whole of his life which are decisive in terms of his ultimate destiny.

87 K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, "The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions", p. 334: "Eschatology is the view of the future which man needs for the spiritual decision of his freedom and his faith. It derives from the situation in the history of salvation brought about by the event of Christ, which is the aetiological source of knowledge. It looks forward to the definitive fulfillment of an existence already in an eschatological situation."

88 K. Rahner (editor), Encyclopedia of Theology, "Eschatology", p. 437: "The church eschatologically proclaims as a fact already realized in Jesus and the saints that saving history (in its totality) ends victoriously as the triumph of the grace of God. It only proclaims as a serious possibility that the freedom of each individual may operate to his eternal ruin." (K. Rahner)

89 K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, "The Word and the Eucharist", pp. 258-259: "...man is essentially and primordially a being in a community, even in the dimension of the individual salutary decision...

...this means that the proclamation of the word of God, that is, the word insofar as it is conveyed by the historical, external salvific act of God as an intrinsic moment of this act and by the community of believers, belongs necessarily to the inner moments of God's salvific action on man."

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[90] DS 2751-2756; 2811-2814.

[91] The assumption here is that it is a determinate group of persons who form a community and that if symbols are meaningful in that community, they can be so only if the community as a whole interprets their meaning. A symbol by definition cannot function for one person alone unless its valency is assured by the community consciousness. Confer, J. Skorupski's Symbol and Theory, 1976, pp. 48-51; G. Ebeling's Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, translated by R. A. Wilson, 1973, pp. 56-58.

[92] 'parametrical' = a variable constant.

CHAPTER THREE

The Kingdom of God as ecclesial

Introduction

In chapter two, we had addressed ourselves to the task of sketching out the significance of the term "eschatological Kingdom of God". We had examined the findings of reputable scholars in their probings that centred on the New Testament understanding of "Kingdom of God" and the "eschatological"[1]. The Kingdom of God, we had observed, was best understood as a symbol that was available to the people of Israel[2]. Also, the Kingdom of God was to be understood as a tensive symbol rather than a steno-symbol[3].

After examining some data of the New Testament concerning the use of the term "eschatological", we grouped the different ways in which the "eschatological" functioned[4]. While no single way was fully adequate in signifying the term "eschatological", we were able to conclude that an element of decision concerning Jesus Christ was presumed in each of the ways, as was a content of matter in terms of which the decision was made[5]. Besides, the matter presented for decision had to include a reference to the historical Jesus if that eschatological decision had to be considered as deriving from the Christ event, and therefore christian.

The conclusions of the second chapter were the following:

a) The Kingdom of God operated as a tensive symbol in scripture, and not as a static concept;

b) The proclamation of this Kingdom of God by Jesus Christ was eschatological;

c) Insofar as this Kingdom of God was eschatological, it could

> be considered as parametrical, that is as admitting of a constant element (the decision in terms of the historical Jesus), and a variable element (the content of matter, or the aspect under which the historical Jesus featured in that decision).

In chapter three, we shall address ourselves to a problem that is occasioned by the functioning of the symbolic in the eschatological Kingdom of God. The symbol is not constructed out of a reasoned effort[6]. The roots of the symbol are already present in a matrix of culture, customs and in the ways of living in a community[7]. Only if this is so can the symbol be articulated and function. The notion of the parametrical includes a variable and a constant element. The variable element can be meaningful if the constant element is also present[8]. Where, we ask ourselves, is this constant element to be discovered or discerned? We may attempt to formulate more precisely the question that was put forward at the end of chapter one. Where may one find a stable element that allows the symbolic aspect of the eschatological Kingdom of God to be articulated, and that allows the variable element in the notion of the parametrical concerning this eschatological Kingdom of God to be meaningful?

The stable element, we assert, is the church[9]. Further, it is in the church that the eschatological Kingdom of God is recognized as ecclesial. We shall be employing "the dogmatic method"[10] as understood by K. Rahner to validate this assertion, that is, we shall elucidate the truth of the assertion by making explicit what is implicit, and corroborating it from insights in the theology of Karl Rahner, and more importantly, of Vatican Council II. We shall then draw our conclusions[11].

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Chapter Three will include the following sections:

I. Church and Ecclesia.

II. The structures of the church according to Karl Rahner and Vatican Council II.

III. The church as sacrament of the eschatological Kingdom of God.

IV. Conclusions.

I. Church and Ecclesia

At the outset, we may remark that the New Testament uses the same word to signify ecclesia and church[12]. The context in which both these words occur determines their particular meanings[13]. We do not wish to apply the term 'church' to a local congregation as opposed to 'ecclesia' where this would mean the universal phenomenon.

In terms of theological reflection, the meaning of the term 'ecclesia' is difficult to determine[14]. Where ecclesia signifies the Kingdom of God in a community of persons, the meaning of ecclesia will be coloured by the different views that are associated with the term 'eschatological'. In the view of thoroughgoing eschatology, the ecclesia would refer to an ethical community that would be awaiting the parousia[15]. In the view of realized eschatology, ecclesia would refer to the community that derives from the Christ event but in such a way that this community would signify in its confession of faith, the proclamation of Jesus that is authentically realized in it[16]. In existential eschatology, the ecclesia would be very much like that expressed in realized eschatology, except for the following differences: though the community signifies its confession of faith in Jesus Christ, the community as such is a dispensable element in the

event of faith; secondly, the community is not a precedent in any material way for the event of faith[17].

We believe that any treatment of Ecclesia and Church should begin with the assumption that the one who treats of this subject should be a member of a church[18]. Any other beginning would have to establish a new context as a valid starting point. We also assume that in being part of a church, one is also part of the ecclesia[19]. The epithets used to describe ecclesia are limited in their scope, e.g. eucharistic community[20], fellowship[21], hierarchical[22], etc. None of these epithets describes the ecclesia exhaustively. However, if one begins to use these terms outside of a church context, the validity of such a use must be established purely on the basis of conceptual exactitude[23]. In such an eventuality, it is not at all clear why such a term should be normative for a community that professes to derive from the Christ event, unless the community already has experience of the term in its life[24].

We shall propose that because the church is sacramental, it is able to realize the ecclesia in its midst[25]. As we have already noted, the argumentation used will be dogmatic. By this we mean that the starting point of our demonstration is not an arbitrary premise from which one reasons to conclusions, but rather a church confession that can be shown to be true or plausible because its implications are consistent with one or another framework of reference.

Our understanding of ecclesia must be linked to the historically conditioned Christ event. The ecclesia is to be considered as the community of persons in whose midst the Christ event is present. We hope to show how this is possible in the remainder of this chapter. We

would then be able to say that the ecclesial element -- and this is not to be understood as a conceptual notion -- is present in the church. In terms of our dogmatic method, our immediate task is to show how the ecclesial structures, or elements, are present in the church.

II. The structures of the church according to Karl Rahner, and Vatican Council II.

In the previous part entitled Church and Ecclesia, we had sketched out some of the views that devolved on these two terms, and the attendant problems that they created. We then suggested that it was not by viewing these terms from a 'non-church' stand that the ecclesial was to be experienced. It was in being a member of a church that one would be able to recognize the ecclesial element in the church. In effect, an essential unity is presumed before the difference -- real or imagined -- between church and ecclesia can be recognized. Besides, as we shall point out, the sacramental approach makes the distinction between ecclesia and church less than pivotal[26].

We pointed out that our elucidation of sacramental understanding of the church would be by way of the dogmatic method. In this present section, we hope to show how the dogmatic method has been used in terms of the church, by two authorities: Karl Rahner and Vatican Council II[27].

In these authorities, we find not 'models' of the church, but "structures"[28]. A model seeks to furnish a completed shape or form on the basis of which a new object is to be built. But all that is to be in the new object is predictable in terms of the model. In effect, the model is the object proleptically[29]. A structure, however, is an essential feature in virtue of which the object can be built. Two

notes qualify the structure: first, it is not discernible by itself but is to be recognized only when it is articulated in the object; second, while it indicates the manner in which a possible object is to be built, it does not allow us to predict exhaustively what the completed object is going to be like.

The two authorities do not paint a complete picture of the church, but call our attention to the radical structures that underlie it, so that any future envisaging of the shape of the church would have to incorporate the structures indicated by them[30].

A. The church in the theology of Karl Rahner

Since Karl Rahner's theology of the church is intimately connected with his metaphysical presuppositions, we shall briefly review these. Then we shall detail Rahner's theology of the church, and finally sum up his position with reference to its structural importance for the church.

1. The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Karl Rahner

In Spirit in the World[31] and Hearers of the Word[32], Rahner attempts to demonstrate that the thomistic system offers a construct, in virtue of which a metaphysical anthropology may be sketched which would harmonize with the christian revelation. Rahner wishes to keep clear of two contrary views: the one in which revelation is continuous in terms of man's nature[33], the other in which it is totally discontinuous[34]. By applying the transcendental method[35] to thomistic metaphysics Rahner feels that he avoids both views, in particular the views of the idealists[36]. Rahner's starting point is the sensitive-rational act. By way of a demonstration, not a strict proof, Rahner calls attention to the different elements present in the act of affirmation[37].

The "conversion to the phantasm" is a pivotal aspect of thomistic metaphysics, according to Rahner[38]. Rahner's metaphysical anthropology is possible and meaningful because the transcendence in the affirmative act takes place in human history. In this connection, the judgment is crucial[39]. The affirmative act of being takes place when the 'thing' as intelligible is affirmed. The intelligibility of a thing is perceived because of its species intelligiblis which enables the 'thing' to be grasped as being[40].

The perceiving of objects, however, does not begin with a passage from the objects to the intellect; rather it is the horizon of being that reaches the individual beings[41]. This process is not an idealist one since it is not an a-priori that begins with innate ideas or some sort of transcendental intuition. The "conversion to the phantasm" while allowing individual, material objects to be affirmed, is, at the same time, concomitant with the direction of the spirit that is open to all being. The action of this spirit is then seen as being in the first place -- in an obscure but real way -- the pre-concept directed towards God[42].

The being that is affirmed in the judgment is affirmed as participating being, as a limit where the limitation of its particularity is perceived[43]. If man were a being that was absolute he would not ask a question about being, since he would have been luminous in himself[44].

The way in which man determines the finite objects in his orientation towards God, the absolute, will determine the way in which man's concrete love of God corresponds to the order of God's love that is presented to him[45]. Having drawn the lines along which man may experience the part he plays in determining the affirmations in his own

life, Rahner, asks where man might look for a revelation of God. His reply is, not in feeling or in the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum[46], but in human history that includes the receptivity which man must avail himself of in order to affirm being[47]. God's revelation must be in human speech unless man is taken out of his human mode of existence. Thus, "metaphysical anthropology becomes the ontology of the potentia oboedientialis for a possible revelation"[48].

Throughout the demonstration, Rahner hopes to show that theology as such is founded not by a mere explicitation of the nature of man, but by the Logos speaking to man, and thus that what he, Rahner, has been doing all along is theological anthropology[49]. Rahner cannot allow a theologia naturalis to go by that name when in fact it treats of God as a subject of enquiry, and applies mere formal logic and other philosophical disciplines. The transcendental method would be required since in terms of metaphysics it would cover all of being which can be affirmed as such[50]. In this way, hearing the word of God in theology is God's act before it is man's[51].

Rahner would have to admit that the clarification of God as the principle of human knowledge and reality, and as opposed to an object of reality, may not satisfy the expectation of those who would wish to discern a uniqueness that is patent in the ontic status of the absolute in general. Besides, if the question that Rahner would address to himself is 'where is the revelation you speak of to be found?' then his answer would have to include a moment at which the dynamism present in man would need the help of grace[52].

In conclusion we may say that Rahner's approach is refreshingly new in that by not adopting an 'entative' view of grace, he has been

able to scrutinize the dynamism in man that is single at its source. The unresolved tension in the notion of the supernatural existential[53] seems to be the potent factor in Rahner's scheme to discover God. To sum up what has been presented as the metaphysical background that Rahner uses, we could say that man in affirming being, perceives the reality of the unthematic, the pre-concept, the a-categoric not as an object of his thinking but as the dynamism that makes his thinking possible, and that realizes his identity as being there (Dasein). This dynamism is perceived in the world, in man's history, and is the starting point for Rahner's Christology[54].

Having said this, we shall now address ourselves to the task of exposing Rahner's understanding of the church.

2. Rahner's theology of the church

Rahner's theology of the church is of a piece with his Christology. The person of Jesus Christ reveals a humanity not as the 'effected' reality of the Logos, but as the disclosure of the Logos[55]. It is this act of disclosure that characterizes both the Christ event and the church. When God decides to reveal himself in his otherness he reveals himself in Jesus Christ. "The humanity is the self-disclosure of the Logos itself, so that when God, expressing himself, exteriorizes himself, that very thing appears which we call the humanity of the Logos. Thus anthropology itself is finally based on something more than the doctrine of the possibilities open to an infinite Creator"[56]. The continuing revelation of God, following this pattern of disclosure, is present in the church. "...the Church is the persisting presence of the incarnate Word in space and time...it continues the symbolic function of the Logos in the world"[57].

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For Rahner, then, the church is not an institution that follows upon the petering out of the initial inspiration of the Christ event[58]. It does not even take its origin from the fact that persons are in need of redemption[59]. Still less is it a group of christians who band together after they discover that they believe in the same Lord, Jesus Christ[60]. For Rahner, the church is "the people of God" willed by God to be the abiding presence of his initiative in and through his son Jesus Christ[61]. Whereas for Anselm the incarnation is the means for Jesus to offer himself in satisfaction for sin[62], for Rahner the incarnation is the historical event in which God's initiative is first victorious in his Son, and then victorious in his church.

In Karl Rahner's understanding of the sensitive-rational act[63], the '<u>Vorgriff</u>'[64] that is uncovered in the analysis of that same act is the unthematic, a-categoric dynamic which is manifested in the world[65]. The dynamic is not known in its pure isolation. It is known not as something objectified, but as constitutive of the being of the objects which are affirmed[66]. Further, it is known in the coming back on itself (<u>reditio subjecti in seipsum</u>) of the subject who affirms[67]. In brief, the dynamic is known as the condition of the possibility of real[68] objects in so far as it is constitutive of the objects themselves, and, by the same token, the dynamic can be discovered as thematized, categorized.

In the actual situation of persons who make acts of affirmation, there could possibly exist a being who would be identified in a unique manner with this dynamic[69]. The uniqueness of this identification would imply that the dynamic that is infinite in its horizon would be objectified in an apt object. It should never be forgotten, however,

that this is a totally a-posteriori argument adduced by Rahner. Because the dynamic is not discovered as an objectified reality, it would be impossible to predicate with logical certainty the existence of such a unique being[70]. But should such a being exist, the dynamic which is present in the one affirming as well as in the unique being which is being affirmed is the same[71]. In such an eventuality, and without doing violence to God's freedom and grace, the possibility is affirmed of a person being able to recognize such a being.

The actual situation in which such a being may be found is not merely the individual but rather the history of man as a whole[72]. The dynamic which was present in the act of disclosing history makes the history of man possible, since this dynamic is the condition of such a history[73]. The particular contexts in which this history would be discernible would be, according to Rahner, the acts of God as recognized by the people of Israel, and now in the catholic church[74]. It is in this history that the kingdom of God as a symbol was progressively realized, until it found its unique expression in the person of Jesus[75].

In making the initial assumption that one has to be a member of the church to understand the true nature of the church, we are also saying that it is only because one has already affirmed the presence of Jesus in the world that one can clarify the manner in which the dynamic is uniquely constitutive of him[76]. The manifested presence of Jesus shows us the dynamic of the infinite God speaking to man through the Word, and communicating life to him[77]. This saving Word of life is present in man's history as visible, tangible, thematic, categorical.

This manifested presence of Jesus must be offered to persons in all ages, and it must continue being nothing less than the grace and

life present in the person of Jesus. If it were something less, then this dynamic would be disclosing a pre-Jesus or a post-Jesus history, and it would not be the eschatological event that the person of Jesus symbolizes[78].

Rahner understands the church as constituted by the manifested presence of the dynamic that has already shown itself in the person of Jesus[79]. As a product of "sociological" initiative, the church could never hope to be the disclosure event of the dynamic that realizes itself in the person of Jesus. The disclosure event is soteriological, and salvation cannot be the creation of man. This, in turn, implies that the saving will of God that appeared in Jesus and manifested itself as a saving event must also be the one that wills the church and its enduring reality in time and space[80].

The church is the disclosing event in space and time of Jesus, and to this extent must be understood as the authoritative, visible, efficacious and saving presence of God's initiative in the world[81].

Like Schillebeeckx, Rahner avoids a simple identification of the church with the Christ event[82]. But Rahner will not allow for a continuing victory of God's initiative by the proclamation of the word alone. The continuing proclamation, the abiding presence of the incarnation in the world is possible in virtue of the sacramental link between the church and the Christ event[83]. Because of this sacramentality attaching to the church in its constitution, the church can authoritatively symbolize -- not merely promise[84] -- God's offer of grace to men and women in their lives[85]. As a community of faith, the church is so structured that it is conscious of its ability to interpret the Christ event, or rather proclaim it, definitively, in the world.

3. A resumé of K. Rahner's theology of the church

The merits of Rahner's understanding of the church are as follows:

1) The church is not seen as an after-thought but as the pre-destined eschatological presence of God in the world;
2) The church is not seen as a mere effect of a causa efficiens[86], an extrinsic result willed by God through the Christ event;
3) The initiative and response present in the person of Jesus is made present in the sacramental life of the church[87];
4) The different elements in the church are in an organic relationship to each other, not because of the exigencies of the situation, but because the church as a whole has been preformally willed by God[88].

Structures in the church according to K. Rahner

It is the community dimension (itself formed by the word of God and realized in a concrete visible reality) that allows for the symbolizing of the Christ event in the church, in that given the fact that the person is called to realize himself in the Christ event, the initiative as well as the response entailed are present in the historical community called the church. It is this church which celebrates the Christ event through proclaiming the word, and through sacraments.

The eschatological reality of the Christ event is present in the church in its definitive form. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of the eschatological reality being present elsewhere too.

B. The church in the theology of Vatican Council II

In this section, we shall not attempt to put together all the statements about the structure of the church asserted in Vatican II,

but only those that are pertinent to our discussion: the structures that would help us to understand the mission of the church today. To this end, we shall divide the section into the following parts:

a) The church as People of God.

b) The church as Mystery.

c) The church as Communion.

d) The church as Representative.

1. The church as People of God

The unfinished business of Vatican Council I (1869-1870) was taken up in Vatican Council II (1962-1965) but was not completed[89]. It was rehabilitated, and recognized as of intrinsic importance to the church. The unfinished business concerned the constitution of the church, the role of the bishops, priests and the laity. In Vatican II, the church was expressing a consciousness of itself not as a pyramidic structure, but as the people of God. The consciousness of itself as people of God could hardly seem a logical development of Vatican Council I. In the wake of Vatican I such a consciousness would have been interpreted as an affront to the Ecclesia docens.

The title of the second chapter of the dogmatic constitution Lumen Gentium is "The people of God"[90]. The title takes it origin from the people of Israel, God's chosen people. The constitution calls the church the "new" people of God, because of the covenant that is now established in Jesus Christ: "The principal purpose to which the plan of the Old Covenant was directed was to prepare for the coming both of Christ, the universal Redeemer, and of the Messianic kingdom" (Dei Verbum, 15/122; Lumen Gentium, 55a/87)[91].

The importance of this term "people of God" is noticed against the controversy that the modernist crisis brought on. The fact that the ecclesia discens and ecclesia docens could be identified rested on the prior unity of both in the universal church. However, there is little evidence that the teaching church had been willing to accept the claims that such a unity imposed[92].

We shall briefly turn to one modernist, George Tyrrell, to highlight the importance of the fact of this unity in the life of the church. Tyrrell accepts the ecclesia docens only in virtue of its expressing the sacred tradition that is lived out by all catholics[93]. Tyrrell also believes that there is little justification for a phrase used by Cardinal Mercier "The Episcopate with the Pope" to denote the joint official commission to teach official catholic doctrine when the bishops by themselves are considered subservient to the pope[94]. This, Tyrrell feels, was the result of Vatican I's decree on papal infallibility.

If we may express Tyrrell's problem of reconciling the unity between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens, it would be that the teaching office in the church does not run parallel to the organic reality that is the church, but proceeds in virtue of it. The papacy and the episcopate showed little signs of recognizing this fact.

One recalls the drafts that were submitted to the conciliar fathers and the process by which the final draft of the constitution Lumen Gentium was conceived[95]. The final draft was voted in after the assembly was informed of three observations that the pope had made. The pope's second observation was that the authority that attached to the conciliar texts would have the character of definita only when it

was explicitly stated, otherwise they had to be considered as constitutive elements of the doctrine of the supreme magisterium of the church[96]. The third observation asked for nota explicativa so as to allay the fears of some. The Theological Commission supplied five such: a) The collegium is not that denoted in Roman/Byzantine law where a group of partners have equal rights; b) The bishop has a three-fold power by episcopal consecration itself, not by having "jurisdiction" conferred on him by the pope, though the final determination of that power must be in virtue of a rule of law, a sort of directive for its exercise; c) The college of bishops possesses supreme and universal authority in the church; the pope belongs to this college; and, the head and members must act in accordance with their different tasks; d) The assent of the pope is required for the collegial action because of the communio rather than because the college of bishops depends on him[97].

In effect, the nota explicativa make it clear that collegiality is a way of life in the church, not a luxury that the papacy can dispense with. Besides, Article 22 of Lumen Gentium centres on collegiality. There does not exist a process of law by which the pope could be made answerable for his actions, but there are norms according to which the pope is bound to exercise his primatial magisterium. "...the Theological Commission of the Council rejected the Pope's proposal to insert the words that the Pope is 'answerable to the Lord alone' in his action. This was held to be superfluous, and an oversimplification of the truth (cf. draft of July 3, 1964, p. 93), on the grounds that the Roman Pontiff is also bound to revelation itself, to the fundamental structure of the Church, to the sacraments, to the

definitions of earlier councils and other obligations too numerous to mention"[98].

The term "people of God" underscores first of all, a new understanding of the universal church as an organic structure rather than a pyramidic set-up. Accountability is predicated of the ecclesia docens and of the papacy. Office, far from being above the church, is only within it: one has to be part of the "people of God" in order to exercise it authoritatively.

2. The church as Mystery

The effort to view the church more as an object of faith rather than a smoothly-functioning institution resulted in the church being referred to as "mystery". "The term 'mystery' as applied to the Church occurs only in the title of Chapter 1 of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church and in numbers 5a, 39a, 44c, and 63a of the same document; in other documents it occurs in UR 2f, 20a; OT 9a, 16d; AG 16c; GS 2a, 40a; NA 4a. But nowhere is the term defined"[99].

Attention was called to the fact that the church was to be the presence that could be ascertained in visible form of God's action with relation to the world of men. The functioning of the church in its human visibility could not be understood merely in terms of the different offices that obtained in it. The visibility of the functioning church was to be significative of the Spirit that assured authenticity in the church. "This Spirit, who is one and the same in Head (Christ) and members, 'vivifies, unifies, and moves the whole body. This He does in such a way that His work could be compared by the holy Fathers with the function which the soul fulfills in the human body, whose principle of life the soul is' (LG 7h/22)"[100]. In saying this, the

Council was affirming the primary source of the church's meaningfulness in the world: the work of the Spirit. By implication, the church was to be the object of faith not in the sense that the church was to be the focus of men's commitment to God, but rather that the church was to be instrumental in giving expression to the faith realized in the hearts of men, and of which the source was the workings of the Spirit.

At the first level, the aspect of mystery confronts a person as inaccessible, as something that cannot be within the control of the person. At this stage, one can either refuse to allow the mystery to confront or decide that one will listen to it should it speak. At the second stage, one realizes that the mystery will speak only if one allows it to engage oneself in the centre of one's freedom, at the conscience level[101]. In short, the mystery does not present itself as an object to be scrutinized in a judgmental context, but as a life to be lived. Insofar as this understanding of mystery is applied to the church, we can say that the question as to the relevancy of the church can only be asked by a person who is a member of the church since a threshold understanding of the lived life of the church is indispensable to asking this question. The question is contingent on one's faith commitment, and the minimum level of this faith commitment must imply membership in the church if the commitment is not to be a mere positive decision.

Because the church is a mystery, it is significative of the fulfilling aspect, the work of the Spirit, yet at the same time, it is the scandal -- its human functioning -- that tests the faith of the believer[102]. By describing the church as mystery, Vatican II recognized a key structural element in the church's constitution: the

church is never for itself as a community, but is significative of the Spirit working in the hearts of men and women in the world. Therefore, the visibility of the church's activity can never explain exhaustively the working of the Spirit.

3. The church as Communion

Vatican Council II's description of the church as communion brings into relief the notion of fellowship of service[103]. This was to be the distinguishing aspect of the church's communion. In effect, the unity which such communion betokened was to be arrived at by the church ministering to others: the leaders of the church ministering to the people of God, and the people of God ministering to the world[104].

The emphasis on service which brings about communion is indicative of a basic structure in the church: the organic nature of the church[105]. Service is recognized as a mutually related function: the person who serves in the church does not merely hand out something to another who is served but discovers a bond, such that it is from the service that is present in the church that the terms "server" and "served" receive their status[106]. Service is seen not as created by the one who serves, but as principally the fruit of the Spirit, and for this reason the result of such service is recognized as fellowship. As in a cell, the nuclear material is mutually related to the protoplasmic material so too the server and the served are related in a functional way, not because of what either can effect in terms of the church's mission, but because of the presence of the Spirit that is responsible for the organic mission of the church.

Communion in the church according to the views expressed in Vatican Council II, realizes itself not so much in the authoritarian

ordering of the different elements and parts of the body of the church, but rather in the organic unity that recognizes the presence of the Spirit as making possible and achieving the mission of the church as a whole. Such an idea of communion in the church is not something totally new, but is given added significance in its conclusions by Vatican Council II. These conclusions appeared in the notion of collegiality, consultative bodies to be set up e.g. priests' senates, the holding of synods, etc[107]. Collegiality and consultation make sense only when it is understood and agreed that communion lies not in merely professing the same doctrine but also in sharing the same life of the Spirit. Service then would be best seen in the efforts of the one serving and the one served to recognize and affirm the presence of the Spirit in both.

We believe that the nature of this organic unity in the church which is the work of the Spirit is manifested in the mutual relation of offices in the church. The magisterium, as the teaching office in the church performs a service in terms of the whole church when in its proper capacity it pronounces on a matter concerning faith and morals. As a service that is within the organic unity of the church, the magisterium must be in communion with the church as a whole. In elucidating the role of the magisterium as sharing in the communion of the church, we refer to the ideas of Maurice Blondel and Yves Congar.

(a) Maurice Blondel

History and Dogma was written by Maurice Blondel to express an alternative to Alfred Loisy's efforts with the historical method. Blondel stressed the fact that a tradition was meant to transmit very

much more than a material fact, a spoken word, in short a brute fact. Blondel understood tradition as a living matrix in which the living past became the throbbing present, and he concluded that the historical method by itself had a focus much too narrow to preside over the interpretation of dogmas of faith; the total tradition of the church was more embracing, and could correctly formulate dogma in the present without the fear of chasing illusory happenings of the past[108].

Blondel pointed out that the historical method tended to examine the externals as static realities insofar as these impinged on the experimental scale, i.e. "what can be scientifically known"[109]. "Historicism tends ...to explain the chain of events ... not so much the initial operation of real beings as the influence of the idea which it has formed of them, without suspecting that, quite apart from what is distinctly perceived and intellectualized in the consciousness, actions and spectators have a thousand other hidden means of exercising their mutual efficacy. This should be carefully noted and remembered when we come to consider the relations between Gospel and the Church"[110].

Blondel argued against the historical method's claims to uncover the proclamation of the eschatological Kingdom of God by itself. This happens, Blondel believes, because "historicism...tends to look for the whole subject matter of history in the evolution which unfolds the series of events under the pressure of the forces which compose our world"[111]. The historical method in setting itself as a norm by which to judge the correctness of magisterial pronouncements, was, by that fact, allowing rational justification alone to judge the validity of dogmas. "Dogmas cannot be rationally justified either by history alone, by the most ingenious application of dialectic to the texts, or by the efforts of

the individual; but all these forces contribute, and they converge in Tradition, the authority of which, divinely assisted, is the organ of infallible expression"[111a]. Blondel agreed that the historical method had a role to play in the scrutiny of dogmatic propositions either to pronounce on their validity, or to recover the past dogmas in the proclamation of the present ones, but the final arbiter could never be a particular methodology or a private individual except insofar as the practice of christianity entered into this individual consciousness[112].

We shall conclude our exposé of Blondel by summarizing his findings: (a) the ability of magisterial pronouncements by way of dogmas to express the eschatological message of christianity did not rest on the historical method exclusively, (b) the meaningfulness of the dogmas in question derived from the tradition of the church as a whole.

Blondel's findings reflect on our efforts to discover the structures of the church which would make its mission meaningful in the world. The findings point out that the magisterial pronouncements (the dogmas) are meaningful when they obtain from the church's tradition as a whole, i.e. when the visible sign is not a mere conceptual proposition but the concretization of the tradition of the church at a particular point in time.

(b) Yves Congar

If Karl Rahner was concerned about the problem of the church not being a mere human community in its origin, Yves Congar is concerned with the fact that any office in the church, e.g. the magisterium, or even the papacy, functions validly only in the tradition of the church as a whole.

Congar is concerned about the manner in which the deposit of faith is preserved in the church[113]. His objective, by means of an extensive analysis of historical material and then by a theological reflection on the same, is to show that there is no single element in the church which by itself can preserve the deposit of faith through the ages. It is the church as a whole that preserves the deposit of faith, her living faith, and it is this total life of the church down the ages that is the subject of tradition[114]. The underlying assumption of Congar is that tradition already exists as a content within which the other elements of the church function[115]. Therefore, one does not ask if tradition connects the terminus a quo (i.e. the Christ event) to the terminum ad quem (the church of the present), but rather how the Christ event is realized in the church today. That would also imply that no single element in the church can, by itself, be an authenticating element in pronouncing on the deposit of faith unless such an element is in fact organically united with the other elements present in that same tradition[116]. In effect, Congar advances the idea that tradition is much more than that which the church actually realizes. If, then, the church is the visible sign of the eschatological Kingdom of God in the world, then the tradition it gives visibility to must be of that world as a whole, not of "christendom" alone[117].

For Congar, therefore, in order that an office function meaningfully and authentically in the church, it must be in organic unity with the other elements present in the church, while the church itself, as the comprehensive visible sign of the eschatological Kingdom of God, must be subject to tradition incorporating the Christ event[118]. Such a tradition is not at the disposal of the church, but rather the opposite.

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The church as organic unity should be seen as giving visibility to this tradition in the world[119]. As a tradition which is formed by the work of the Spirit, there is a need to discern the work of the Spirit outside of the visible church, for in that eventuality the church can truly exist as visible sign of God's presence in the world.

4. The church as Representative

The representative function of the church derives from the understanding of the mediatory role of Jesus Christ himself. The mysterious plan of God's redemption displays itself in Old Testament times through election, and in the history of the people of Israel. Finally it reveals itself in Jesus Christ as the eschatological presence of the Kingdom of God. In Jesus Christ, par excellence, mediatorship is exercised uniquely, yet not in a way that Jesus takes the place of man before his heavenly Father. Jesus is the cause and condition of man being saved, but it is man who must be related to the Father through the work of the Spirit. The church is asked to be mediator to the extent that it proclaims Jesus as the cause and condition of man's salvation in the world. To this extent, the church represents Jesus Christ.

The mediatory role of Jesus is understood in terms of the history of Israel where the theological principle "the election of a minority for the redemption of the whole" operates. Jesus, as the Servant of Jahweh, is then seen as the one who delivers us from our sins[120]. But if we have to be redeemed then Jesus cannot be our substitute, else we shall still be in our sins. As cause and condition for man to be saved Jesus Christ is not our substitute but our representative.

"Representation is a provisional standing-in-the-place of another; substitution is a definitive exchange made for a being that has been

turned into an object, as though it (he) were already non-existent or dead... Only a being that is a person and does not seek to abandon himself and his identity can be represented. To be a person is an essential presupposition of being represented. Whatever is turned into a thing, an object, can be substituted for, but not represented"[121].

Because the person is deemed responsible for his actions he is capable of being represented, the assumption being that only persons are endowed with free choice. In the context of representation, there are three persons: the one to whom the representation is made, the one who represents, and the one who is represented, the first being man, the second Jesus Christ, and the third the Father. As mentioned earlier, the representative function of Jesus Christ is not to take man's place, but to put man in relation with the Father. The church is asked to perform the same function: to represent so as to put the world in relation with God.

We realize that at this stage, we have not spelt out the concrete manner in which such a represenation can be effected, but we merely note that if its function of representation is not to become one of substitution, the church cannot address a message to the world of persons without at the same time making sure that the world recognizes the church as mediatory, and constitutive of <u>its relationship to the Father</u>.

<u>A resumé of the two points of view on the structures of the church</u>

In this third chapter of our dissertation, concerning the ecclesial aspect of the eschatological Kingdom of God, it was our task to investigate the nature of the stable element that would allow the eschatological Kingdom of God as symbolic to realize itself authentically.

We felt that an understanding of the structures of the church would enable us to recognize the stable element in the church itself. The method we employed was dogmatic, in that we did not begin to view the human community as church and then reason to a stage where the community was to show itself as supplying an apt situation for the Christ event to reside in, but rather we began with the supposition that the constitutive element of the community called the church is in essence God's will that effects the church along with the Christ event. The reasoning in this method is that were one to view the church first as human community and then as ecclesia (the community in which the Christ event was being proclaimed), the church could be just an accident of history, and its ability to proclaim the Christ event authoritatively would be open to question. The dogmatic method, in effect, begins with the act of faith expressed in the church, and then highlights the whole series of complexes that pertain to the Christ event, the community of the faithful and the precedents that are implicit in the act of faith.

We now present the results of our efforts:

I. The church, as organic community, provides the stable element for the eschatological Kingdom of God. This is possible since the church as community is considered as pre-willed by God.

II. The church can be the stable element required because it sacramentalizes the Christ event in a communitarian context.

III. The immediate reason as to why the church can sacramentalize the Christ event is that the church expresses in visible

form the tradition in which the Christ event is to be found, and it does so in its organic unity[122].

III. The church as sacrament of the eschatological Kingdom of God

In sections I and II of this chapter, we were concerned about the ecclesial dimension of the eschatological Kingdom of God. In section II, we investigated the structure of the church. In terms of the structures, we now set about exploring the notion of sacrament. We believe that the structures mentioned best realize the notion of sacrament in the church. This section will include the following parts:

1) The notion of Sacrament in the church.

2) The Sacrament as Symbol.

3) The church as symbol of the eschatological Kingdom of God.

A. The notion of sacrament in the church

In treating of the notion of sacrament, we do not intend giving a full-dress treatment of the same[123], since to do so would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. But in saying that the structures spoken of in section II, 2) of this chapter are best realized in a sacrament, it behoves us to show why this should be so. To this end we shall draw up an image of the sacramental notion that realizes itself in these structures. This notion, we believe, is understood to be orthodox in the church.

We begin by using Augustine's definition of the sacrament which the Council of Trent saw fit to incorporate in its treatment of sacraments in general[124]. The council did not differentiate between symbol, mystical sign or sacred sign, in their application to sacraments[125].

However, the council later on speaks of sacraments in terms of signs[126]. Of course as 'sacred signs'[127], they accomplish what they signify. In the case of the Eucharist, the council does use the term symbol when referring to the bread and wine after the consecration[128]. The real stress of the council was on the fact that the sacraments possess the grace they signify[129]. It would seem from what has been said up until now that because the sacraments, except the Eucharist, did not possess the substantial presence of Jesus Christ, they were termed 'effective signs', but signs nevertheless. And in terms of scholastic philosophy the orthodoxy of this nomenclature could be preserved, because the sacramental signs produced grace, and this grace was the term of all justification and sanctification[130]. The problem with considering sacraments in this way was that the grace they effected by signification did not need to be essentially tied up with the historical Jesus except in the case of the Eucharist. The sacramental structure of grace needed to be articulated differently if grace was not to be progressively seen as an entitative 'tertium quid' that justified and sanctified man with only an indirect reference to the historical Jesus in the Christ event[131]. The new articulation viewed the sacraments in the context of a divine human encounter[133] where the signifying function of the sacraments could be interpreted more Christologically. This was only natural. If justification comes soley through Jesus Christ, then it would seem appropriate that the sacramental construct would give prominence to the presence of this Jesus in the justified state. However, the post-reformation understanding of the functioning of efficient and

instrumental causes was assumed to be wholly pertinent to the new articulation[134].

Later, Karl Rahner elucidated his theory of symbol using the material of classical metaphysics, and then applying it to the transcendental method born out of a Heideggerian perspective[135]. It is to this theory of symbol that we shall address ourselves in the next section, and show how it incorporates what we have already said about the sacramental structure of the church, and also about the need for a definite Christological starting point.

B. The sacrament as symbol

We shall first treat of the symbol and then point out its relevance to sacramentality in the church. In 1) The notion of Sacrament in the church, we had merely noted the dogmatic understanding of the church with regard to the sacraments[136]. Now we wish to show that the concept of symbol may be legitimately applied to the concept of sacrament, and that the particular understanding of the symbol invests the sacramentality of the church with a much greater potential.

1. The Symbol[137]

Three aspects of the symbol in the understanding of Karl Rahner combine to make it a potent entity: scholastic thomism, dogmatic theology and the transcendental method deriving from Heidegger.

a. Scholastic Thomism

Rahner begins by noting that scholasticim understands the principle of form as manifested in the materiality of individuality[138].

It is the form that supplies the intelligibility of matter, yet form is known in the restriction that matter brings with it. The principle of matter, however, is not an independent entity that is able to effect a restriction. It is known by implication, not by effect, and should be designated by the term 'potentia'[139].

All beings are assumed to be symbolic by nature[140]. To express themselves, to manifest themselves, beings have to determine their potentials. This determining of their potentials would produce a plurality of determinations, and the individual being would not be integrated, nor would it be one substance[141]. The fact is, however, that beings are perceived as individuals. This could only be in virtue of a principle of unity. This unity proceeds from the form, the determining principle that does not effect the being as a transitive efficient causality, but is the intrinsic factor in the being that makes the being in question intelligible.

One could therefore say that the form of a being is perceivable not in itself but in so far as it is able to actualize its different potentials, or that the symbol is able to realize itself in terms of its different manifestations. This actualization or manifestation is not the totality of the form, and to this extent must be considered as different from the form (the inner reality of the symbol so to speak), but in so far as the actualization or manifestation is derivative from the being's form itself, the actualization or manifestation must be constituted of that which the form determines.

b. Dogmatic Theology

We shall begin with the implication of the symbol for Christology. The presuppositions are the doctrine of the persons in the Trinity, the

fact of divine revelation, and the person of Jesus[142]. As the Father's Word, Jesus is the manifestation of the Father, the second person of the immanent Trinity. With the relation between the 'economic' and the 'immanent' trinity as a background, we can say that the humanity of Jesus which the Logos, the expression of the Father assumes in a hypostatic union, is constitutive, 'the real symbol', of the Logos himself.

In this pattern, it could be said that the Logos is the symbol of the Father, and that, in fact, when God reaches out to man in his otherness, the manifestation or symbol of himself in terms of man is Jesus Christ, true God and true men. The source of the symbolizing principle is in the Father, so that all that in turn is perceived as symbols or manifestations are actualized by that same dynamism proceeding from the Father. This is saying the same thing as that the unifying principle in the symbolism that is present in the Logos, in Jesus Christ and the church that proceeds from the Christ event, is the Father. Of course, a caution must be exercised: the historical Jesus, the Christ event and the church are not to be considered as symbols of necessity or on the basis of emanation[143]. The premise Rahner begins with is that it is the free will of the Father that expresses itself in symbol.

c. The Transcendental Method[144]

The name of this method suggests that the starting point includes all the possibilities that lie in man's affirmation of reality. There is no abstract, positivistic starting point, but the dynamism that is found in man in his act of affirmation is examined on the various registers that make him intelligible as an intellectual being. The

act of affirmation does not reveal a being with no relationship to others, but rather a finite being that is able to understand itself in virtue of a dynamism that is infinite in its horizon[145].

The infinite horizon as well as the sense of identity of a finite being are both discernible in the act of affirmation, and reveal the a-priori conditions for the affirmation itself. The process by which one arrives at an understanding of the conditions in the affirmation is not by way of induction or deduction but by making explicit what is already implicit.

For Rahner, then, the symbol is not an arbitrarily chosen medium that is totally separated from the reality to be manifested. There is a prior unity between the manifestations and the inner reality that is understood. The understanding of the symbol begins with Christology, in that the ongoing revelation of the Christ event in the world is not an added feature of the historical Jesus, and therefore not disparate as far as its ontological status is concerned, but is properly and authentically realized in the manifestations or 'symbolisms' that proceed from that inner reality, the event of the historical Jesus.

2. The Sacrament

If Rahner's understanding of the symbol is applied to the notion of the sacrament as it is understood in the church, we can say the following: a) this notion of symbol is not foreign to the Tridentine understanding of the sacrament in the church; b) since the sacrament is to make present in a true and authoritative way the saving disclosure of the person of Jesus, it could be legitimately considered a symbol. As we have explained above, the symbol is capable of revealing because both the signifying reality and the reality signified are con-

stituted by the same dynamic, which we had also considered as 'form'; c) the symbol of the Kingdom of God is articulated in that the person of Jesus is made present by the sacramental encounter and Jesus realizes the Kingdom of God in its fullness; d) finally, it must not be said that the sacrament holds the Word of God to ransom! Rather it is the Word of God that makes the sacrament possible and efficacious[146].

C. The church as symbol of the eschatological Kingdom of God

As symbol, the church is never for itself but only for the world. The church's life, its organizations and its liturgical reality are manifestative, never the final term of one's faith in Jesus. Only Jesus as Lord, is the final term, the motive and the object of christian faith.

As a manifestation of a reality that engages man in the depths of his being -- that is precisely what the transcendental analysis brings in its wake -- that manifestation cannot be deficient in its efficacy, i.e. lack the essential element of saving grace without which man cannot be justified. In other words, the symbol, that is the church, must be aware of the abiding presence of the Christ event in its midst and be able to authoritatively proclaim the same. Otherwise such a proclamation would either be deficient in its efficacy, or remain unrecognized in that it would not offer itself to man as crucial for his existence[147].

Because the church as a whole is symbolic there would be no room for a magical understanding of the sacrament[148]. Not a special word, not a propitious time, not a particular place, but the life of the church as a whole would manifest the Christ event in the world. In virtue of the understanding of the church as symbol, the fact that

there are a particular number as such of sacraments becomes relativized since the particular concrete structures of the church are at the service of the Word, and not the other way around.

IV. Conclusions

The main concern of this chapter was to ascertain the nature of the stable element that would allow the eschatological Kingdom of God as symbolic reality and as parametrical notion, to realize itself. The symbolic notion of the Kingdom of God stemmed from the fact that in chapter two we had discovered no single interpretation of the eschatological Kingdom of God that was adequate. At the beginning of chapter three we had posed the question about the stable element, and had asserted that it was the church that would supply such an element.

However, in section one of this chapter, where the relation between church and ecclesia was discussed, the findings we arrived at made it clear that if one began with fixed concepts as to what constituted church and what ecclesia, the scriptural data was ambivalent. Besides, the history of the churches showed that different claims could be forwarded with plausible arguments as to the validity of the identities of 'ecclesia' and 'church'. The problem lay in the methodology employed to ascertain one or the other.

In section two, we decided to study the way in which a Roman catholic approached his own church. The assumption we began from was that only a member of a church could legitimately and meaningfully begin to ask a question about the eschatological Kingdom of God. We paid special attention to Rahner's methodology, Blondel's and Congar's remarks about the function of the church vis-à-vis tradition, and noted some salient features from the two dogmatic constitutions of

Vatican Council II. Our investigations revealed the church as a pre-willed, organic community that functioned in tradition.

In section three, our efforts were directed to show how the structure of the church as revealed in section two could correctly be considered as sacramental. The structure, we argued, was consonant with the notion of sacrament in e.g. conciliar statements. We then noted the deficiencies that applied to the traditional understanding of the sacraments, chiefly the approach to sacramental grace as entitative. Rahner's eludication of the symbol, and its application to sacramental reality was seen as a corrective to the entitative approach in that the sacrament was understood to reveal a divine-human encounter, the term of reference -- from man's side -- being not impersonal grace as such, but encounter with the Lord who reveals himself in symbols, manifestations.

The conclusions to chapter two are as follows:

1) The question we asked about the stable element allowing the eschatological Kingdom of God as symbolic and parametrical reality to realize itself is answered, not by first considering a man-made congregation as a possible church or an ecclesia, but rather by assuming that one's congregation is church, or does possess the ecclesial element. An approach in which one sets up a norm a-priori of what a church or ecclesia should be faces at least two problems: first, the problem of connecting the normative aspect of his proposition to the Christ event not in terms of concepts but in terms of continuity with the total reality of the Christ event; second, providing the authentic validation for the reality of church or ecclesia that would exist in terms of the norm that had been set up.

2) The assumption made in 1) does not pre-empt the problem about the stable element, but it sets the context for at least one perspective, a de facto existent church, and reflectively observes how the Christ event can be meaningful in terms of this church. The merit of this assumption is that the perspective it begins with allows scope to the living subject of a church, the Spirit, since this perspective is not inextricably tied up with the postulates and reasoning processes that are to be found in mere positive disciplines.

3) Having made our assumption about the church, our efforts clarified the structures which are to be found in a church which confesses the Christ event in its midst. These structures allowed us to view the church as a symbol, through which the eschatological Kingdom of God was made present.

4) Because the church can be viewed as a symbol, the possibility remains that its basic structure may be articulated in new, creative ways. The functional symbolism of the church may be articulated anew in the world.

The manner in which the symbolism of the church can be articulated anew in the world will be the burden of the fourth chapter.

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FOOTNOTES

1 Confer chapter two, pp. 10-12 and 15-18.

2 In itself, the symbol need not be considered as an ontological entity. It is a 'creative expression' -- we refer to tensive symbols -- that is employed within an ontological framework. In the Old Testament. the signs that would have been functioning in the symbol were limited because while they could be significative in terms of the Christ event, they themselves were not the Christ event. By the same token, the Kingdom of God in its fullness could be symbolized only in the Christ event.

3 Confer chapter two, p. 22.

4 Confer chapter two, pp. 15-22.

5 Confer chapter one, pp. 24-26.

6 P. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 18: "...I shall always understand by symbol, in a much more primitive sense, analogical meanings which are spontaneously formed and immediately significant, such as defilement, analogue of stain; sin, analogue of deviation; guilt, analogoue of accusation..."

M. Eliade, Images and Symbols, translated by Philip Mairet, Sheed and Ward, 1961, p. 177: "...the function of a symbol is precisely that of revealing a whole reality, inaccessible to other means of knowledge; the coincidence of opposites, for instance, which is so abundantly and simply expressed by symbols, is not given anywhere in the Cosmos, nor is it accessible to man's immediate experience, nor to discursive thinking."

7 J. Skorupski, Symbol and Theory: a philosophical study of theories of religion in social anthropology, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1976, p. 18: "(The symbolist approach) considers religion and magic to be distinctive in that beliefs and rituals taken together constitute a symbolic system which describes the pattern of social relations in the society in which they exist..."

8 The reasoning is that one cannot decide about nothing.

9 For the present, we shall merely refer to the meaning of church as it appears in Rahner & Vorgrimler's Theological Dictionary, p. 79: "Church...means the Lord's holy congregation." Confer pp. 47-49 for a more extensive treatment.

10 This method is akin to the method used in dogmatic theology. Rahner & Vorgrimler's Theological Dictionary, p. 135: "Insofar as dogmatic theology is a systematic, 'positive' (historical) hearkening to God's word spoken by the Church, in an effort to understand this word, it is also 'speculative' (scholastic) at the

same time, because for the mind to welcome and assimilate something is a positive activity which brings into play all the subjective factors in the hearer's nature."

11 We believe that our mention of the term 'dogmatic method' is apt to bring the following rejoinder: if dogma implies "a divinely revealed truth, proclaimed as such by the infallible teaching authority of the Church, and hence binding on all the faithful without exception, now and forever" (Avery Dulles, S. J., The Survival of Dogma, Doubleday and Company, N. Y., 1973, p. 156), then a method constructed on dogmatic lines is self-validating, and to the extent that it is so such a method can say little to man's real situation or make little claim on the understanding of man. Such a method, in effect, would be making arbitrary claims based on self-assured premises.

Our answer to this objection would be as follows:

a) An issue can only be expressed in a particular situation and to the extent that the situation remains constant, the issue is meaningful. The issue we are concerned with is the church which is not a mere conglomeration of persons, or a mere sociological entity but a 'revealed datum'. The fact that we begin with a revealed datum is admitted, but no more.

b) Scientific evidence is interpreted to mean something that elicits one's acceptance because it is compelling. The element of freedom in such acceptance is absent. In the case of the church as revealed datum, scientific evidence cannot be adduced since what constitutes church is the fact of God's revelation freely received by persons in community. ("...man's existence is essentially a 'dogmatic' one. It can be shown that since man must act he must to some extent necessarily affirm some contingent facts as unconditionally valid. In view of this, historical revelation and the acceptance of propositions to be affirmed absolutely cannot be repugnant to man's nature. The absolute character of the claim and obligation of dogma is addressed precisely to man's freedom; dogma expresses a truth which can be rightly heard and attained only in the free decision of faith".) Encyclopedia of Theology, "Dogma", by K. Rahner, p. 352).

c) Finally, the dogmatic method implies a clarification of an experience that is being had. In terms of our problematic regarding the church as being the stable element for the symbolic and parametrical functioning of the eschatological Kingdom of God, our effort is to elucidate the manner in which this is so, not to argue from a third point of view which sees the symbolic and the parametrical notion of the Kingdom of God as congruent with the notion of the church as such.

12 The greek word 'εκκλησία' is used over a hundred times in the New Testament. (Confer Bruce M. Metzger's Lexical Aids for Students of New Testament Greek, p. 12.)

G. Kittel (editor), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. III, pp. 500-505.

'εκκλησια': the general sense is 'assembly' or 'church'. Liddell-Scott understands it to be the 'assembly duly summoned', less general than σύλλογος; in the LXX it denotes 'the Jewish congregation', and in the NT 'the church as a body of christians'. Some NT lexicons understand the term to imply the whole body of christians; others the individual congregation, e.g. the house church.

An important point is that the same word is used for the Jewish christian congregation at Jerusalem and the Gentile congregation at Antioch.

13 R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, p. 62. Also pp. 37-42; 56-62) ibid., p. 308: "The fact that ecclesia sometimes means the total Church, sometimes the local congregation...reflects the peculiar double character of the eschatological Congregation. On the one hand, it is no phenomenon of the world but belongs to the new aeon; on the other hand, this eschatological Congregation which as such is invisible, takes visible form in the individual congregation within the world."

E. Brunner, Das Missverständnis der Kirche, Druck: H. Bircher, Sulgen, 1951, p. 12: "Die Ekklesia des Neuen Testaments weis sich als der Leib Jesu Christi, als die Offenbarungs und Heilswirklichkeit, darum niemals als Mittel zu einem Zweck, sondern als Selbstzweck, wenn auch erst als die der Vollendung harrende Gestalt dessen, was Got will."

Another way of interpreting the church is in terms of "was sie ist, durch den ihr gegenwartigen Christus ...darum ist sie, die Gemeinde, selbst Wunder. Sie ist darum in der Tat,,nichts soziologisch Verstanbares'' (K. L. Schmitt)". (Confer ibid., p. 14).

G. C. Berkouwer, The Church, p. 30: "The New Testament does not speak in the plural of 'churches' (ekklesiai), but that does not signify any rupture or disunity, since different groups of believers in different places are meant; they together form the Church of Christ (cf. Gal. 1:2, Acts. 15:41; 16:5, etc.)."

Among Roman Catholics too, there exists the continuing and unresolved question as to how magisterial pronouncements about the church do in fact express the actual situation of the church and at the same time proclaim the Christ event present in the church.

14 G. Ebeling describes Martin Luther's idea of the church from the standpoint of spiritual understanding of the Spirit, of Faith.

Confer Luther Einführing in sein Denken, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1964, pp. 114-115.

"Die Kirche ist geistlich, sofern sie als in diesem Leben verborgen verstanden wird, die ihr Vertrauen nicht auf irdische Machmittel setzt...

,,Geistlich'' ist nicht ein besonderer Bezirk des Seienden, ein Bereich reiner Geistlichkeit, Innerlichkeit und Unsichtbarkeit. Die Verborgenheit so verstehen, hieße sie nicht geistlich, sondern fleischlich verstehen. ,,Geistlich'' ist die Kategorie des wahren Verstehens. Wer geistlich existiert, der existiert zwar in der Sichtbarkeit, aber doch nicht offenkundig. Zu sehen ist allerdings etwas, nämlich der Gegensatz, nicht das geistliche Leben als solches."

15 Confer chapter two, pp. 18-19.

16 Confer chapter two, p. 19.

17 Confer chapter two, pp. 19-20.

18 Our reasoning is that only one who is experiencing the Christ event in his church would be able to pose the question as to whether or not the ecclesial element is present to a lesser or greater degree. In other words, it is not so much a question of the presence of the Christ event in the community as the ability of the community to recognize that presence which is material to our understanding of the church. In saying this, we differ from confessions that claim no necessity of the community's recognizing the presence of church or ecclesia.

K. Rahner (editor), Encyclopedia of Theology, "Church" by Marie-Joseph le Guillon, pp. 216-217: "The tension between the Kingdom and the Church which...results from the sacramental structure of the church, can also be understood as a consequence of the divine action which involves the whole process of salvation -- summons, justification, glorification -- and whose final goal is the glory to be revealed (Rom 8:18-30).

"...in the light of revelation, the Church is recognized as a society of fellowship with God, the sacrament of salvation, the people of God established as the body of Christ and the temple of the Holy Spirit."

19 Confer p. 6, footnote 2 and p. 85, footnote 26.

20 We have in mind Willi Marxsen's book The Resurrection of Jesus, translated by Margaret Kohl, SCM Press Ltd. London, 1970, with its particular understanding of Luke 24: 30-31.

21 E. Brunner, Das Missverständnis der Kirche, p. 12: "Die Ekklesia des Neuen Testaments, die Christusgemeinde, ist gerade das nicht, was jede ,,Kirche'' mindestens auch ist, eine Institution, ein Etwas. Die Christusgemeinde ist nichts anderes als eine Gemeinschaft von Personen."

22 A. Dulles, Models of the Church, Doubleday and Company, N. Y. 1974, p. 20: "...the Church, according to Robert Bellarmine, is a specific type of human community (coetus hominum). 'The one and true Church' he wrote in a celebrated passage, 'is the community of men brought together by the profession of the same Christian faith and conjoined in the communion of the same sacraments, under the government of the legitimate pastors and especially the one vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman pontiff!'" (italics mine)

There is nothing particularly reprehensible in considering these terms as meaningful in terms of the community that professes faith in Jesus Christ. It would not be denied, however, that it is only in a visible community that professes faith in the Christ event that these terms could be meaningful at all. In other words, whether we feel more at home with the use of church or ecclesia, the understanding underlying both terms is that they are communities of persons who have decided to accept Christ in a way that the community as a whole recognizes.

23 This is not mere semantics. It provokes a legitimate question. When Emil Brunner says "Wo Jesus Christus so gegenwärtig ist unter Menschen, da ist Ekklesia im Werden (Das Missverständnis der Kirche, p. 108)", we may rightly ask how he understands Jesus Christ. The same would be true of Bellarmine's definition insofar as the norms he proposes would be purely conceptual! We feel the questions to be legitimate because conceptual exactitude by itself needs no validation, but the criterion that sees the conceptual exactitude realized in a particular community must be established. Churches which have stopped being ecclesial, as Brunner suggests in his book on pages 96-97, would have to be convinced of their having rejected the 'apotolic ecclesia'.

24 The point of this question is not to say that this relevance is impossible. It is rather to focus attention on the problem that the liberal efforts of the nineteenth century provoked, that is, the depicting of an image of the Christ without historical precedents.

25 Since we shall be dealing with the meaning of 'sacramental' at greater length in the course of this chapter, we shall desist from a positive explanation of what is implied in the sacramental. However, the sacramental aspect of the church is not to be understood in a pejorative sense as does Brunner on page 88 of his book, Das Missverständnis der Kirche.

26 We recognize that here we are invoking a Heideggerian perspective. But since this perspective would require a treatment of some length and since we shall be treating of this perspective in the third chapter of this dissertation, we shall forbear from attempting to elucidate that perspective at this point.

[27] The choice of these two authorities is made on the following grounds: K. Rahner brings to his theology a rich understanding of dogmatics, anthropology and transcendentalism. Vatican Council II issued two dogmatic constitutions: Lumen Gentium and Dei Verbum. The aftermath of Vatican Council II has been influenced by these authorities. (Confer T. M. Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology, 1800-1970, (translated by N. D. Smith, foreword by E. Schillebeeckx), copyright 1970 by Gill Macmillan Ltd., Paulist Newman Press.)

[28] The word 'structure' is used in opposition to the word 'model'. Structure denotes the "manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed" (Jacques Ehrmann (editor), Structuralism, Doubleday and Comapny, N. Y., 1970, p. 1).

We believe that with all the qualifications that one may apply to "models" (confer A. Dulles' Models of the Church, pp. 19-37), the conception of the model remains static.

[29] We are aware that our distinction between 'model' and 'structure' may seem somewhat arbitrary; also, that while the use of 'structure' is meaningful in a symbolist context, it may not necessarily be so here. However, we feel that our reference to 'structure' rather than 'model' is warranted by two reasons: first, models derive from conceptual frameworks, and even in the case of 'disclosure models' (confer I. T. Ramsey's Religious Language, Macmillan Paperbacks Edition, 1963, or F. Ferre's Language, Logic and God, Harper and Row, Publishers, N. Y., 1961) the disclosure is not within the model but outside of it! Second, the symbolist perspective obtains only when the structure is articulated, and that is exactly what we shall show to be happening in the case of the structures that apply to the church. Besides, we are dealing on the level of Semantics, not Semiotics (confer Paul Ricoeur's The Conflict of Interpretation, p. 79).

[30] Confer K. Rahner's The Shape of the Church to come, A Crossroad Book, The Seabury Press, New York. Translated and introduced by Edward Quinn. Copyright by S.P.C.K., 1974.

[31] K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, 1968. (The original work was finished in May, 1936, and the first edition was published in 1939 by Rauch in Innsbruck). This translation is by William Dych SJ from Geist in Welt, 1957.

[32] K. Rahner, HW, 1969. (The first edition appeared in 1941). This translation is by Michael Richards from Hörer des Wortes, 1963).

[33] HW, p. 26.

[34] HW, ibid.

[35] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. XIII, 8."Experience of self and experience of God," p. 126: "The unity which exists between experience of God and experience of the self...could of course be made clear in a process of transcendental reflection...The transcendence of man in knowledge and freedom, as it reaches up to absolute being...is at the same time the condition which makes it possible for the subject strictly as such to have experienced himself and to have achieved an 'objectification' of himself..."

[36] HW, p. 45.

[37] K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 121.

[38] Confer ibid., Chapter IV: Conversion to the Phantasm.

[39] K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 125: "...the judgment does not consist in relating and connecting the known, universal quiddities as such which stand on the side of the knowing subject, but in referring these to the 'something' standing over against the knowing subject, which is designated by the quiddity of the subject of the proposition, and of which the quiddity of the predicate is affirmed. Even if an attempt is made to conceive a universal concept by itself, it succeeds only in an affirmative synthesis, in a judgment."

[40] K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 378: "In its first and fundamental meaning, the species is not an 'intentional' (in the modern sense) double of the external object after the manner of an image, but, as the self-realization of the sensible in the material medium of sensibility, belongs to the being of the object itself, since every emanating influence is a perfection of the agent."

[41] HW, p. 42.

[42] HW, p. 64: "The pre-concept aims at the absolute being of God in the sense that the esse absolutum is always fundamentally affirmed through the former's basic unlimited breadth. This is no purely a priori proof of the existence of God, for the pre-concept and its breadth declar-e itself as an actual and necessary condition for all knowledge only through the a posteriori perception of a real existent being."

[43] HW, p. 64: "...the affirmation of the actual finitude of an existent requires, as condition for its possibility, the affirmation of the existence of an esse absolutum, which takes place implicitly already in the preconcept of being in general, through which the limitation of the finite existent is for the first time recognized as such."

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[44] HW, p. 85: "...in his transcendental experience of limitation man presents being to himself...as something that does not lie at his disposal."

[45] HW, pp. 101-102: "The disclosure of the transcendental horizon of being in general through which man stands before God takes place in a deliberate attitude which man adopts to himself. This is the human consequence and resultant of the free delimitation of this finite cognitive existent thing by God."

[46] ibid., p. 113.

[47] ibid., p. 113.

[48] ibid., p. 161.

[49] ibid., pp. 168-169.

[50] ibid., p. 171.

[51] ibid., p. 174.

[52] HW, p. 75. (Note: this is actually footnote 3 that begins on page 73 and continues onto page 75): "...we must again emphasize the fact that the factual, supernatural self-revelation of God is only one possibility, which man cannot expect or derive, and which is in this sense absolutely not owed him, although it belongs to his inner essence -- it has in fact been given by God. This is possibly a new point of departure to arrive at a theological understanding of the possible unity of the quality of not being owed, and at the same time, the immanence of divine grace in man."

A critique of this position is provided by E. Schillebeeckx in Revelation and Theology, translated by N. D. Smith, Sheed and Ward, 1968, Vol. II, p. 62.

[53] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. I. 4."Theos in the New Testament," p. 83, footnote 1: "Cf. K. Rahner, Hörer des Wortes (Munich 1941). It must of course be noted that this necessary 'natural' openness of man to God is, in the historically realized scheme of things, always necessarily 'overlaid' (even when man is not in a state of justifying grace) by a supernatural 'existential' ordering the spiritual person to the God of eternal life."

[54] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IX, 11."One Mediator and many mediations," p. 180: "It is not the Christ-event which provides the foundation for God's will for our salvation, i.e. God's desire, effectual throughout the whole of history, to communicate himself; the Christ-event is itself the 'effect' of the latter. Because God loves the world he sent his Son."

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[55] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, 9."The Theology of the Symbol," p. 238; "...the humanity of Christ is really the 'appearance' of the Logos itself, its symbolic reality in the preeminent sense, not something in itself alien to the Logos and its reality, which is only taken up from outside like an instrument to make its own music but not strictly speaking to reveal anything of him who uses it."

[56] ibid., p. 239.

[57] ibid., p. 240.

[58] The idea that the church is an accident of history or the next best thing to experiencing the Christ event in its pristine purity is ruled out. Such a trend is to be found, we feel, in George Tyrrell's The Church and the Future, Priory Press, Hamstead, London, 1910, p. 83.

[59] Besides the problem occasioned by the natural and the supernatural ends (refer to de Lubac's The Mystery of the Supernatural, translated by Rosemary Sheed, Geoffrey Chapman Ltd., Great Britain, 1967) God's initiative would seem to be superceded!

[60] This idea of a general christianity is rejected by Rahner. Confer TI, Vol. II, 1."Membership in the Church according to the teaching of Pius xii's encyclical 'Mystici Corporis Christi'." pp. 1-88.

[61] K. Rahner, Inspiration in the Bible, Herder KG, 1961, p. 39: "God wills the Church and has instituted her. His is an absolute will. He intends her to be, therefore, in redemptive-historical predefinition. This partly because his design for the Incarnation of the Logos is an absolute one, and made by God prior to any human, free, decision, which could have been its motive. The Church is also implied in this design. Another reason is that the Church, as distinct from the Synagogue, is a Church for all time, the ultimate and irrevocable economy of salvation, the concrete representation of God's free, triumphant, unconditional design for our salvation."

[62] Confer Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, The Open Court Publishing Co., Illinois, 1954.

[63] K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 78: "If we start out from the fundamental premise of the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge that knowledge is the being-present-to-itself of an existent of a definite intensity of being, which presence-to-self is just the material expression of the intensity of being itself, it follows necessarily that the knower of such an intensity of being and the known are identical."

[64] K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 142: "3. Agent Intellect as 'Pre-apprehension' ("Vorgriff") ...the agent intellect is to be understood so that it can know the form as limited, confined, and thus as of itself embracing further possibilities, through which

the form possessed in a concretion in sensibility is apprehended as limited and so is abstracted, we call 'pre-apprehension' ("Vorgriff").

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 191: "As the appropriation of understanding, the interpretation operates in Being towards a totality of involvements which is already understood -- a Being which understands. When something is understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation, and this is always done under the guidance of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which is grounded in something we see in advance -- in a fore-sight...the interpretation will be found essentially upon fore-having (Vorhabe), fore-sight (Vorsicht), and fore-conception (Vorgriff)."

65 We refer to this act as dynamic insofar as it is a forward thrust that is found as the possibility of the intellect functioning, and not as the object of the intellect as such.

K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, Seabury Press, N. Y., 1978, p. 33: "Man is a transcendent being insofar as all of his knowledge and all of his conscious activity is grounded in a pre-apprehension (Vorgriff) of 'being' as such, in an unthematic but ever-present knowledge of the infinity of reality (as we can put it provisionally and somewhat boldly).

66 K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 220: "...in the intellectually known, an a priori element which spirit brings with it from itself is known simultaneously (the light of the agent intellect is seen), and this is the condition of every objective knowledge (it is not known unless it is illuminated by light). This a priori element of all knowledge is therefore not an innate idea, since it is known simultaneously as the condition of the possibility of the intellectual apprehension of what is given sensibly -- namely then, when it exercises a 'formal' function in respect to the material of sensibility."

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 414: "The Articulation of the understanding of Being, the delimitation of an area of subject-matter (a delimitation guided by this understanding), and the sketching-out of the way of conceiving which is appropriate to such entities -- all these belong to the totality of this projecting; and this totality is what we call 'thematizing'...Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first 'posit' entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine their character 'Objectively'."

67 Confer K. Rahner's TI, Vol. XIII, 2. Thomas Aquinas on Truth, p. 21, for commentary on the scholastic reditio subjecti in seipsum.

68 By 'real' we imply a starting point that obtains in the context of a sensitive-rational act, and therefore opposed to 'logical'.

[69] K. Rahner, HW, p. 141: "...insofar as the access to God is given only in the a priori structure of the human spirit (that is, only in its own proper transcendence or a return into itself), we may assert that man possesses the possibility of a return into himself that reveals being, and hence God,...only in an out-going into the world of which man himself is a part."

[70] The statement or argument that is made uses a proleptic device. We are not beginning a process of discovery from scratch. In actual fact, we are also using the giveness of revelation as an element in this process. The proleptic device implies that while the presence of such an object exists, our knowledge of it exists as a pre-apprehension prior to our affirming the object of revelation as such. The use of this proleptic device is not meant to nullify either the gratuity of revelation (e.g. justifying grace) or man's inability to save himself, that is to say: the proleptic device does not fuse the natural and the supernatural. Confer K. Rahner's TI, Vol. IV, "Nature and Grace," pp. 165-88; HW, p. 73, footnote 3.

[71] In affirming the sameness of the dynamic in the person who affirms and in the unique object that is affirmed, we are face to face with the problem of the 'supernatural existential'. The total meaning of this notion is far from settled. We refer in the first place to the understanding given it by K. Rahner in his TI, Vol. X, 2."Church Churches and Religions," p. 35: "This 'supernatural existence' or mode of being (as we may call this finality and dynamic impulse which makes us tend towards the immediate presence of God is indeed the outcome of grace. But it is inserted into man's nature through the salvific will of God to become an abiding element in his spiritual mode of being, and as something that is a living force in man always and everywhere, whether accepted or rejected by man's own free will. It radically influences the ultimate development of his existence as spiritual."

Confer also, TI, Vol. III, 6. "Reflections on the experience of grace", pp. 86-90; Henri de Lubac's The Mystery of the Supernatural, chapter 10, "A Finality that has no End", pp. 242-271; and Hans Urs von Balthasar's The Theology of Karl Barth, pp. 222-226.

For criticism of Rahner's idea of the 'supernatural existential', confer Edward Schillebeeckx's Revelation and Theology, Vol. II. "The non-conceptual intellectual element in the act of faith: a reaction", pp. 30-75.

[72] K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, p. 141: "The 'supernatural existential' also has a history. If it is in this way that man is a being of subjectivity, of transcendence, of freedom and of a mutual relationship with the holy mystery which we call God; if he is the event of God's absolute self-communication, and if he is all of this always and inescapably and from the very beginning; and if as such a being of divinized transcendence he is at the same time a historical being both individually and collectively, then it follows that this everpresent and supernatural existential...has a history individually and collectively, and this is at once the single history of both salvation and revelation."

Rahner's idea of history is not conceived in terms of positive scientific methods, or the historico-critical method. Such history cannot be the focus of Rahner's method since it need not be historic, i.e. geschichtlich. Yet, the historic takes place on the same plane as does history whether it is considered as chronological, transmission of traditions, etc.

Confer Van A. Harvey's The Historian and the Believer, chapter VII, "The Morality of Historical Knowledge and the perspective theory of history", pp. 204-45, and the description of 'field-encompassing history, pp. 223f and 248f. Also, confer R. G. Collingwood's The Idea of History and the scissor's and paste historical method; Norman Pittenger's Christian Faith and the Question of History, chapter four, "The Historical Nature of Christianity", pp. 71-90; and Wolfhart Pannenberg's Human Nature, Election, and History, chapter five, "Election and History", pp. 83-105.

[73] An enlightening idea of the type of history we are dealing with in Rahner is presented by Walter Kasper in Encyclopedia of Theology edited by K. Rahner, p. 633: "God is the end of history in the sense that he is also end-term and completion, because he assumes and affirms it 'inconfusedly and undividedly' (D 302). This means that the consummation of history must not be regarded as coming only from on high, in the sense of a one-sided theology of the incarnation. It must also be regarded as a process of self-maturation accomplished from below...its fulfillment is the passover mystery of Easter, a possibility of surpassing itself provided by grace." (History, III, Theology of History").

Also, confer K. Rahner's HW, p. 133.

[74] Confer K. Rahner's Foundations of Christian Faith, pp. 162-170.

Also, W. Pannenberg's Human Nature, Election, and History, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1977. p. 99: "The symbolic representation of God's Kingdom to come has been the basic idea of Christian history. The entire course of that history is characterized by a continuous struggle for the expression of God's Kingdom in the life of the Christian people. It has been a struggle to reshape the society formed by the Christians so as to correspond to their faith in the Kingdom of God."

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[75] Confer also, W. Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. One, chapter three, "Kerygma and History", pp. 81-95, especially pages 92-93 concerning the transmission of traditions.

[76] Refer footnote 71.

The understanding is that one can clarify only that of which one has experience. The presence of Jesus in the world is a datum of revelation and this datum can form part of the experience of a person only through faith. The visible act of faith in Jesus is normatively present in the church.

[77] This 'manifested presence of Jesus' through which God speaks and communicates life to man may be termed the 'Christ event'. We are aware of the problems connected with the understanding of this term. For us it denotes a happening in history which derives from the person of Jesus Christ. By 'happening' we mean a concrete and visible occurrence; by 'history' we mean that there is a matrix of community in which the occurrence is registered; and finally, by deriving 'from the person of Jesus Christ' we mean that our understanding of this occurrence and history is, first of all, manifest in the revelation of Jesus Christ; secondly, that such an understanding is a posteriori; and thirdly, that the salvation mediated to man in this occurrence is solely in virtue of Jesus Christ.

We agree that, in terms of the transcendental method, the Christological understanding of the Christ event is not seen to be specifically determined by history. (Confer Walter Kasper's Jesus the Christ, translated by V. Green, Paulist Press Paperback, 1977, 50-51, "It is not the transcendental approach as such which deserves criticism but the fact that Rahner plays down the formal nature of that approach...history is essentially the categorical material in and through which transcendental freedom is realized. Rahner takes too little notice of the fact that the true reality of history implies a determinaton of the transcendental conditions affecting the possibility of understanding. It is a determination which is not derivable from and not wholly conceivable in terms of those conditions...Rahner's approach is still largely within the bounds of the idealistic philosophy of identity and its identification of being and consciousness... In his reaching out to infinity...man remains finite.")

To this critique of Walter Kasper as regards Rahner's approach to Christology and therefore to the Christ event, we have two observations to make: first, the reality of the intellectual dynamism cannot be gainsaid as one legitimate point of departure for man to face up to the mystery of Being; second, at no stage of his treatment of the transcendental method does Rahner attempt to compare the entitative status of the supernatural to that of the natural. The transcendence appears in the fact that every historical manifestation of the dynamic is symbolic, that is, it does not exhaust the

potential of the dynamic. If then, the question of Rahner's 'metaphysicing' (Jesus the Christ, p. 50) historical Christianity is posed to us, we reply that every symbolic manifestation is limited by its field of reference, and this field of reference is never absolute. It is this non-absolute field of reference that is the precise problematic in HW: the problem of continuity and discontinuity between the finite and the infinite. Confer also K. Rahner's TI, Vols. IV ("On the Theology of the Incarnation", pp. 105-120); V ("Christology within an evolutionary view of the world", pp. 157-192; XIII ("The Quest for Approaches leading to an understanding of the Mystery of the God-Man Jesus", pp. 195-200).

78 The visibility of the eschatological event that begins in Jesus in not merely juxtaposed to the person of Jesus. Rather, the visibility is already part of the manifestative reality of the person of Jesus here and now. Rahner's theory of the symbol connotes precisely this oneness of sacramentality: the dynamic that is constitutive of the manifestative presence of Jesus is also constitutive of its sacramental manifestation.

79 K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, pp. 343-44, "By the very nature of Christianity, church must be understood in such a way that it springs from the very essence of Christianity as the supernatural self-communication of God to mankind which has become manifest in history and has found its final and definitive historical climax in Jesus Christ. Church is part of Christianity as the very event of salvation. The concreteness of Jesus Christ as something which challenges me must confront me in what we call the church. It is a church which I do not form and which is not constituted only through my wishes and religious needs, but rather it is a church which confronts me in a mission, a mandate and a proclamation which really makes the reality of salvation present for me."

80 Confer K. Rahner's The Church and the Sacraments, pp. 18-19.

81 Confer K. Rahner's TI, Vol. IX, chapter eleven, "One Mediator and many mediations", pp. 169-184.

82 J. Powers, Symbolic Instrumentality in the Sacramental Theology of E. H. Schillebeeckx, O.P., (manuscript), Rome, 1968: "...Prof. Schillebeeckx takes exception to the authors who would see in the sacraments a continuation of the earthly life of Christ. The sacraments...cannot be said to continue Christ's earthly life, but rather should be seen as continuing the function of that earthly life precisely because they are the earthly extension of the heavenly Christ."

Also confer K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, p. 19: "As with Christ the distinction between his Godhead and his humanity remains without confusion though they are inseparable, sign and reality, manifest historical form and the Holy Spirit, are not the same in the Church, but as in Christ, are not separable any more either."

[83] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. XIV, 8. "What is a Sacrament?," p. 139: "I believe...that the word pronounced in the Church in the name and at the behest of God and Christ has in principle an exhibitive character, that it effects what it signifies, to express it straightway in the formula which is classic to the theology of the sacraments."

[84] We say "not merely promise" where promise denotes a reality only in the future.

[85] This idea of Rahner is linked to his understanding of the function of the potentia oboedientialis, i.e. the fact of human nature ordained to grace as a potentia oboedientialis. Confer Hans Urs von Balthasar's The Theology of Karl Barth for a discussion and critique of the same, pp. 222-225. Also, K. Rahner's TI, 7. "Nature and Grace," pp. 184-187, and HW, p. 161.

[86] K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, p. 40: "The sign effects grace by grace producing the sacramental sign of the sanctification effected. This, of course, can only be said if the church as an entity is truly and inseparably connected with grace."

The connection referred to above may be better understood by a passage from Rahner's Spirit in the World, p. 359: "'To move' and 'to be moved' are the same in their intrinsic being. They are distinguished only by the fact that the being of what we call 'to move' maintains itself precisely in the moved as an actuality of the mover; it produces the 'to be moved' with its same intrinsic quiddity from out of the moved (the moved 'moves itself'), and thus expands in the moved itself as an actuality of the self-mover."

[87] The initiative refers to the opus operatum; the response, to the opus operantis.

K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, p. 33-34: "...Opus operatum is not a concept in opposition to faith. It states that God sola gratia, out of pure grace, gives this faith and utters this gracious summons to man plainly and simply in the historically visible form of the sacraments. Opus operatum...does not mean that where a human being is capable of personal faith, this grace which is offered and unconditionally promised in the sacraments, ignores the faith of the human being."

[88] K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, p. 14: "Through the incarnation the whole of redemption was already pre-formed...

...the whole of mankind is in principle already accepted for salvation in this member and head of mankind who is irrevocably united with God in unity of person."

[89] Confer D. O'Hanlon, Hans Küng and Yves Congar (editors), Council Speeches of Vatican II, 1964.

[90] Vat. II, pp. 359-69.

[91] Bonaventure Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, p. 41.

[92] Confer A. R. Vidler, The Modernist Movement in the Roman Catholic Church, 1934.

[93] G. Tyrrell, Medievalism: A Reply to Cardinal Mercier, London, 1908, p. 53: "If you mean that the tradition lives exclusively in the collective episcopal conscience, or still worse...in the single conscience of the Pope,...your meaning is repudiated... You forget that every baptised Christian is a commissioned apostle and teacher; and as such is no mere telephone, but must speak from the fullness of living personal interest in the truth of his religion; that he must think his faith and penetrate and develop it according to the measure of his education and understanding."

[94] ibid., p. 192: Card. Mercier's pastoral: "L'épiscopat, en union avec le Souverain Pontife, a donc ainsi reçu et possède seul la mission d'exposer officiellement, de commenter authentiquement les doctrines révélées par le Christ;..."

[95] H. Vorgrimler (editor), Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 1969, Vol. I. 1) The nature of the Church militant; 2) The members of the Church and the necessity of the Church for salvation; 3) The episcopate as the highest grade of the sacrament of orders; the priesthood; 4) Residential bishops; 5) The states of evangelical perfection; 6) The laity; 7) The teaching office (magisterium) of the Church; 8) Authority and obedience in the Church; 9) Relationships between Church and State and religious tolerance; 10) The necessity of proclaiming the gospel to all peoples and in the whole world; 11) Ecumenism. An appendix in the form of a chapter 'Virgin Mary, Mother of God and Mother of Men'. (p. 106) John XXIII made a specific request that the constitution should not be scholastic in character. (p. 108)

[96] Op. Cit., Vol. I, p. 135.

[97] Op. Cit., Vol. I, pp. 135-137.

[98] Op. Cit., Vol. I, p. 202.

[99] B. Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, p. 14.

[100] Op. Cit., p. 15.

[101] K. Rahner (editor), Encyclopedia of Theology, "Mystery" by K. Rahner, pp. 1002-1003: "At bottom there is only one mystery: God's incomprehensibility as God is not simply the remote horizon within which our existence moves, or the infinitely distant point towards which the multiplicity of finite realities move asymptotically as towards a single inaccessible unifying point; without ceasing to be that, God gives himself to us without intermediary; he himself as he is becomes the innermost reality of our being. The one mystery is that this is possible, real and known to us through grace in faith. And this one mystery has a double aspect: God himself as mystery and God's self-communication to us, through which as abiding mystery he becomes our innermost reality."

[102] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. VI, 18." The Sinful Church in the Decrees of Vatican II," pp. 270-292.

[103] The Documents of Vatican II, p. 352: "The Spirit dwells in the Church and in the hearts of the faithful, as in a temple (cf. Cor. 3: 16; 6:19). In them he prays and bears witness to their adoptive sonship (cf. Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8:15-16 and 26). Guiding the Church in the way of all truth (cf. Jn. 16:13) and unifying her in communion and in the works of ministry, he bestows upon her varied hierarchic and charismatic gifts, and in this way directs her; and he adorns her with his fruits (cf. Eph. 4:11-12; 1 Cor. 12:4; Gal. 5:22). By the power of the Gospel he permits the Church to keep the freshness of youth. Constantly he renews her and leads her to perfect union with her Spouse. For the Spirit and her Bride both say to Jesus, the Lord: 'Come!' (cf. Apoc. 22:17)

"Hence the universal Church is seen to be a people brought into unity from the unity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit."

[104] B. Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, p. 131: "For such full incorporation the Council here requires: (1) possession of the Spirit of Christ; (2) acceptance of the entire system of Church organization; (3) acceptance of all the means of salvation; and (4) union with Christ within the visible structure of the Church by the bonds of faith, sacraments, ecclesiastical government, and communion."

[105] B. Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, p. 157: "The Church's form of unity is communion. The Council speaks of the "unity of communion" (LG 15a/33), and of fellowship in unity" (UR 2d/344). The Holy Spirit "gives her (the Church) a unity of fellowship and service" (LG 4b/17); he is "the principle of their coming together" LH 13a/31). We have here a very important but relatively unexplored principle: the external unity of the Church should be sought and structured in the form of a communion. If it is, the Church will be the universal congregation of love. "If by the will of Christ some (in the Church) are made teachers, dispensers of mysteries, and shepherds on behalf of others, yet all share a true equality with regard to the dignity and to the activity common to all the faithful for the building up of the Body of Christ" (LG 32c/58)."

[106] B. Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, p. 158: "However, those who carry out these hierarchical services were not meant by Christ to shoulder alone the entire saving mission of the Church toward the world. On the contrary, they understand that it is their noble duty so to shepherd the faithful and recognize their services and charismatic gifts that all according to their proper roles may cooperate in this common undertaking with one heart (LG 30b/57)."

[107] B. Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, p. 159: "The Church is not a democracy; much less is it a monarchy; it is a fellowship in which 'all share a true equality with regard to the dignity and to the activity common to all the faithful for the building up of the Body of Christ' (LG 32c/58). This conception must be taken seriously and put into practice."

[108] M. Blondel, History and Dogma, Harvell Press, 1964, p. 267: "...whenever the testimony of Tradition has to be invoked to resolve one of the crises of growth in the spiritual life of Christians, it presents the conscious mind with elements previously held back in the depths of faith and practised rather than expressed, systematized or reflected upon. This power of conservation and preservation also instructs and initiates... It has a humble sense of faithfully recovering even what it discovers."

[109] Op. Cit., p. 240.

[110] Op. Cit., p. 241.

[111] Op. Cit., p. 241.

[111a] Op. Cit., p. 279.

[112] Op. Cit., p. 286-287: "One realizes through the practice of Christianity that its dogmas are rooted in reality. "...one must consider not only the efforts of each man, but the concensus of all who live the same life and share in the same love." "History cannot, without leading to the shipwreck of faith, disregard Christian knowledge by which I mean the results methodically acquired by the collective experience of Christ verified and realized in us."

[113] Y. Congar, Tradition and Traditions, published in the United States by the Macmillan Company, 1967.

[114] Op. Cit., p. 454: "(1) Documents are not the sole constitutive elements of Tradition, which cannot be either conceived or defined without the inclusion of its living subject, which is (primarily) the Holy Spirit, and (visibly) the Church with its assisted magisterium. (2) The Church and the magisterium have no autonomy whatever in regard to the depositum fidei. But this deposit must not be identified with the documents or monuments.

The Church and the magisterium are closely tied to these latter, and yet command resources which go beyond those of a purely documentary kind."

115 To the objection made against the catholics that they assimilate history into revelation, Congar states the catholic position as one which does not begin by trying to link the present church with the Christ event but rather living out of a reality which has the divine already within it.

Op Cit., p. 269: "Basically, it (i.e. the catholic position) consists in a recognition of the fact that the divine activity persists in the Church, not as revealing or establishing the essential structure of the religious relationship, but in order to enable this relationship to continue and its implications to be grasped by men."

116 Op Cit., p. 313: (in the following quotation from Congar, the argument is made for one such element: infallibility.) "A certain number of the Church's acts, or acts of the pope who personifies it, are infallible. It cannot be said without qualification, of the pope and the Church that they just are infallible. But infallibility is assured to certain acts of which they are subjects, and so one can say, with the Vatican Council, that the pope is infallible when... The acts occur sometimes at the end of a period of research or of a struggle full of uncertainties, of which history can provide us with more than one example."

117 Y. Congar, The Mystery of the Church, Geoffrey Chapman, Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1960, p. 143: "...catholicity as the universal capacity of the Church's principles of unity means that the peculiar values of the Hindu world -- values in the sphere of thought and art, values of character, language, cultural in their specific nature -- can be taken up into the unity of the Body of Christ and become mystically (pneumatically), as it were, the flesh and members of the new Adam. Christ will not be complete till he has, in this way, incorporated the whole man in each of us, and all the human values lying scattered in all their variety throughout the world. For he has -- and so has the Church, his Body -- the capacity to bring all this together in himself unto God."

118 Concilium, Supplement au no 60, decembre 1970, Y. Congar, "Structures essentielles pour l'Eglise de demain", pp. 148-149: "L'ecclésiologie du peuple de Dieu s'approfondira dans une ecclésiologie de communion et de fraternité. ...Bibliquement parlant, communion, koinônia, suppose participation, metochè: voir 1 Jn 1, 1-3. C'est parce qu'on a part aux mêmes biens, à la même mission (cum-munus) que l'on est en communion. On continue donc la démarche du concile: fonder les structures dans une ontologie de grâce finalement sacramentelle."

In both the above passages, the unity or the communion indicated by Congar would be achieved on the basis of the tradition -- spoken of earlier -- present beyond the confines of the visible church:

[119]Y. Congar, Tradition and Traditions, p. 454: "Tradition is ultimately synthetic in its method of growth; it contains both documents and objective facts, both original data and life given through the Holy Spirit, an objective external norm together with a living subject. We could not give an adequate account of Tradition if we were to reduce it to any single one of these constituents."

[120]B. Kloppenberg, Ecclesiology of Vatican II, p. 86.

[121]Op. Cit., p. 87.

[122]It is always necessary to keep in mind that it is not a simple efficient causality that enables the church to do this, else we would be considering the church as a human community.

[123]Confer K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, and G. C. Berkouwer, The Church.

[124]Confer Catechismus, Romae, 1920, p. 104: "Sacramentum, inquit ille, est signum rei sacrae (De Civ. Dei, X, 5): vel, ut aliis verbis, in eandem tamen sententiam dictum est, sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visible signum, ad nostrum iustificationem institutum (sanctus Bernardus, Serm. de coen. Dom. 2)." Confer also DS 1639.

[125]Catechismus, p. 104: "...rem demonstrandam saepissime sacramenti nomine, interdum vero etiam symboli, vel mystici signi, vel sacri signi voce usos esse. Atque haec de sacramenti nomine dicta sint: ...."

[126]Catechismus, p. 106: "....alia vero Deus instituit, quae non significandi modo, sed efficiendi etiam vim haberent; atque in hoc posteriorum signorum genere sacramenta novae legis numeranda esse, liquido apparet; signa enim sunt divinitus tradita, non ab hominibus inventa, quae rei cuiuspiam sacrae, quam declarant, efficientiam in se continere certo credimus.

[127]Catechismus, p. 106: "Quare, ut explicatius, quid sacramentum sit declaretur, docendum erit, rem esse sensibus subiectam, quae, ex Dei institutione, sanctitatis et iustitiae tum significandae, tum efficiendae vim habet: ex quo sequitur, ut facile quivis possit intelligere...."

[128]Catechismus, p. 171: "Commode etiam fieri videbitur, si panis et vini natura, quae huius sacramenti symbola sunt, perpendatur..."

[129]Confer DS 1606.

[130]E. Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, Vol. II, p. 62, and DS 1607-8.

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[131]Confer E. Doronzo: De Sacramentis in genere, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, 1946, pp. 136-262. Grace is seen as the self-sufficient term of reference, so much so that the aspect of relatedness to Jesus Christ, the cause of redemption, seems downgraded.

[132]Confer Joseph Powers, Symbolic Instrumentality in the Sacramental Theology of E. H. Schillebeeckx, (manuscript) 1968.

[133]Confer Emil Brunner, The Divine - Human Encounter, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1943.

[134]E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, Sheed & Ward, Ltd., 1963.

K. Rahner, TI, Vol. XIV, 9."Introductory Observations of Thomas Aquinas' Theology of the Sacraments in General," p. 150. "But surely the ultimate reason for this lack of clarity, over and above all these others, is the fact that the relationship between the 'sign function and the instrumental causality of the sacraments as Thomas presents them is not fully thought out in its ultimate significance. Yet it is emphasized that both aspects belong to the sacrament. The first represents a further extension of the ancient theological traditions of Augustine, and second -- probably developed more by Aquinas himself -- is designed to overcome a danger which -- it is evident -- Thomas himself clearly recognized, the danger, namely, that the sacraments themselves might be regarded merely as sheer external manifestations of an event of grace which in itself is totally independent of these signs."

[135]Confer K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, "The Theology of the Symbol", pp. 221-252.

[136]This understanding of Sacraments corresponds to that found, for instance, in The Christian Faith, Theological Publications, Bangalore, 1973, pp. 345-361, edited by J. Neuner and J. Dupuis.

[137]K. Rahner (editor), Encyclopedia of Theology, "Symbol" by Jörg Splett, pp. 1655-1657.

[138]K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, 9."The Theology of the Symbol", p. 232: "This external manifestation of the substantial form or cause is indeed, according to the basic doctrines of scholasticism just alluded to, different from the form as such. But it still manifests this basic form in this very difference: it is a symbol which is created by that which is symbolized as its own self-realization. In this differe tiated 'symbol'that which is symbolized is present, the form itself (creating the 'ontological-symbolic' difference between symbolic reality and symbolic representation), since it brings about the 'other' which it forms, inasmuch as it imparts to it the reality which the form itself has."

[139] K. Rahner, HW, p. 124: "The materia of Thomistic ontology is indeed a real metaphysical constituent of an existent thing, but it is not observable, it is not to be considered as material."

"The being of man that the scholastics call forma is (thus) the 'having being' of that unspecified real possibility that is called materia. The being of man is actualized in itself in such a way that even in its first incipient essence it must be comprehended as the reality of the 'other', that is, of the materia."

[140] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, 9. "The Theology of the Symbol," p. 224; "Our first statement, which we put forward as the basic principle of an ontology of symbolism, is as follows: all beings are by their nature symbolic, because they necessarily 'express' themselves in order to attain their own nature."

[141] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, 9. "The Theology of the Symbol", p. 227: "But these plural moments in the unity of a being must have an inner agreement among themselves on account of the unity of the being, even though the plurality of moments in a being must be constituted by the reciprocal diversity of these moments. And they cannot have this agreement as the simple juxtaposition, so to speak, of moments which are there as such originally. This would imply a denial of the unity of the being in question: unity would be the subsequent conjunction of separate elements which once stood only on their own. This would be to betray the profound principle of St. Thomas: non enim plura secundum se uniuntur: there can be no union of things which are of themselves multiple. A plurality in an original and an originally superior unity can only be understood as follows: the 'one' develops, the plural stems from an original 'one', in a relationship of origin and consequence; the original unity, which also forms the unity which unites the plural, maintains itself while resolving itself and 'dis-closing', itself into a plurality in order to find itself precisely there."

[142] K. Rahner, The Trinity, Seabury Press, N. Y., 1974, pp. 32-33: "The relation which exists between the two is more essential and more intimate. Human nature in general is a possible object of the creative knowledge and power of God, because and insofar as the Logos is by nature the one who is "utterable" (even into that which is not God); because he is the Father's Word, in which the Father can express himself, and, freely, empty himself into the non-divine; because, when this happens, that precisely is born which we call human nature. In other words, human nature is not a mask (The πρόσωπον) assumed from without, from behind which the Logos hides to act things out in the world. From the start it is the constitutive, real symbol of the Logos himself. So that we may and should say, when we think our ontology through to the end: man is possible because the exteriorization of the Logos is possible."

[143] Confer Anne Carr, The Theological Method of Karl Rahner, Scholars Press, Missoula, 1977, pp. 262-263.

[144] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. XIII, 3."Possible Courses for the Theology of the Future," p. 46: "A transcendental theology could be defined as that kind of systematic theology which (a) avails itself of a transcendental philosophy as its instrument, and at the same time (b) is more explicit than formerly and, unlike fundamental theology, not wholly concerned with general principles in defining its themes for investigation on the basis of questions arising at a genuinely theological level. For these themes are the a priori conditions in the believing subject which enable him to recognize the fundamental truths of his faith."

K. Rahner, TI, Vol. X, 1 "The New Image of the Church," p. 21.

[145] K. Rahner, Spirit In The World, pp. 142: "...the agent intellect is to be understood so that it can know the form as limited, confined, and thus as of itself embracing further possibilities in itself, as bordering upon a broader field of possibilities.

"...it comprehends of itself the whole field of these possibilities..."

"This transcending apprehension of further possibilities, through which the form possessed in a concentration in sensibility is apprehended as limited and so is abstracted, we call "pre-apprehension" ("Vorgriff").

[146] Confer K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, "Word and Eucharist", pp. 253-286.

[147] Confer K. Rahner, The Church and Sacraments, p. 32.

[148] The magical understanding of the symbol is to be understood in opposition to the sacramental. The magical would imply that a mere material thing would have power out of proportion to its nature. It negates the sovereignty of God -- his freedom in particular -- in that times, places, actions and particular individuals would manipulate God's activity. The notion of magic which such a material object implies, nullifies the worth of the present in that it identifies the present with the Ur-time (confer Mircea Eliade's Images and Symbols, Search Book edition, New York, 1969). By this identification, the present is seen as meaningful only when thrust back into the past. This magical notion tends to enslave the world of persons in that the freedom of the person does not feature in worship. The sacramental understanding of the symbol takes into account the following: a) The starting point of the sacramental activity is the faith of the church within which the person's humble surrender in faith takes places. Sacramental activity does not call God to book or force his hand; b) Sacramental activity confronts man with the mystery of God and invites man to surrender to this mystery in loving, humble prayer-fullness; c) While recalling the Christ event of the past, sacramental activity invests the present with its meaning and points to the future as history that is meaningful; d) Sacramental activity is meaningful because the whole life of man

enters into the surrender which he makes to God in faith; e) Sacramental activity always implies an intention: that means there must be a free decision on the part of the person who benefits from it.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Mission of the Church as Sacrament

Introduction

The aim of this dissertation has been to clarify the mission of the church as sacrament to non-christian peoples. The second and third chapters detailed some of the characteristics that applied to the Kingdom of God as eschatological and ecclesial. The evangelists described Jesus as proclaiming the eschatological Kingdom of God, while Paul and the other New Testament writers proclaimed Jesus as the realization of that Kingdom. At the close of chapter three, we elaborated on why the church was to be considered a symbol and therefore a sacrament.

In this chapter, we suggest that the understanding of the mission of the church as sacrament must be considered a hermeneutical undertaking[1]. The conclusions and observations made in the previous chapters should be pertinent to this understanding. If this understanding were not a hermeneutical undertaking then we should have been able to describe and predict the mission of the church merely in terms of conclusions deriving from positivistic premises[2], or -- using the historical-critical method[3] -- to make assertions about the scope of this mission in the world purely in terms of analytic considerations[4]. Such conclusions or assertions would not be sufficient. Our task is to arrive at an understanding of the church's mission such that it engages persons at the conscience level, and the above mentioned conclusions or assertions, while combining to make for a rigorous scientific methodology[5], need not make a claim on a person at that level. To

assume that such methodology would be sufficient would be to play down the depth and the seriousness of the faith-event present in the church[6], for without being a mere ethical construct[7], the faith event engages the person in conscience, in the depths of his being[8].

A hermeneutical undertaking implies that no methodology as such is used, since a methodology assumes predictable steps and a consequent predictable end result. A hermeneutical undertaking stresses non-objectified self-understanding[9] such that even the manner in which one understands oneself is constitutive of one's being[10]. It would seem that the hermeneutical process would be most appropriate to understanding the mission of the church since the proclamation of the faith event[11] engages and constitutes the being of a person, no less, in the world[12].

The mission of the church continues the proclamation of the faith event in sacramental reality. It is the consciousness of such a reality that urges us to embark upon a hermeneutical quest, so that what is present in consciousness may attain a greater degree of clarity[13].

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to study the hermeneutics of such a proclamation. To this end, the chapter will include the following parts:

I. The Heideggerian Perspective.

II. The Problem of the Self-understanding and Gadamer's solution.

III. The church and the Horizontverschmelzung.

IV. Proclamational Causality.

V. Conclusion.

I. The Heideggerian Perspective[14]

The mission of the church was seen by us to engage a person at the conscience level. An approach which would enable the church to do this could not be merely rational. Rational thought believes that it is primarily through intellectual constructs of reality that perception occurs. Besides, rational thought operates on the premise that intellectual perception while operating in the flow of history is not affected by that very history. This premise would, in part, explain the sterility of rationalism which canonized reason and allowed it to invest the world with reality!

A new approach was called for, in which judgmental objectivity (the intellectual-rational approach) would not be dominant. We characterize the new approach by the term "perspectivism", since this is an approach that views reality without assigning it values that obtain from uncorroborated premises. "Perspectivism" is a phenomenological tool since it sees reality not in isolated identity, but within a total context. The total context in which reality is enmeshed provides the continuous background that allows reality to be perceived as particular.

To attain the correct perspective, we do not begin by assigning arbitrary contexts to different pieces of reality. We begin by examining the reality with which one is in contact, and noting the manner in which the bits of reality form a perspective while fitting into that very perspective themselves. In this process, perception does not apply first to the perspective and then to the different bits of reality fitting into the perspective, but rather the perception is in the seeing-of-the-bits-of-reality-in-perspective.

In terms of what we have said above, we believe that the mission of the church cannot be first constructed in its own right and then judged suitable for the world. The mission of the church must take shape in a perspective, that is in the context of the life experience of non-christian persons. At the same time, the church must retain its identity as salvific presence of Jesus in the world. We believe that the possibility of such a perspective has been described and explained by Heidegger, and that further, it allows the church to truly remain the salvific presence of Jesus in the world.

In the following paragraphs we wish to present a brief resumé of the seminal influences that form part of the background against which Heidegger's perspective will be elaborated.

The Kantian critique had questioned the possibility of transcendental metaphysics on the premise that metaphysics could not hope to be scientific in character. Only in terms of direct observation could scientific phenomena be established[15]. Hence, the positive sciences could be exact because they availed themselves of judgments that were synthetic a-posteriori[16]. Metaphysics, on the contrary, could be treated only in judgments which were analytic a-priori.

The Hegelian dialectic attempted to surmount the Kantian critique by situating the whole thinking process in the subject[17]; it was only in the dialectical process that the reality of being was affirmed[18]. The Hegelian dialectic managed to survive the Kantian critique only at the expense of 'logical necessity'[19]. This 'rational necessity' had to be posited to the extent that Hegel placed a self-defining identity in the thinking subject[20]. By doing so, being was forgotten, and the overall effect was that the rationalism of the eighteenth century was

given a reprieve[21]. The result was that the metaphysical constructs adduced by the thinking subject were in need of an epistemological basis[22] to guarantee their validity, and this guarantee was not forthcoming.

Hegel strove to give his dialectical process the shape of a scientific system and he is generally credited with having succeeded in his endeavour[23]. However, the system ended in becoming a full-blown idealism[24].

Edmund Husserl began the process which we have come to recognize as 'phenomenology'[25]. It was different from Hegel's phenomenology of the spirit in that it was consciousness that characterized the subject[26]. Further, having bracketted existence as such, Husserl applied a 'phenomenological reduction'[27] to all conscious phenomena in the hope of realizing a rigorous and scientific philosophy of being. Husserl's project was never completed, and several years before his death, his colleague, Martin Heidegger, had already branched into something different.

With Heidegger, the inquiry into being did not have, as its objective, an elaboration of the scientific constituents of being. There was no bracketing of existence, and as a matter of fact, Heidegger stressed the 'facticity of being'[28] in his analysis of being. For Heidegger, the phenomenological reduction became part of a hermeneutical process in which one's mode of understanding being was itself constitutive of one's own being[29].

The Heideggerian perspective is to be understood as detailing the existentials[30] -- specifically Dasein -- so that being is not seen as object but as difference, that is, the factor that conceals and re-

veals[31]. It is this aspect of difference that is explained in Identity and Difference[32]. It is in terms of a given oneness of being that its difference appears[33]. One experiences being as difference, not as what is objectified in the judgment, and the currency in which such experience is given is Language. Language is the "house of being"[34].

Heidegger believes that the principle of identity in the rationalist perspective said something which in reality it did not set out to say[35]! It is not that two beings are identical, but rather that Being is the principle of beings[36]. Man is also a being whose principle is Being, but because of his faculty of thinking, he can respond to Being, and to this extent an event of appropriation obtains in which man and Being are mutually owned. "In the event of appropriation vibrates the active nature of what speaks as language, which at one time was called the house of Being. 'Principle of Identity' means now: a spring demanded by the essence of identity because it needs that spring if the belonging together of man and Being is to attain the essential light of the appropriation"[37].

II. The Problem of the Self-understanding and Gadamer's Solution

The church is a phenomenon that is present in the world. It has a mission to the world, but for reasons already stated the church cannot arrive at an understanding of its mission by reasonings born of positive scientific methods. The relevancy of such reasonings to the world would be unproven, and besides, the church would be implicitly asserting its effective control over the proclamation of the Word. Both, the reasonings and the implicit assertion would combine to make the church responsible only to itself and not to the Word of God. This would mean that the church was being untrue to its primal mission: to

be at the service of the Word. We can say, therefore, that the church may not primarily articulate its mission in judgmental concepts, since such an articulation bypasses the crucial question as to whether the articulation is meaningful at all.

We believe that there is a viable alternative to the methods of positive science which would enable the church to understand its mission to the world. Such an alternative is offered by the hermeneutics elaborated by Hans Georg Gadamer.

Hans Georg Gadamer does not propose a method of self-understanding which could serve as a model for others and which could then be applied to reality to elucidate its meaning. Were Gadamer to do this, he would be negating his hermeneutic endeavour by reverting to positive scientific methodology. Gadamer's approach to the task of self-understanding consists in describing reality in a phenomenological manner. This process of describing reveals two horizons which we shall have occasion to refer to at a later stage of this section. In describing reality within its total context, Gadamer stresses that the intention with which one embarks upon such an undertaking derives from the "application" that makes such self-understanding imperative. In keeping with his phenomenological approach, Gadamer examines the context in which reality becomes meaningful: "Gadamer does not simply set up a theory about understanding, but rather investigates the conditions under which understanding does in fact take place"[38].

By using the phenomenological process elaborated by Gadamer, we can also consider the church as a reality within a context, the world; we can describe it in terms of our efforts to understand the mission of the church in the world today ("application"). Our efforts, then,

will be directed towards investigating the conditions under which the understanding of the church's mission to the world takes place.

Heidegger had detailed the existentials, and it was in virtue of these that one experienced beings. The "Angst"[39] that was provoked by the consciousness of these existentials came from the fact that the historicity of beings[40], their "onticity"[41], was known in the process of interpreting the being in question. This meant that the self-understanding of a being was a datum, a givenness, of its ontological status. In saying this, Heidegger was not reverting to the metaphysical type of being that rationalism had expounded. In the first place, Heidegger was merely signaling his difference with Husserl. For Husserl, phenomenology was to be the rigorous science that could be used to uncover the meaning of being in consciousness[42]. For Husserl, therefore, being was understood in terms of the conscious subject, and in spite of his efforts to apply the transcendental reduction ceaselessly, Husserl did not succeed in convincing others that he had overcome the charge of ideal subjectivism that had been levelled against him[43].

Heidegger used the tools with which Husserl had supplied him to stress the facticity of being. This implied that the method of phenomenology could not be reduced to that of a rigorous science since the judgment was inoperative in terms of the epistemological status of objects. For Heidegger, "in proportion as being reveals itself it becomes more mysterious; to know the truth about being is to know that being is essentially hidden; to lift the veil from being is to see how veiled it really is. Thus it is Husserl's attitude which ultimately becomes 'naive', since only the naive 'scientist' of being could ever expect it to give up all its secrets... For him (Heidegger) being is

not an object of knowledge"[44]. As we have noted, the very uncovering of one's ontological status was constitutive of one's own ontological status.

In effect, it was not only that Heidegger stressed the facticity of being against Husserl's subjective consciousness, but also that he was elaborating a hermeneutic of being[45]. This hermeneutic was to be seen not as a series of positive premises from which one could conclude to the meaning of being, but rather as a basic mode of existence. This mode of existence obtained from the mutuality of beings vis-à-vis Being, a mutuality that appeared in the aspect of difference whereby beings in their historicity revealed and concealed Being. The mutuality of beings vis-à-vis Being provoked the problem of the self-understanding[46].

For Heidegger, self-understanding was the mode of being of Dasein, as Dasein stood in relation to Being. The self-understanding was the perceiving of the difference of being, and in the process of perceiving, the meaning of being became apparent, was revealed[47]. But then, it could be legitimately asked in what sense the self-understanding could be understood as authentic, since authentic would denote the resolution of one's being in terms of one's possibility as Dasein[48]. For Heidegger himself, the possibility of death cuts from under Dasein the very ground of its being[49]. For Bultmann, in an attenuated sense, the possibility is life eternal.

In textual hermeneutics, the problem of the self-understanding becomes crucial[50]. If hermeneutic pertained to the interpretation of texts, then which of many interpretations is valid: an interpretation that hopes to reproduce what the author has in mind, or one that is arrived at in terms of descriptive linguistics, or one that a changed

philosophy of life bestows on it? Self-understanding as a mode of interpretation would seem to become an abstract possibility. For if it is asked whether we actually arrive at the understanding that the author had in mind, the answer is that only if it is assumed that we know what the author wanted to express can we compare the present interpretation with that of the author's, and our problem is precisely that of not knowing what the author wanted to express. In terms of an interpretation based on descriptive linguistics, we could say that by itself such linguistics does not have as its object a semantic function but a merely semiological function[51], and that this function is not relevant to our problem of authentic interpretation. Finally, if a changed philosophy of life is ultimately responsible for an authentic interpretation of texts, then two further questions suggest themselves: a) if the text is merely an elucidation of the changed philosophy of the times, its interpretation is inconsequential since the changed philosophy already has the meaning that the text is to be invested with; b) if the text per se is that which shapes the meaning of its own interpretation, then the function of the text is still to be delineated in the process of interpretation, and this was precisely our problem in the first place. The problem of the self-understanding, then, which is sketched in terms of the text applies also to the facticity of being, the Dasein, since language is the house of being, and constitutive of being. Besides, when the mutual relation between language and being is asserted, the problem of self-understanding is seen as the problem that applies to hermeneutic as a whole: what is the hermeneutic that authentically interprets Dasein[52]?

In Truth and Method[53], Hans-Georg Gadamer offers an answer to the question just asked.

Gadamer's solution begins with a detailed analysis of the aesthetic experience of art[54]. Art is more than the mere experience of pleasure or of a finely refined imagination[55]. It is both and more, because art is a realization of Being such that art and art alone could accomplish[56].

> "It is no longer a one-sided relationship. That the picture has its own reality means now that the original is representation in order to appear. It can also present itself as what it is in another way. But if it represents itself in this way, this is no longer any casual event, but is part of its own being. Every such representation is an ontological event and belongs to the ontological level of what is represented. Through being represented it experiences, as it were, an increase in being. The particular import of the picture is determined ontologically as an emanation of the original."

The aesthetic experience of art lies in the differentiating of Being that art achieves by revealing and concealing in the picture itself[57]. Art is an authentic realization of World in the Heideggerian sense in that it does denote the facticity of being[58].

Gadamer then goes on to explain how the event of art is possible only in terms of a tradition, for it is the finding of oneself in a tradition that enables one to approach an artistic object[59].

> "...if a work, with its own value as a literary work of art, is declared to belong to world literature, then the concept of literature is far wider than that of the literary work of art. An entire written tradition partakes of the mode of being of literature -- not only religious, legal, economic, public and private texts of all kinds, but those writings in which these texts are scientifically treated and interpreted; namely, the human sciences as a whole."

This finding of oneself in a tradition is the pre-understanding[60] in that it allows one to approach an artistic object in terms of its significance today. Gadamer calls attention to the fact that it is because

there is a unity of tradition in which the present object and its historical precedents reside that there exists the possibility of understanding the present. This fact is referred to by Gadamar as 'effective-history' (Wirkungsgeschichte)[61].

> "The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship in which exist both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding. A proper hermeneutics would have to demonstrate the effectivity of history within understanding itself. I shall refer to this as 'effective-history'. Understanding is, essentially, an effective-historical relation."

Gadamer treats of artistic objects since aesthetics convincingly proves that it is not the product of a method, but transcends it. The artistic object manifests its meaning in a texture of relationships between itself and the tradition in which it stands.

The next question to which Gadamer addresses himself is textual interpretation[62]. In understanding the meaning of a text, the text itself is seen to be a differentiating factor in terms of language[63]. Just as artistic tradition enables a person to approach an artistic object, so too language is a tradition in that it is the horizon that allows the text to reveal and conceal by way of differentiation[64]. The point at which the differentiation occurs, the text as such, is not to be considered semiologically, since our problem of textual interpretation is on the semantic level[65]. As a linguistic phenomenon that is to be interpreted semantically, there is need for the text, as the differentiation, to be in relationship with the on-going tradition present in language, and the complex of relationships that ensues will mediate the meaning of the linguistic phenomenon in question[66].

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> "The effect of a living tradition and the effect of historical study must constitute a unity, the analysis of which would reveal only a texture of reciprocal relationships (ein Geflecht von Wechselwirkungen)."

Gadamer does not deny that one does approach the linguistic phenomenon, the text, with an 'intentionality'[67], and also that this 'intentionality' is the pre-supposed condition for the meaning of the differentiation to be manifest. But this is precisely what the Heideggarian 'hermeneutical circle'[68] entails, namely that one does not arrive at the meaning of being by a process of deduction but by a process of clarifying the experience that one has. This process of arriving at the meaning of a text by experiencing it as differentiation within a tradition is referred to by Gadamer as the fusion of horizons, Horizontverschmelzung[69]. The circumstance in which a text becomes meaningful and reveals its relevancy to the reader[70] occurs when the horizon that is uncovered by the particular text (the linguistic phenomenon, the differentiation that reveals and conceals) meets the horizon of tradition as a whole. In this occurrence, the text is discovered as the differentiating factor that reveals its meaning by being set against its context.

Gadamer understands the structure of language as being identical with the semantic structure of being, and it is this that Gadamer characterizes as tradition[71].

> "A more important point is the one to which we have constantly referred, namely that language constitutes the hermeneutical event proper not as language, whether as grammar or as lexicon, but in the coming into language of that which has been said in the tradition: an event that is at once assimilation and interpretation (das Aneignung und Auslegung zugleich ist). Thus here it really is true to say that this event is not our action upon the thing, but the act of the thing itself (das Tun der Sache Selbst ist)."

It is only because the text is seen as a happening in this tradition that we can fathom its meaning at all[72]. Gadamer sees the Romantics as being correct to the extent that they turned towards individual experience, but deficient in that they considered tradition as the limiting factor in their understanding of the world. As a result, Gadamer believes, they were swayed by their own prejudices and historico-critical norms to the exclusion of those that were present in tradition or language. What they uncovered from the reading of the text was not an understanding of the text in question since they had not opened themselves to the structure of being as a whole, but an objectified conclusion, a product of a positive discipline, born of a prejudice that they did not recognize as their own[73].

The hermeneutic process as described by Gadamer has a relevance to our subject matter in the dissertation insofar as it focuses on the fusion of horizons for a hermeneutic interpretation. "...the encounter with the horizon of the transmitted text in reality lights up one's own horizon and leads to self-disclosure and self-understanding; the encounter becomes a moment of ontological disclosure. It is an event in which something emerges from negativity -- the negativity of realizing that there is something one did not know, that things were not as one had assumed"[74].

In seeking to establish the appropriateness of Gadamer's hermeneutics for our purpose, that is, for the understanding of the mission of the church in today's world, we begin by considering the church as a symbol. As a symbol of the eschatological Kingdom of God[75], the church

is already a horizon pre-formed and pre-willed by God in this world.

For Gadamer, the text becomes meaningful in its "application" only when it is seen as the differentiating factor in terms of its tradition. And this differentiation occurs at the moment when the horizon of the given text fuses with the horizon of the tradition that carries the individual text in its flow.

As a horizon, the church as symbol seeks to serve the Word in today's world, and in doing so signifies its "application". Further, the church must be seen as the differentiating factor -- as did the text in Gadamer's hermeneutic -- to be constituted as meaningful to the world. The church realizes this meaning by allowing its present horizon to fuse with the horizon of its total tradition, a tradition to which it is subject.

III. The church and Horizontverschmelzung

In chapter three, we had indicated how the church was the subject of tradition. By this we meant that the church was the authoritative[76] symbol of that tradition, yet did not exhaust that tradition. As authoritative symbol, the church manifests in itself the mission of Jesus Christ, and proclaims the eschatological Kingdom of God. We shall now concern ourselves with the implications of the title 'authoritative symbol' since in terms of our hermeneutic endeavour its meaning conveys a horizon that needs further clarification.

It is not as though we had come upon a totally new phenomenon called 'church' and were trying to elucidate its possible meanings[77]. It is as a hermeneutical endeavour that we approach the task of understanding the church's mission to non-christian peoples today[78]. As a hermeneutical endeavour we suppose that the church <u>is</u> already function-

ing as the symbol of the eschatological Kingdom of God, but now requires a further self-understanding to signify its role.

As authoritative symbol, the church possesses an horizon which it proclaims as definitive. If this were not so, we could not have stated our problem. By the term 'definitive' we imply that the church understands itself as the normative visibility of God's transcendental action. It is in terms of this horizon that the saving word of God is spoken and in which grace justifies visibly. That is precisely what characterizes the sacramental aspect of the church both in its inward and outward activity, else the church would cease to have a raison d'etre in the world of men. The premise that the church sees as proper for its continued presence in the world is its function of making the presence of God address man in the world. However, the sacramental aspect of the church in its outward activity requires greater clarification since up until the present time, christian theology concerned itself with the justifying effect of grace in the inward activity of the church, and made allowance for justifying grace in the outward activity of the church mostly as a logical possibility. In asserting this, there is no attempt to cast the church in a pejorative light. The facticity of the church is shaped by the historic circumstances in which it is placed. We are merely noting the fact that the consciousness of the church until now was more in terms of its mission to baptized christians, and it was Vatican Council II that underscored the fact of the church's mission as sacrament vis-à-vis the world.

In the light of dogmatic statements issued in Vatican Council II, the accent has shifted from the realm of logical possibility to reality in fact. "...the Church, in Christ, is in the nature of sacra-

ment -- a sign and instrument, that is, of communion with God and of unity among all men..." (Vatican II, L. Gentium, no. 1). This statement of Lumen Gentium, backed by other conciliar statements[79], makes it almost imperative to understand the church as authoritative symbol in terms of not only christian but also non-christian peoples.

If it is asked why our clarification must assume the dimensions of a hermeneutical endeavour, we answer that this is so because the church is proclaiming the eschatological kingdom of God as engaging the being of a person, not as a mere ethical or sociological programme. As a hermeneutical endeavour, the understanding of the church must be derived from the complex of relationship that obtains between the church that is here and now, and the tradition to which the church is subject[80]. For the church to be meaningful at all it is necessary that this tradition encompass the tradition of the world as a whole; all creation is totally beholden to the Christ event which has already taken place. In brief, this tradition is also the tradition for the non-christian world. The church would therefore have the task of allowing its present horizon and the horizon of this tradition to be fused before it could become fully meaningful as the sacrament (symbol) of the eschatological Kingdom of God. In the fusing of these horizons the proclamation of the church would be authentic since it would be realizing in its authoritative and symbolic activity the meaning of the kingdom of God today.

In terms of our hermeneutical endeavour, we believe that the proclamation[81] which the church is called to make requires a more precise understanding so that it can be properly related to horizons that admit of non-christian traditions. We hope to supply such an under-

standing in the section entitled 'Proclamational Causality'. Before that, however, we wish to detail briefly the doctrine of the church that confirms our expanded notion of tradition.

Scolion One: Non-christian elements recognized in the church's tradition

In this scholion, we merely wish to document the church's implicit recognition of the presence of soteriological reality outside its visible confines[82].

(a) The church of Abel

Even while the early church championed the cause of Christ, it did allow for divine initiative to reach persons who were not members of the visible church as is seen in the conditions it attached to those who were to be saved[83]. The church of Abel doctrine was understood to be the economy of salvation which did in fact obtain, though the circumstances of the time did not allow the church to spell out the factual implications of such a doctrine[84].

(b) The Votum Baptismi

According to this doctrine, a person who showed himself willing and ready to receive the sacrament of baptism but was unable to receive the sacrament because of circumstances beyond his control[85], was considered by the church to have received the grace of the sacrament[86].

(c) Sacramentum et Res

The background that is presupposed for the doctrine of the Sacramentum and Res supplies confirmatory evidence. It was enunciated by Augustine who held the doctrine of the primacy and the freedom of grace[87]. The distinction between Sacramentum and Res pertained to God's activity in the world[88]. This activity was always present in the world but was now seen to be explicitly so in the church of Jesus Christ. The

doctrine of the efficaciousness of the sacraments as also of their being received without profit is understandable, in part, because of this distinction. Of course, even though Augustine noted this distinction, he was hardly aware of its present day implications[89].

IV. Proclamational Causality

What is suggested in the term 'proclamational causality' is not a separate species of cause to be added on to the classical four[90]. Rather, this type of causality seeks to specify the formal cause of scholastic philosophy in greater detail so that its functioning in our hermeneutical endeavour may be pertinent[91]. In terms of scholastic philosophy we could say that the determining principle in a being is its formal cause; in the christian economy, this determining principle is the gift of God himself such that the finite being which is determined realizes its own being in that God-determining process.

Since proclamational causality takes place in the church, and since the church is sacramental, the context of our explanation concerning 'proclamational causality' will be sacramental. But it has not been usual to view sacramental reality in the church in terms of formal causality, and because of this we shall offer a brief review of causality affecting sacraments, point out the limitations of such understandings of sacramental causality, and then propose 'proclamational causality' as being a viable understanding of sacramental causality and in keeping with our hermeneutical endeavour.

A review of sacramental causality

The term sacramental grace implies that justifying grace that proceeds from the Christ event has a visibility in the sacrament[92].

This reference of grace to the celebration of the sacraments in the church is assumed as established. This reference is implicitly held in the classical expression 'opus operatum' which is the constitutive part of any confecting of a sacrament[93]. The 'opus operatum' affirmed the efficacy of the sacraments. What has never been defined, however, is the manner in which such efficacy operates[94].

Of course, the principle cause of grace was admittedly God himself. Other causes that obtained in the conferring of grace through the sacrament were to be understood as instruments, at least according to the Thomist school[95]. To the extent, then, that a sacrament was conjoined to God as the principle cause, in order to confer grace, the sacrament was classified as an 'instrumental cause'[96]. Further, in so far as the sacramental action effected a transformation in the person, the recipient, the sacramental action could be termed as 'physical'. The nomenclature that was applied to sacraments was 'physical instrumental cause'[97]. However, it was still not decided in what manner the 'physical instrumental cause' operated to confer grace, and magisterial pronouncement has allowed this situation to stay.

We shall detail the various theories put forward to explain the physical instrumental causality of sacraments. In our exposition, we have adopted one scheme merely to present the different types of causality. The author of this scheme shows a marked preference for the classical efficient (moving) causality and in terms of this preference the other groups of causality run the risk of being improperly categorized, and we note the deficiencies that these explanations have to contend with. The theories are grouped as follows: a) Conditional Cause; b) Physical,

dispositive cause; c) Physical, perfective cause; d) Moral Cause; e) Intentional, dispositive cause.

a. Conditional Cause

This type of causality is also referred to as Occasional cause. Rather than seeing the sacrament as a cause in the full sense of the word, i.e. where the effect is unqualifiedly commensurate with its cause, the sacrament is considered as providing the circumstances that would 'attract' grace, thus proving to be a condition[98]. This attraction is not to be seen as setting an obligation in terms of grace, but rather as being the circumstance in which sacramental grace is effective[99].

b. Physical, dispositive cause

Here, the sacraments are viewed as being more than mere conditions, in that they effect a disposition in the recipient that is condusive to his receiving grace[100]. In actual fact, this category is similar to a. in that grace itself is the external factor that reaches the recipient when the sacramental action has attuned him to it[101].

c. Physical, perfective cause

The understanding of sacramental causality in this category implies that the sacrament in so far as it is an instrument that is assumed by God, adorns the soul of the person who is transformed in the sacramental action[102]. In this category, the 'physical instrumental cause' is efficient in the classical sense of that term, i.e. the potential of the instrument in the sacrament is preserved in the effect that properly derives from the principle cause, God[103].

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d. Moral Cause

In this case, at the start of the sacramental activity, the sacramental cause may be termed active only with difficulty, but the effect of the sacramental activity is real[104]. Here, there is a correspondence that is observed between God as the cause of grace, and the de facto circumstances of the sacramental action. These circumstances could be interpreted as the memory of the passion and death of the Lord, impetrary prayers, functioning in the name of Jesus Christ, etc.[105]

e. Intentional, dispositive Cause

In this category, the sacrament is considered more as a sign that tells something about another rather than a sign that effects, in virtue of itself[106]. The one who administers the sacrament has the intentionality in that by his words and gestures -- the signs he executes -- the recipient is disposed towards the receiving of sacramental grace.

The problem with a., b., d., and e. is that the visibility of sacramental grace becomes something merely incidental. The influence of the sanctifying cause is realized in a tangential manner in the sacramental rite[107]. However, the freedom of God is preserved and grace is viewed as at the disposal of God, not man.

The case of c. calls for a special examination. Not only is it thomist in its basic understanding, but it is normally assumed that the tradition of the church favours its particular interpretation of sacramental causality[108]. The term it uses to describe a sacrament is 'signum efficax'[109], and it espouses efficient causality in the classical sense of the term. Here, the instrument is conjoined to the

principle cause while at the same time keeping its own identity (virtus). The keeping of its particular identity raises at least two questions: first, it presupposes an ontological status of the instrument prior to its joining the principle cause else the ontological status would have to be predicated in terms of formal causality[110]; second, because of the identity that it preserves even with the principle cause, God's freedom is not properly safeguarded since the initiative of grace must shape itself in terms of the instrumental cause.

When the humanity of Jesus is seen as the instrument of the divinity in the sense we have just explained then it would seem to lead to a doctrine of adoptionism. Besides, God's transcendental and free activity on man's behalf would not be self-sufficient by implication. In the case of the sacramental activity of the church, it would be difficult to deny the charge of magic levelled against the opus operatum since the performance of the sign would necessitate the effect of grace!

The formal cause of scholastic philosophy gave being its determining note, its generic nature. In sacramental theology too, the formal cause determines the character of a particular sacrament[111]. The aspect of determination could not be wrought through efficient causality because then what is to be effected is already predicated: i.e. the terminus ad quem would be affirmed before the determining note of the formal cause -- through a supposed efficient causality -- informed it[112].

If our point of departure is the person of Jesus Christ, then in terms of a transcendental analysis, we may become aware that "man listening" and "God speaking" are present in the same person, Jesus[113].

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In the person of Jesus, God's transcendental, free and self-sufficient activity is manifested as a pre-formal (or quasi-formal causality) since the humanity of Jesus is 'not effected' as an instrument of the divinity but is determined formally in virtue of the transcendent dynamic, the divinity[114]. Understood in this way, sacramental causality is not so much a "product" of a gracious act of God, as the constant determining factor in the world that was willed by God even as God willed Jesus. Because of this pre-formal causality, and also because of what has been said regarding the transcendental dynamic that thematizes itself in the church, we can say that the church is the primordial sacrament in terms of other sacramental activity[115]. The pre-formal causality symbolized in the church enables us to recognize the pre-formal causality in the sacraments of the church. The implication in what has been said is not to explain the particular ontological status of grace or the ontological status of the visibility it encompasses to produce a sacrament, but rather, that given the fact that grace is always recognized as visible or not at all, how we are to recognize it in the world we live. We believe this to be possible by way of proclamational causality, since for the church -- as we have earlier pointed out -- proclamation happens in a sacramental context.

A. Proclamation

Here, we shall try to repeat briefly what has been said often and so well about the meaning of proclamation. The meaning of proclamation is the place in which the word of God is announced and where, therefore, the Christ event takes place in the faith community[116]. The traditional

proclamation -- at least according to the theologians of some confessions -- was opposed to the understanding of the institutional and sacramental aspects of the faith community[117]. This opposition arose, in part, because of what was seen to be the downgrading of justifying faith by making it subservient to the human intention in the sacramental rite[118]. It was felt that God's word would not be free and efficacious in itself, and this freedom and efficaciousness had to be preserved since in terms of God's action all else had to be relativized[119]. This opposition, in effect, affirmed the immediacy of the Holy Spirit in the church, and the primacy of grace.

Further, the sacramental aspect of the church was seen as dependent on a metaphysical construct[120], and this construct was interpreted as setting the possibilities for God's transcendent action in man. Such a construct would effectively chain God's freedom of action and choice. So the sacramental had to be set aside, at least in the sense we have explained.

We shall now address ourselves to one representative of the theologians of The New Hermeneutic[121] in order to indicate what is acceptable to us in terms of the understanding of proclamation, and also to indicate our point of divergence.

Gerhard Ebeling[122] explains the reformers' understanding of scripture as sui ipsius interpres[123]. Ebeling sees Luther not as advocating interpretation in terms of one's own fancies, but rather allowing the Holy Spirit to instruct and guide[124]. In this case, proclamation would occur not by human skill being used to elucidate the scriptures but by allowing the word of God to effect its saving significance by the expression itself[125]. The word of God was judgment and salvation. To

this point, Ebeling was saying no more than Bultmann did when Bultmann explained how redemption occurred in the faith event[126]. The preaching of the word was proclamation in that when the word of God was offered to man in the kerygma[127], the "effect" was one of pure faith. I say 'pure faith', because even though man was to understand himself -- in terms of existential philosophy -- as capable only of sin and death, the saving word (kerygma) that was uttered situated man anew in a faith event that was discontinuous with man's intrinsic condition[128]. The post-Bultmannians saw a problem here, and attempted to correct it. The problem was that the word of saving faith (kerygma) had to be considered a hermeneutical principle in man's factual (intrinsic) condition (i.e. as Dasein), else the kerygma would be meaningless for man, or perhaps a mere hope for the future[129]. In terms of the Heideggerian perspective -- the latter Heidegger, to be precise[130] -- language as the house of being was seen as providing the context in which the kerygma could operate as a hermeneutic. To the person who was redeemed in the church, the kerygma would be the language event that would proclaim to him God's justification, so that whereas before, logically, the existentials would lead him to death, now the saving word of faith would invest his existence with life eternal[131].

The positive aspects of proclamation understood in this sense are that God's word is absolutely free, that it is not satisfied with a forensic notion of justification while yet providing a basis for christian hope. The questionable aspect of this understanding of proclamation is that of criterion. In the last analysis, Ebeling has no other criterion for determining the event of faith than the individual

himself, that is, only the individual person need recognize the faith event or the language event in himself[132]. We see this to be the main drawback with Ebeling's understanding of proclamation: there is no 'stable element' for such proclamation to be authenticated, and it runs the risk of too easily becoming solipsistic. The result would be that the church community would be of little consequence, and the situation of the person as a church member would produce the anomoly where the person experiences a faith event which is un-precedented in terms of the community, and yet, the community carries within itself the tradition that allows the faith event to be meaningful[133]. One would have to play fast and loose with language-event as a hermeneutic if the faith event as meaningful occurrence in man's life did not admit of authentication outside of the individual[134]. If the tradition contained in language is necessary to make the faith event meaningful in the individual decision then the church as community must have a role in the proclamation which is more than incidental.

Our understanding of proclamation begins not with a mere "ex auditu" where this is reduced to an external (physiological) hearing of the word of God, nor with a hearing that merely promises hope for the future, but with the fact of man hearing and God speaking in the person of Jesus Christ[135]; so that when the word of God is proclaimed, it is not an arbitrary summons to faith and repentance, to mercy and hope, but the dynamic of God's action eschatologically victorious in his Son, Jesus Christ, symbolized in the church, and therefore visible in the world[136]. In short, the fact of proclamation is rooted in the life of the community as a whole -- the church being the symbol -- since

the total life of the community is itself -- as explained above -- the visibility of the free, self-sufficient and transcendent activity of God.

B. Proclamational Causality

Proclamational causality takes into account the fact that God's initiative manifests itself not primarily in the imposition of something on another, as this occurs in efficient causality. Proclamational causality allows God's pre-defined, or pre-formal or quasi-formal activity to engage human persons. There is no attempt to relieve this activity of God of its mystery[137].

For the christian, the visibility of this activity is seen in Jesus Christ. And since it is in Jesus that the transcendental, free and self-sufficient activity of God is revealed, this may rightly be termed as a proclamation that is immediate and free. If this proclamation is to be continued in time and space, and if it is to be considered as authentic and authoritative, then the church in which such proclamation is made must be constituted by the same pre-formal activity of God made visible in Jesus.

In no eventuality is it the church that produces or creates (effects) the event of faith in the world, or even in itself. The function of the church is to recognize what is already being done through the pre-formal activity of God. And therefore, the absolute freedom of God is preserved and the primacy of grace is not impugned. This is what proclamational causality entails.

C. The implications of Proclamational Causality

Since proclamational causality is concerned with recognizing or being aware of the visibility of God's transcendent activity in the world, it must be understood more as an enterprise to be completed rather

than a self-sufficient system that has already been completed. In the following three steps, we shall detail the manner in which proclamational causality could operate in the service of the church's mission to non-christian peoples.

1. Proclamational Causality is definitive[138]

Proclamational causality operates on the premise that if man is redeemed, it is through God's initiative alone, that if the Christ event has taken place its power is already at work in the world, and that, therefore, the purpose of proclamational causality is to supply the criteria -- in terms of the church -- to enable God's initiative to be recognized in the world[139]. Proclamation would be to recognize, not to vainly hope to supply the constituents that would validate a proclamation when and wherever it is to be made.

As something that is on-going, proclamation has a bearing on the Christ event. When we speak of the Christ event being eschatological in that it is seen as God's final revelation to man, we may not imply that God's pre-formal activity has realized itself exhaustively in the person of Jesus Christ[140]. Rather, the fact that such a realization has taken place in Jesus is an invitation to discover or clarify its ramifications for the world of persons as a whole, else the Christ event's soteriological significance for man would be less than academic[141]. For, it is not a forensic notion of redemption in Jesus Christ that is offered man, but an engagement in his very being.

Therefore, the task of proclamational causality is to define not by input but by recognizing the continuing extent (or thematization) of the Christ event.

2. Proclamational Causality supposes a pre-formal unity

Proclamational causality requires that a pre-formal unity exist[142], if the proclamation is to be authentic and valid. This should be clear in terms of what we said about the sacrament and symbol, and the sacramental nature of the church with regard to the function of proclaiming the Christ event.

If no intrinsic pre-formal unity is to be allowed, then the church's proclamation would have to be seen in terms of efficient causality, and with this the notion of the church as instrument in the classical sense would have to be invoked. Besides the attendant difficulties that we have listed above with regard to instrumental causality, the ontological status of the persons who do not visibly form the church becomes largely unintelligible. Instrumental causality would merely provoke the problem as to why such persons could at all be the subject of such a proclamation in the first place.

We merely recall, at this point, that the pre-formal unity is not an arbitrary premise that one starts from, but a complex of relationships in terms of which one discovers one's identity as being. One's being is a givenness, not a projection.

3. Proclamational causality and Horizontverschmelzung

For H-G. Gadamer, the meaningfulness of the present is apparent by allowing the horizon of the present to meet the horizon of the content of tradition, in which the present is situated. Gadamer sees the horizon of the present situated in the text that is to be interpreted. But this is so only because the text is a linguistic element that is mutually related to language, the house of being. For us, the situa-

tion of the present is the concrete horizon of the church as symbol and sacrament[143]. The horizon which we must allow to meet the present must be the tradition that is to be found in the present history of the church as a whole, since this history is positive in its thrust[144]. It is not to be found in dogmatic history, since dogma is the symbolic representation of circumscribed tradition at one or the other point of its fullness[145]. The horizon that constitutes tradition pertains to the world as a whole. This is so for the following reasons: a) The Christ event affects the world as a whole[146]; b) The church's mission is not to supply an input to a situation (the non-christian world) that is unredeemed, but to recognize the already-present grace and faith in that situation.

Both, the horizon of the church today, and the horizon of the world's tradition proceed from the Christ event.

The unity spoken of above, which is at the basis of any proclamational causality is also the reason why the church as proclaimer can dialogue with the proclaimee or even challenge him[147]. If the model of a question and answer is used, it can be said that only if the question and answer are present in the same hermeneutical situation can they be meaningful[148]. The meaning of the question can be assured only if the questioner knows, in some way, the answer, else there cannot be any correspondence between questioner and respondent[149].

The meaningfulness of proclamational causality is assured when the proclaimer and the proclaimee are both illuminated by the proclamation itself. Both the proclaimer and the proclaimee are equally beholden to the Christ event. If, then, the horizons meet in the proclamation -- for it is here that the reality of Christ and faith be-

come meaningful -- then the church's being able to recognize the reality of the saving fact will imply that the proclamation is the occasion for the church to understand itself more fully, particularly since the proclamation transcends the proclaimer (i.e. the proclamation is not a product or effect of the proclaimer). This is the case with christian proclamation since the proclamation is not created or produced by either proclaimer or proclaimee[150]. The horizons for proclaimer and proclaimee are not objectifications else they could not be operative as hermeneutic. The role or function of the church, as has been stressed by us throughout, is to define or recognize the proclamation that is taking place, not create or produce it. The proclamation, therefore, happens when the horizons of the proclaimer and proclaimee meet. The true awareness of the church today is contingent on such a proclamation taking place.

This may also be described as a dialogal situation. In such a situation, the proclamation will correspond to the reality of the proclaimee since the proclamation is <u>not</u> a prescriptive decree but the affirmation of the fact. Unless the prescriptive decree, at some point, reflects the situation it rules on, (in our case the one to whom the proclamation is made), it must needs be arbitrary. If it does reflect the situation it rules on, it ceases to be prescriptive and becomes declarative. This is exactly what "recognizing" implies[151].

D. <u>Proclamational Causality and the mission of the church as sacrament</u>

1. Given the fact that Vatican II described the church as the sacrament of the world; given the fact that this same council also affirmed the unity of all peoples with the paschal mystery of Christ[152];

and given the fact that some non-christian religions were recognized as paths explored by men and women to worship the true God[153], -- there appears to be more than an incidental significance in the phrase 'sacrament of the world' when applied to the church. The assumption that the forces of darkness are alone at work outside the visible church is untenable. Because of its sacramental nature, the church is to be considered as proclamational cause in the realizing of the Christ event in the world[154]. The church is not to be considered as a community of persons who preside over a cumulative, soteriological deposit and who exhaust it in their lives, but as a community within whose tradition the definitive form of the Christ event is preserved unimpaired.

2. Because of the intrinsic unity between the church as proclamational cause and the world as the situation in which the proclamation is made, we can assert that it is within a dialogal situation that the church's proclamation is seen as meaningful[155]: this implies that both proclaimer and proclaimee are mutually enhanced by the proclamation, by way of discourse[156].

3. Until the present time, it was assumed that the proclaimee could be an individual person only[157]. However, along with the fact that the soteriological activity of the Christ event is affirmed even outside the visible church is the understanding that such a person experiences this soteriological activity (proclamational) in a community and that in terms of what we have said about the event of saving faith, the community must be constitutive of the individual's personal faith[158]. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask why the non-christian community within which a person makes his act of faith should not be

considered as supplying the 'stable element' that allows the transcendent activity of God to assert itself authentically in the person's life. This is not to say that the church, without more ado, proclaim the non-christian community christian[159]. It does imply, however, that when the church relates to the non-christian community, it must seek, primarily, to affirm and proclaim the reality of the Christ event already present in the community. Dialogue, and not confrontation, should be the primary objective of the churchs missionary activity.

V. Conclusion

The eschatological Kingdom of God needs a communitarian context as a stable element for its realization. The church is that context. When the church affirms the Christ event as relating to all persons, the possibility of recognizing the eschatological Kingdom of God outside the visible church exists. In describing itself as 'sacrament of the world', the church is affirming the real existential presence of the eschatological Kingdom of God in the world as a whole[160]. In the concluding sections of this dissertation, we spelt out the meaning of the sacrament in terms of proclamational causality and detailed some of the implications that this would have for the church when carrying out her mission to the world. The fact that the church admits of the reality of the eschatological Kingdom of God in the world as a whole means also that it allows for a community within which this reality is perceived. In effect, the stable element, we referred to, would be the particular non-christian community in which a person lives and worships God[161]. As more definite conclusions of our essay, we state the following:

(a) In terms of our hermeneutic endeavour, the mission of the

church as sacrament is not so much to supply a new input to the non-christian community as to proclaim the new reality, the Christ event, that is already present. It would be appropriate for the church to declare this explicitly with all its implications. One of the implications would be to recognize the presence of the eschatological Kingdom of God explicitly in a non-christian community.

(b) The mission of the church would begin with the understanding that it is a partner in a dialogue, not an official seeking compliance with a divine decree. The contribution of the non-christian is as important as is the church's role of recognizing and certifying the authentic notes of the eschatological Kingdom of God in the non-christian's way of life. Recognizing implies an implicit comparison: something is known in relation to something that can be known. Since the church is aware of the criteria for recognizing, it will be able to see the presence of the eschatological Kingdom of God in the dialogal input of the non-christian. But then, the 'fullness of truth' that the church sees in itself must be reckoned not quantitatively or cumulatively, but definitively. This would follow from the fact of the church's sacramental mission to declare authoritatively the eschatological Kingdom of God that is already present; at the same time, since the proclamation is a grace event illuminating the church itself, it will result in a greater visibility of the Christ event in its totality.

(c) Proclamation causality in terms of the celebration of sacraments in the church would effectively prevent the charge of 'magical efficaciousness' being brought against them.

FOOTNOTES

[1] hermeneutical:

(a) Jerome Biblical Commentary, p. 605-606, No. 71: "First, it could refer to interpretation by speech itself, inasmuch as language interprets what is in a man's mind... Second, the word hermeneia could refer to the process of translation from an intelligible one... Part of the clarifying task of hermeneia was to translate past meaning to the present. Third, the word hermeneia was used for interpretation by commentary and explanation." (Hermeneutics, R. E. Brown)

(b) M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 201: "...assertion cannot disown its ontological origin from an interpretation which understands. The primordial 'as' of an interpretation (ἑρμηνεια) which understands circumspectively we call the "existential-hermeneutical 'as' "in distinction from the "apophantical 'as'" of the assertion."

(c) J. M. Cobb & J. B. Robinson (editors), The New Hermeneutic, pp. 44-45.

(d) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1974, p. 4.

(e) H-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated by David E. Linge, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976, p. 15.

[2] Confer W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, translated by Francis McDonagh, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 29: "Every form of positivism takes some fact or institution as the ultimate basis of its arguments. In the case of legal positivism it is existing laws, which are not open to question. In the case of the positivism of revelation which Dietrich Bonhoeffer detected in Karl Barth, it is the fact of the word of God or of his revelation in Christ... Barth took as the basis of all his arguments, without considering what grounds he had for such an assumption. Empiricist positivism takes experience, or, more accurately, sense-perception, as the ultimate fact upon which all knowledge builds or by reference to which it must be justified."

[3] historico-critical method:

(a) The Historian and the Believer, V. A. Harvey, pp. 14-15: "Historical explanation, therefore, necessarily takes the form of understanding an event in terms of its antecedents and consequences, and no event can be isolated from its historically conditioned time and space."

(b) Confer also W. Pannenberg, Theol. and the Phil. of Science, pp. 110-116.

4 analytic considerations: By these we refer to the deductions that may be made from fixed premises, in the manner of the positive analysts.

F. Ferré, Language, Logic and God, p. 10: "When we say that analytic propositions are devoid of factual content, and consequently that they say nothing, we are not suggesting that they are senseless... For, although they give us no information about an empirical situation, they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 4.1121.)"

5 scientific methodology: Confer B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, Herder and Herder, N. Y., 1972, p. 248: "An account of scientific method stands to cognitional theory as the less to the more general, so that no firm barrier separates science, scientific method, and general cognitional theory... Reductionists extend the methods of natural science to the study of man. Their results, accordingly, are valid only so far as a man resembles a robot or a rat and, while such resemblance does exist, exclusive attention to it gives a grossly mutilated and distorted view."

6 faith event in the church: By faith event, we understand the appropriation of the justifying act of God in Jesus Christ as recognized by the church. This would include proclamation of the word in the church and the acceptance of this word by a person. The proclamation may not be interpreted as "free-floating" faith as does Bultmann (Kerygma and Faith, H. W. Bartsch, editor, pp. 42-44) but as an initiative of God made visible in the church. In the course of this chapter we hope to substantiate this statement.

7 ethical construct: We believe that there is a difference between norms for right action, and a newness of life that one experiences in virtue of faith. Faith denotes a newness of life. This newness shows itself in right action, but by itself ethics is powerless to help a person to pursue right action.

8 One is reminded of the 'fundamental option'.

9 non-objectified self-understanding:

(a) M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 351: "Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its 'subsistence' is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the "Self-subsistence" of the existing self, whose Being has been conceived as care. (Footnote one: Sein "Bestand" grundet nicht in der Substanzialitat einer Substanz, sondern in der "Selbstandigkeit" des existierenden Selbst, dessen Sein als Sorge begriffen wurde.)"

(b) H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 66-67: "...all self-understanding takes place in relation to something else that is

understood and includes the unity and sameness of this other... we learn to understand ourselves in it, and it means that we preserve the discontinuity of the experience in the continuity of existence."

10 (a) M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 90: "We have now pointed out how those modes of Being-in-the-world which are constitutive for knowing the world are interconnected in their foundations; this makes it plain that in knowing, Dasein achieves a new status of Being (Seinsstand) towards a world which has already been discovered in Dasein itself. This new possibility of Being can develop itself autonomously; it can become a task to be accomplished, and as scientific knowledge it can take over the guidance for Being-in-the-world. But a 'commercium' of the subject with a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand."

(b) R. E. Palmer, Hermeneutics, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1969, pp. 134-135: "Prior to every thematic statement lies the foundation of understanding. Heidegger puts it succinctly: 'All prepredicative simple seeing of the invisible world of the ready-to-hand is in itself already an 'understanding-interpreting' seeing."

(c) M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Anchor Books, Garden City, N. Y., 1961, p. 70: "We understand the word 'being' and with it all its influence, even though it looks as though this understanding remained indefinite. Regarding what we understand, regarding what in some way opens itself to us in understanding, we say: it has a meaning."

11 (a) G. Ebeling, The Nature of Faith, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1967, p. 127: "...(its reality, i.e. faith's)...is obviously of the nature of an event, which effects a total transformation, and yet never becomes a possession, but remains an event -- the justification of the sinner which lasts as long as the sinner lives."

(b) We distinguish between preaching which would denote the conveying of information by one person telling another something and proclaiming which would imply a declaration that the Christ event is present and is to be understood as such.

12 (a) M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 93: "'World' is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.

"'World' functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those entities which we have just mentioned.

> "'World' can be understood in another ontical sense -- not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that 'wherein' a factical Dasein as such can be said 'to live'. 'World' has here a preontological existentiell signification.
>
> Finally, 'world' designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special 'worlds' may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in general. We shall reserve the expression 'world' as a term for our third signification.

13 The consciousness that we speak of here is not that which produces the Gegenstand. Also confer Quentin Lauer, Phenomenology, pp. 36-37.

14 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, (trans. by J. Stambaugh), Harper Torchbook edition, N. Y., 1965, p. 31: "...man's distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being, face to face with Being; thus man remains referred to Being and so answers to it... And Being? Let us think of Being according to its original meaning, as presence. Being is present to man neither incidentally nor only on rare occasions. Being is present and abides only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him. For it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence."

M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 59: "We now understand the name "logic" ...as the name for that kind of thinking which everywhere provides and accounts for the ground of beings as such within the whole in terms of Being as ground (Λόγος). The fundamental character of metaphysics is onto-theo-logic. We should now be in a position to explain how the deity enters into philosophy."

15 J. Hick (editor), The Existence of God, Macmillan Publishing Co., N. Y., 1974, p. 46: "...in dealing with objects of pure thought, we have no means whatsoever of knowing their existence, since it would have to be known in a completely a priori manner. Our consciousness of all existence...belongs exclusively to the unity of experience; any (alleged) existence outside this field, while not indeed such as we can declare to be absolutely impossible, is of the nature of an assumption which we can never be in a position to justify." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason.")

16 Confer J. Macquarrie, God-Talk, 1967, an examination of the Language and Logic of Theology. Copyright 1967 by SCM Press Ltd. Harper and Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 49 East 33rd Street, New York, N. Y. 10016. First American Edition. Printed in the U.S.A.

17 C. Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1975, p. 81: "Hegel's theory of the subject was a theory of self-realization. And as such it was radically antidualist. For this expressivist theory is opposed to the dualism of post-Cartesian philosophy (including empiricism)..."

H-G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press, 1976, p. 53: "It has been demonstrated, then, that consciousness is self-consciousness. In its knowing consciousness is actually more sure of this than of all conceptions of what is which have been mediated by the senses and the understanding. This certainty goes beyond all of these conceptions... The living feels the living -- it understands it from the inside as it understands itself as a self. The autokinoun, abstractly defined, is the act of the living self relating itself to itself. Expressed as knowing, it is the formula of idealism, I = I, selfconsciousness."

18 H-G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, pp. 18-19: "...the real is not determined as something other than itself, but rather as that which it is. Thought's reflection here is reflection into self since in fact it does not reflect about something while going outside of its content in order to bring in other determinations of reflection, but rather immerses itself in its own content, i.e., in that which the subject itself is... Accordingly, the subjectivity of self-consciousness is the subject of all statements, whose predicates are the simple abstractions or determinations of thinking as they are thought purely by themselves."

Also confer H-G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, p. 45.

19 C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 108: "...the absolute is subject, a subject who posits its own embodiment, and posits it according to rational necessity. And this means...that the universe should be seen not only as the embodiment of a cosmic life, but also under the category of expression. Its structures express or manifest the lineaments of rational necessity, since it is posited not just to embody spirit, but also to be understood by spirit in its own self-awareness."

20 C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 85-86: "...we can say that the subject is both identical with and opposed to his embodiment...the subject is characterized teleologically, as tending towards a certain perfection, that of reason and freedom, ...(this) in line with both Aristotle and expressivist theory.

It is this inner complexity which make possible its double relation to its self/other. In order to be at all as a conscious being, the subject must be embodied in life; but in order to realize the perfection of consciousness it must fight and overcome the natural bent of life as a limit."

21 H-G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, p. 8: "The task now is not so much to purify the individual of his immediate dependency on the senses and to raise him to the substance which thinks and is thought, as it is the reverse, namely, to actualize the universal and to infuse it with spirit by dissolving the fixed determinations of thought (Ph 30)."

C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 110, and p. 226: "...the Hegelian notion of concept...is not just a descriptive notion applying to things...the concept is ultimately assimilated by Hegel to the subject, a spiritual being which posits its own embodiment. In fact, the concept is just spiritual subject when we see it in its aspect as rational necessity."

22 C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 237: "He (Hegel) wants to show from conceptual necessity what we know from experience and from a deep intuition only, viz., that all things not only can in principle but do effectively pass away. He wants to show this because it is essential to his ontology that all finite beings are in contradiction, in being finite embodiments of the infinite, and hence they must go under."

23 Scientific: in that the different philosophies were only necessary stages of one philosophy. The progress by contradiction is inexorable.

C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 513: "The progress of philosophy is necessary. Every philosophy had necessarily to appear at the time that it did; thus each philosophy appeared at the right time, none outleapt its moment, but all of them grasped the spirit of their time in thought. (GPhil, 125). The different philosophies are necessary stages on this return, and hence are legitimately part of the final synthesis."

24 C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 569: "What makes possible this final victory of conceptual clarity is of course Hegel's ontology, the thesis that what we ultimately discover at the basis of everything is the Idea, conceptual necessity itself. Conceptual thought is not trying to render a reality whose foundations can never be definitively identified, nor is it the thought of a subject whose deeper instincts, cravings and aspirations can never be fully fathomed. On the contrary, at the root of reality, as in the depths of himself, the subject ultimately finds clear, conceptual necessity."

25 Starting from the consciousness of the subject -- object in the ego, Husserl applied a transcendental reduction.

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 50: "The expression 'phenomenology' signifies primarily a methodological conception. This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research. The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves, and the farther is it removed from what we call "technical devices", though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines.'

Also confer, Q. Lauer, Phenomenology, p. 19, and E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns, The Hague, Netherlands, 1973, p. 86.

[26] Q. Lauer, Phenomenology, p. 37; "As early as the Logical Investigations, Husserl sought to discover the essence of consciousness -- understanding it as an act of being conscious, rather than as a faculty for being conscious. And he came to the conclusion that all consciousness is necessarily "consciousness-of" something. In speaking thus, he was saying that the "of" is inseparable from every act of consciousness, which was but another way of saying that consciousness is essentially oriented toward an object."

The subject here is the thinking Subject in action.

[27] Confer Q. Lauer, Phenomenology, p. 55.

[28] M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 82: "Dasein understands its own-most Being in the sense of a certain 'factual Being-present-at-hand'. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's "facticity". This is a definite way of Being (Seinsbestimmtheit), and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped as a problem until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-World in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world."

[29] M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 62: "The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting...this hermeneutic also becomes a 'hermeneutic' in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends."

[30] W. Brock, "Introduction and Analysis", (from M. Heidegger, Existence and Being), Henry Regency Co., 1949, pp. 32, 40-41.

(p. 32): "The analysis of 'in-being' is to clarify what is meant by the 'Da', the "There", of human Dasein, what, in Heidegger's terms, is its existentialistic constitution."

(pp. 40-41): "The analysis of the three 'existentialia' of 'Befindlichkeit', 'understanding' and 'speech' forms only the first part of the characterisation of the 'everydayness' of Dasein, i.e. the 'in-Being' of the 'one like many' (in German: 'man'), the primary 'who' of Dasein. The aspect of the analysis is of considerable import in 'Being and Time', where 'authentic Existence' is to be developed from its common background of the average and levelled kind of life of the 'one like many'."

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 33: "...existence is the determining character of Dasein, the ontological analytic of this entity always requires that existentiality be considered beforehand. By 'existentiality' we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But in the idea of such a constitutive state of Being, the idea of Being is already included."

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[31] M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, pp. 64-65: "Being shows itself as the unconcealing overwhelming. Beings as such appear in the manner of the arrival that keeps itself concealed in unconcealedness... The difference of Being and beings, as the differentiation of overwhelming and arrival, is the perdurance (Austrag) of the two in unconcealing keeping in concealment. Within this perdurance there prevails a clearing of what veils and closes itself off -- and this its prevalence bestows the being apart, and the being towards each other, of overwhelming and arrival."

[32] M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, (English translation by Joan Stambaugh), English translation copyright 1969 by Harper and Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 10 East 53rd Street, New York, N. Y. 10022, Harper Torchbook Edition, N. Y. 10022.

[33] M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 62: "...we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its difference with beings, and of beings in their difference with Being. The difference thus comes specifically into view. If we try to form a representational idea of it, we will at once be misled into conceiving of difference as a relation which our representing has added to Being and to beings. Thus the difference is reduced to a distinction, something made up by our understanding (Verstand)."

[34] M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 204: "The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. Language is a totality of words -- a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-at-hand. Language can be broken up into word-Things which are present-at-hand. Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness it Articulates according to significations, has, as its kind of Being, Being-in-the-world -- a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the 'world."

[35] M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, pp. 23-24: "What does the formula A=A state which is customarily used to represent the principle of identity? The formula expresses the equality of A and A... For something to be the same, one is always enough. Two are not needed, as they are in the case of equality.

"The formula A=A speaks of equality. It doesn't define A as the same. The common formulation of the principle of identity thus conceals precisely what the principle is trying to say: A is A, that is, every A is itself the same."

[36] M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 69: "Inasmuch as Being becomes present as the Being of beings, as the difference, as perdurations, the separateness and mutual relatedness of grounding and of accounting for endures, Being grounds beings, and beings, as what is most of all, account for Being. One comes over the other, one arrives in the other."

[37] M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 39.

[38] J. M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", (J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr., editors, The New Hermeneutic), Vol. II, p. 72.

[39] Translator's footnote, in M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 227: "'Angst'. While this word has generally been translated as 'anxiety' in the post -- Freudian psychological literature, it appears as 'dread' in the translations of Kierkegaard and in a number of discussions of Heidegger. In some ways 'uneasiness' or 'malaise' would be more appropriate still."

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 233: "Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as 'solus ipse'. But this existential 'solipsism' insofar from the displacement of putting an isolated subject - Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world."

[40] Translator's footnote, in M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 30: "'In den historischen Giesteswissenschaften...' Heidegger makes much of the distinction between 'Historie' and 'Geschichte' and the corresponding adjectives 'historisch' and 'geschichtlich'. 'Historie' stands for what Heidegger calls a 'science of history'. (See H. 375, 378.) 'Geschichte' usually stands for the kind of 'history' that actually happens."

[41] Translator's footnote, in M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 31: "While the terms 'ontisch' ('ontical') and 'ontologisch' ('ontological') are not explicitly defined, their meanings will emerge... Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them."

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 34: "Dasein accordingly takes priority over all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence. The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself 'ontological', because existence is thus determinative for it."

[42] R. E. Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 126: "Husserl never used it ('hermeneutic') in reference to his work, while Heidegger asserted in Being and Time that the authentic dimensions of a phenomenological method make it hermeneutical; his project in Being and Time was a 'hermeneutic of Dasein'. Heidegger's selection of the term 'hermeneutic' -- a word laden with associations, from its Greek roots to its modern use in philology and theology -- suggests the anti-scientific bias which forms a marked contrast to Husserl. This same strain is carried over into Hans-Georg Gadamer's 'philosophical

hermeneutics', stamping the word itself with 'overtones of anti-scientism'."

Confer also, E. Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, pp. 154-155 and H-G. Gadamer's Truth and Method, p. 489.

[43] P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 257: "Husserl saw in the reduction the primordial philosophical act by which consciousness cuts itself off from the world and constitutes itself as an absolute; after reduction, every being is a meaning for consciousness and, as such, is relative to consciousness. The reduction thus places the Husserlian cogito at the heart of the idealist tradition by extending the Cartesian cogito, the Kantian cogito, the Fichtean cogito."

[44] Q. Lauer, Phenomenology, pp. 170-171.

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 61: "Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of the phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation."

[45] R. E. Palmer, Hermeneutics, pp. 227-228.

[46] M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 226: "The way of disclosure in which Dasein brings itself before itself must be such that in it Dasein becomes accessible as simplified in a certain manner. With what is thus disclosed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in an elemental way."

[47] M. Heidegger, Being and time, p. 310: "Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it...to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being. For this reason, anxiety as a basic state-of-mind belongs to such a self-understanding of Dasein on the basis of Dasein itself. Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety."

[48] M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 353: "Existentially,...Dasein's 'Being-at-an-end' implies Being-towards-the-end. As Being-towards-the-end which understands -- that is to say, as anticipation of death -- resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be...It harbours in itself authentic Being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity."

[49] No less a person than Bultmann himself has objected to this understanding of the Heideggerian resolution towards death as being antithetical to his own. Bultmann asserts that Heidegger is speaking only as an ontologist. But then, Bultmann speaks of love as the only possibility for the christian as though the christian were a continuous human being! Unless one reverts to an objectivised framework of reference in which the human person neutrally surveys the possibilities of death and life which are offered, we ask whether the possibility of love -- implying eternal life in the Bultmannian sense -- is not to be discerned in the existentialist understanding of the christian person, the baptized Dasein. If the answer of Bultmann is 'no', then we must assert that Heidegger's hermeneutic endeavour is restricted somewhat arbitrarily since the existential of understanding oneself as a mode of being is of little consequence to the christian. There is little wonder then that the act of faith for Bultmann is one with no continuity with the human Dasein; it is merely event. By considering faith as a mere event, we believe that Bultmann is merely postponing the problem as to how christian faith and love are meaningful to the human person.

V. A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer, p. 143: "Insofar as Bultmann insists that faith may be translated into existentialist categories, no reference to Jesus seems necessary. But insofar as there is an essential reference to Jesus, it is difficult to see how faith is completely independent of historical inquiry, as Bultmann claims it is."

[50] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 266.

G. Ebeling, Word and Faith, p. 328.

In his book Validity in Interpretation, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Yale University Press, 1967, proposes a particular understanding of the meaning of the text in opposition to the one that Gadamer proposes: "It is natural to speak not of what a text says, but of what an author means, and this more natural locution is the more accurate one. Furthermore, to speak in this way implies a readiness (not notably apparent in recent criticism) to put forth a wholehearted and self-critical effort at the primary level of criticism -- the level of understanding." (p. 244)

[51] P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, The Texas Christian University Press, Fortworth, 1976, p. 8: "The distinction between two kinds of linguistics -- semiotics and semantics -- reflects this network of relations. Semiotics, the science of signs, is formal to the extent that it relies on the dissociation of language into constitutive parts. Semantics, the science of the sentence, is immediately concerned with the concept of sense (which at this stage can be taken as synonymous with meaning, before the forthcoming distinction between sense and reference is introduced), to the extent that semantics is fundamentally defined by the integrative procedures of language."

[52] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 274-276.

[53] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, Copyright of English translation by Sheed and Ward, First published in 1975, German edition "Wahrheit und Methode" published by J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen, 1960. English edition by Garnett Barden and John Cunningham from the second edition in German, 1965. The Seabury Press, 815 Second Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017. A Continuum Book Printed in the U. S. of America.

[54] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 146: "Every work of art, not only literature, must be understood like any other text that requires understanding, and this kind of understanding has to be acquired. This gives to the hermeneutical consciousness a comprehensive breadth that surpasses even that of the aesthetic consciousness. ...hermeneutics must be so determined as a whole that it does justice to the existence of art. Understanding must be conceived as a part of the process of the coming into being of meaning, in which the significance of all statements -- those of art and those of everything else that has been transmitted -- is formed and made complete."

[55] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 86: "Aesthetic experience also is a mode of self-understanding. But all self-understanding takes place in relation to something else that is understood and includes the unity and sameness of this other. Inasmuch as we encounter the work of art in the world and a world in the individual work of art, this does not remain a strange universe into which we are magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to understand ourselves in it, and that means that we preserve the discontinuity of the experience in the continuity of our existence."

[56] Confer H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 124.

[57] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 127: "The picture is an ontological event -- in it being becomes meaningfully visible. The quality of being an original is thus not limited to the 'copying' function of the picture, and thus not to the particular area of 'objective' painting and plastic art, from which architecture would remain excluded. The quality of being an original, rather, is an element that is founded in the representative character of art."

[58] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 141: "What we mean by representation is, at any rate, a universal ontological structural element of the aesthetic, an ontological event and not an experiential event which occurs at the moment of artistic creation and is only repeated each time in the mind of the viewer."

[59] Confer H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 144.

[60] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 234: "The general structure of understanding acquires its concrete form in historical understanding, in that the commitments of custom and tradition and the corresponding potentialities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself. There-being that projects itself in relation to its own potentiality-for-being has always 'been'. This is the meaning of the existential of 'thrownness'. The main point of the hermeneutics of facticity and its contrast with the transcendental constitution research of Husserl's phenomenology was that no freely chosen relation towards one's own being can go back beyond the facticity of this being."

[61] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 267.

[62] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 300-301: "...a report depends in part on what the text represents as a phenomenon of expression. From this one can discover what the writer intended without saying, what party he belonged to, with what views he approached things, or even what degree of lack of principle or dishonesty is to be expected of him...above all, the content of the traditional material must itself be interpreted, even if its subjective reliability is established, i.e. the text understood as a document, the true meaning of which can be discovered only beyond its literal one, e.g. through comparison with other data which allow us to estimate the historical value of a text from the past."

[63] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 304: "...the individual text makes up, together with other sources and testimonies, the unity of the total tradition. This unity of the total tradition (Einheit des überlieferungsganzen) is his (the historian's) true hermeneutical object."

[64] Confer H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 304.

[65] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 324: "This is the parallel to the hermeneutical experience. I must allow the validity of the claim made by tradition, not in the sense of simply acknowledging the past in its otherness, but in such a way that it has something to say to me."

[66] Confer H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 251.

[67] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 324: "A person who does not accept that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see what is shown by their light. It is like the relation between the 'I' and the 'Thou'. A person who reflects himself out of the mutuality of such a relation changes this relationship and destroys its moral bond. A person who reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this tradition in exactly the same way."

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[68] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 261: "Heidegger's description and existential account of the hermeneutic circle constitutes in contrast a decisive turning-point. The hermeneutic theory of the nineteenth century often spoke of the circular structure of understanding, but always within the framework of a formal relation of the part and the whole or its subjective reflex, the intuitive anticipation of the whole and its subsequent articulation in the parts."

"As against this approach, Heidegger describes the circle in such a way that the understanding of the text remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of fore-understanding. The circle of the whole and the part is not dissolved in perfect understanding but, on the contrary, is most fully realised."

[69] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 273: "Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness involves the experience of the tension between the text and the present (das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Text und Gegenwart). The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation but consciously bringing it out. This is why it is part of the hermeneutic approach to project an historical horizon that is different from the horizon of the present."

[70] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 275: "In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is the essential tension between the text set down - of the law or of the proclamation -- on the one hand and, on the other, the sense arrived at by its application in the particular moment of interpretation, either in judgment or in preaching."

"This includes the fact that the text, whether law or gospel... is to be understood properly, i.e. according to the particular situation, in a new and different way. Understanding here is always application."

[71] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 421.

[72] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 420-421: "This structure of the hermeneutical experience that so totally contradicts the idea of scientific methodology itself depends on the eventual character of language that we have described at length."

[73] H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 263: "The prejudices and foremeanings in the mind of the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to misunderstandings.

"This separation, rather, must take place in the understanding itself, and hence hermeneutics must ask how it happens.

"This point can be clarified by comparing it with the hermeneutic-theory of romanticism. We shall recall that the latter conceived understanding as the reproduction of an original production."

"Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text is part of the whole of the tradition in which the age takes an objective interest and in which it seeks to understand itself."

74 R. E. Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 201.

75 We say this for the following reasons: a) the eschatological notion of the "already" and the "not yet" is more in keeping with our view of the church; b) the pre-formal definition of the church in terms of its constitution is the basis of our investigation; c) the symbolic understanding of the church follows the lines proposed by Karl Rahner and is to be understood as the thematization of God's activity in the world.

76 The ability of the church to enunciate tradition is acknowledged. However, this does not imply that the church is excused from the task of ascertaining the claims that such a tradition makes since it is here that the problem arises.

Confer K. Rahner, TI, Vol. XIV, 4. "On the Concept of Infallibility in Catholic Theology," pp. 78-80.

77 This would be the position of a person who approached any of the christian churches from a purely sociological angle.

78 Here, we exclude the understanding that proposes dialogue as a comparing of ideas (semiological). We are rather concerned with the meta-linguistic stage where semantics are involved. Confer Raimundo Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, London, 1973, pp. 17-27.

79 Confer Vat. II, Lumen Gentium, 9f/26, 48b/79; S. Concilium 5b/140, 26a/147; and Ad Gentes 5b/589.

80 Y. Congar, The Mystery of the Church, Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1960, p. 143: "To take but one example of which it is easy to imagine others of the same kind, catholicity as the universal capacity of the Church's principles of unity means that the peculiar values of the Hindu world -- values in the sphere of thought and art, values of character, language, cultural in their specific nature -- can be taken up into the unity of the Body of Christ and become mystically (pneumatically), as it were, the flesh and members of the new Adam. Christ will not be complete till he has, in this way, incorporated the whole man in each of us, and all the human values lying scattered in all their variety throughout the world. For he has -- and so has the Church, his Body -- the capacity to bring all this together in himself unto God."

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[81] K. Rahner (editor), Encyclopedia of Theology, p. 1828: "In its content and its conceptuality, it (the Word of God) is not simply a word about God, but the Word of God in that it always points beyond itself to that immediacy in which God gives himself in grace to man as the absolute sphere which cannot be encompassed (in other words, as a mystery). ...Insofar as God's forgiving and deifying communication of himself as a free, personal self-disclosure of the God, who is himself inaccessible to man in his innermost being and in his free activity, has the character of a word, the whole experience of this God who reveals himself can quite correctly be called the Word of God." (K. Rahner, "Word of God")

[82] DS 1551, 1552, 1560.

[83] I Tim. 2:1-6.

[84] A. Flannery (editor), Vat. II, p. 351. L. Gentium, No. 2: "...all the just from the time of Adam, 'from Abel, the just one, to the last of the elect' will be gathered together with the Father in the universal church". (Gregory the Great, Hom, In Evang. 19, 1: PL 76; 1154B; Augustine, Serm. 341, 9, 11: PL 39, 1499; John Damascene, Adv. Iconocl. 11: PG 96, 1357.) This stands, even if Augustine changed his stance in the face of the Pelagina controversy.

[85] DS 1524, 3869.

[86] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. II, 1."Membership of the Church according to the teaching of Pius XII's encyclical 'M. C. Christi'." p. 87: "...basically every personal act finds also a historical expression (a constitutive sign) for the fact of its being a votum ecclesiae in the concrete nature of man and its incarnate act. Hence, the justified person belongs (or is 'referred') to the Church without being a member of it, belongs 'invisibly' to the visible Church by grace and has a 'visible' relation to this Church, even when this relation is not constituted by baptism or by an externally verifiable profession of the true faith (as in the case of the catechumen). In other words, there is a lowest limit in a certain sense, below which man's state of grace and its quasi-sacramental tangibility can no longer be separated from each other, as if the former could exist without the latter."

[87] J. Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), Vol. One, University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 296-304.

[88] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. X, 1."The New Image of the Church", p. 23: "...(sacramental) grace is never simply identical with that (Church) which constitutes its effective sign. Rather, in virtue of the particular concrete sign which it institutes in the present (both aspects must be expressed) it assures us that its power extends everywhere."

[89] The fruitlessness in the celebration of a sacrament can never apply to the 'opus operatum' of the sacrament; it can only apply to the aspect of the 'opus operantis'. This latter aspect pertains both to the minister and to the recipient. Further, and more to our purpose, is the example of the sacrament of matrimony which can be received validly but not necessarily with profit, i.e. with grace.

Confer E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, p. 82: "The 'merely valid' sacrament is nevertheless still Christ's personal redemptive act in the midst of his ecclesial community and, indeed, as directed to a particular person. This simply shows that a sacrament in the full sense of the word is realized only when it is fruitful, but that even so that unfruitful though valid sacrament is truly a ritual prayer of Christ and his Church for the recipient, and is therefore the presence on earth of the heavenly reality of salvation."

[90] P. Harvey, The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, first published 1937, Oxford University Press, reprinted with corrections 1969, p. 46: "Aristotle treated of "Physica", an examination of the constituent elements of things that exist by 'nature' ('nature' being 'an innate impulse to movement'), and a discussion of such notions as matter and form, time, space, and movement, with an exposition of the Four Causes, the Material Cause (that of which a thing comes to be), the Formal Cause (the intelligible nature of a thing, that in virute of which it is what it is), the Moving Cause (from which immediately originates the change), the Final Cause (the end or aim of the change)..."

[91] This is in opposition to efficient instrumental causality.

[92] Confer DS 1310, partim, and 1606-1608.

[93] It is hoped that the following description of the five groups of causes will elucidate the manner in which "efficacy" is seen to operate.

[94] E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, p. 76: "...in its human reality the Church's symbolic act is quite clearly separate from Christ. Even so, it becomes identified sacramentally with the body of Christ, which is active in heaven. In this case, therefore, instrumentally retains its precise meaning (sacramentum separatum). The organic unity of 'sign' and 'instrumental efficient cause of salvation' can therefore best be expressed by the term 'instrumental causality of the symbol'." This is one way of understanding the efficacy of sacraments.

[95] Thomas distinguishes between the primordial sacrament united to the Word of God and the particular sacraments in the church. Confer E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, pp. 73-74.

[96] The doctrine of 'physical' causality in sacraments is commonly linked to the character of the sacrament or to the 'ornatus animae'. This linkage is based on an analogy to natural causes... Confer E. Doronzo, De Sacramentis in genere, p. 105.

[97] R. Schulte, in "Sacraments", elucidates the instrumental causality of sacraments as follows: "The precise mode of (this) 'instrumental production' of grace is not stated. But, particularly in the light of the necessity for salvation which is sometimes attributed to the sacraments (DS 1604), it seems that a real (instrumental) efficient causality is intended." (Confer K. Rahner (editor), Encyclopedia of Theology, p. 1479). The above may be contrasted with what Karl Rahner says about 'transitive efficient causality': "...the sign in the sacrament precisely as sign is just as unrecognized as it is in the other theories (physical, moral, intentional causality). The fundamental defect that leads all these theories into conceptual difficulties, consists,...in tacitly laying down the pattern of transitive efficient causality, in which one factor adequately distinct from another must produce the latter." (Confer, The Church and the Sacraments, 37.)

[98] E. Doronzo, De Sacramentis in genere, p. 164: (Bonaventura, In 4 Sent., dist. 1, p. 1, q. 4) "Est etiam aliorum magnorum magistrorum circa hoc opinio, dicentium quod in sacramentis non sit causalitas, neque virtus aliqua nec effectiva nec dispositiva ad gratiam...Sacramenta enim dicunt assistere divinam virtutem quae est causa gratiae...Huic positioni pietas fidei non contradicit, et ratio consentit." ..."Concedimus ergo, quod sacramenta novae legis sunt causa et efficiunt et disponunt, extenso nomine, ut dictum est; et hoc securum est dicere. Utrum autem plus habeant, nec volo affirmare, nec negare."

[99] ibid., (Scotus, In 4 Sent., dist. 1, q. 5) "Est ergo modus iste, quod susceptio sacramenti est dispositio necessitans ad effectum signatum per sacramentum, non quidem per aliquam formam intrinsecam, per quam necessario causaret terminum, vel aliquam dispositionem praeviam, sed tantum per assistentiam Dei causantis illum effectum, non necessario absolute, sed necessitate respiciente potentiam ordinatam. Disposuit enim universaliter, et de hoc Ecclesiam certificavit, quod suscipienti tale sacramentum, ipse conferret effectum signatum."

[100] E. Doronzo, De Sacramentis in genere, p. 165: (Ferrariensis, In C. Gent., l.4, c. 57) "Considerandum quod duplex est instrumentum: quoddam quod sua actione attingit ultimam perfectionem quam principale agens intendit; quoddam vero quod ipsam ultimam perfectionem non attingit, sed aliquam ipsius dispositionem...Sacramenta ergo dicuntur causa salutis et gratiae, non quia ad ipsam gratiam attingant, cum gratia a solo Deo creetur in anima, sed quia ad ipsam gratiam disponunt, causando aliquid in anima, in quantum sunt instrumenta divinae virtutis, puta characterem vel ornatum, quo anima ad suscipiendam gratiam sit disposita."

[101] Op. Cit., (S. Thomas, In 4 Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1.) "Instrumentum gratiae etiam instrumentaliter non pertingit ad ipsam justificationem, seu ad ultimum effectum, quod est gratia; solum ad aliquam dispositionem, quae est necessaria ad ipsam gratiae susceptionem."

[102] Op Cit., p. 167: (Cajetanus, In 3 par., q. 62, a. 1, n. 6) "Sacramentum instrumentaliter attingit gratiam sacramentalem; et non oportet recurrere ad dispositionem praeviam ad gratiam. Quidquid enim, secundum aliorum opinionem ut probabiliorem, dixerit Auctor in IV Sent., hoc in loco, secundum propriam sententiam, longe altius sensit, expresse ponens gratiam gratum facientem, qua scilicet homo fit membrum Christi, et qua sumus divinae naturae consortes, a Deo principaliter et a sacramento instrumentaliter effici."

[103] Op. Cit., p. 166: "Suarez, fere solitarius, recurrit ad suam peculiarem theoriam de potentia oboedientiali activa (In 3 p., q. 13, a. 4, Disp. 31, sect. 6 n. 45 sqq.). Docet nempe virtutem qua sacramentum instrumentaliter agit non esse, ut alii communiter colunt, virtutem a Deo intrinsece communicatam et virtuti naturali sacramenti additam, sed procedere ex ipsa virtute naturali secundum potentiam oboedientialem activam, quatenus omnis virtus naturalis habet in se modum quemdam virtualitatis, quo possit absque additione novae virtutis elevari ad producendum effectum sibi superiorem (In 3 p., q. 62, a. 4, Disp. 9, sect. 2, n. 14).

[104] Ibid., p. 169: CANO. (Opera, v. 3, Romae, 1890, p. 249 et 255) "Virtus enim redemptionis in marsupio est, in quo pretium redemptionis servatur; et virtus sacramentorum sanguis Christi est, qui in sacramentis adhibetur."

[105] Ibid., p. 170: LUGO: (Disp. Schol., t. 3, Parisiis, 1892, p. 364) "Sacramenta...legis novae sunt causae morales, quia ipsa habent vim movendi Deum; sunt enim actiones, et operationes Christi.."

ibid. p. 170: FRANZELIN: "Christus redemptor sacramenta instituit per legatos suos suo nomine et sua auctoritate administranda ad applicationem meritorum suorum pro singulis initiatis; unde consequens est, sacramentis, utpote quae moraliter sunt actiones Christi ipsius, inesse signitatem supernaturalem ex persona et meritis redemptoris, vi cujus dignitatis exigant collationem gratiae proinitiatis."

[106] ibid., pp. 171-172: "...breviter ad hoc reducitur Billot: Sacramentum est signum practicum gratiae. Ergo in sacramento est virtus intentionalis quae est propria signi. Ergo sacramentum causet intentionaliter et ideo non moraliter nec physicae. Ergo effectus sacramenti est ejusdem ordinis intentionalis ac proinde non est per se gratia (imo nec character) sed deputatio ad sacra. Ergo gratia (idem dic de charactere) nonnisi dispositive a sacramento causatur, quatenus nempe inducitur deputatio quae gratiam appellat seu quae se habet ut dispositio et exigentia gratiae. Ergo tota causalitas sacramenti est intentionalis instrumentalis dispositiva."

[107] Confer E. Doronzo, De Sacramentis in genere, pp. 174-181.

[108] Confer the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Studies, 27 July, 1914, DS 3601-3624. Confer also p. 101, footnote 136.

[109] E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, p. 75: "If we appreciate 'sign' in its true human significance, as soon as we have said 'sign' we have already said 'efficient causality'. For here 'sign' means the visible presence of a grace-giving activity. In formal terms, the sign-value and the causal value remain distinct. (To have emphasized this is a lasting achievement of the Thomist school; it is not possible to confuse the efficacy with what Billot calls the efficacy of a sign as such.)"

[110] i.e. if the scheme of the four types of classical causes is preserved.

[111] Confer DS 1312.

[112] K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, Burns and Oates, 1974, p. 35: "Usually the question of the kind of causality at work in the sacraments is envisaged unconsiously, as though as a matter of course in termsof the concept of transitive efficient cause borrowed from the philosophic doctrine of the categories. God, sacramental sign and grace are envisaged from the start as quite distinct factors, almost as though they were material things. Then the causality of the sacramental signs is thought of in relation to God, as a 'moral' causality, analogous to that of prayer, for example, the making good of a legal claim on someone who has contracted to perform something. Or it is thought of in terms of grace, and then the efficacy is represented on the analogy of the physical causation of an effect. In view of the difficulty of a rite 'physically' causing interior grace, this view calls to its aid the proposition that the causality in question is 'instrumental'."

[113] K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, p. 225, "If God himself is man and remains so for all eternity..,then man is for all eternity the expression of the mystery of God which participates for all eternity in the mystery of its ground... He (the Word of God himself) is the union of the historical manifestation of the question which man is and the answer which God is. He is the union of a question which as a question about God is the manifestation of the answer. This is the union which is meant in Christology."

[114] K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, p. 223: "..,there could be men,...even if the Logis had not himself become man. But we can and have to say nevertheless: the possibility that there be men is grounded in the greater, more comprehensive and more radical possibility of God to express himself in the Logos which becomes a creature."

ibid., p. 224: "...we cannot understand the Incarnation in such a way that the Logos becomes man and then says something about God only by the fact that he speaks. For the moment we understand it this way, the Incarnation of God would be superfluous. For God could also call forth and express in some other prophet the words which the man Jesus as the messenger of God says about God. The man Jesus must be the self-revelation of God through who he is and not only through his words, and this he really cannot be if precisely this humanity were not the expression of God."

[115] K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, p. 344: "If Christ is not only an idea, but a concrete person, if salvation in Christ takes place not only through the communcation of an ideology which basically could also be reached independently of Jesus and his proclamation, and if salvation depends on the concrete event of his cross, death and resurrection, then this salvation cannot only be found in and based upon a subjective interiority. The concreteness of Jesus Christ is something which challenges me must confront me in what we call the church. It is a church which I do not form and which is not constituted only through my wishes and religious needs, but rather it is a church which confronts me in a mission, a mandate and a proclamation which really make the reality of salvation present for me."

[116] K. Rahner, TI, Vol. XII, 12."On the Structure of the People of the Church Today", p. 218: "She is a 'visible Church, the 'people of God' in the concrete, a social entity, a formal group, an institution in the world with all that that entails, and that too not merely in virtue of her 'nature' as instituted by God, but also in virtue of all that is in her and pertaining to her."

[117] Confer R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, p. 302: "...the salvation-occurrence is nowhere present except in the proclaiming, accosting, demanding, and promising word of preaching. ...It means that the salvation-occurrence continues to take place in the proclamation of the word. The salvation-occurrence is eschatological occurrence just in this fact, that it does not become

a fact of the past but constantly takes place anew in the present. It is present not in the after-effect of a significant fact of world-history but in the proclamation of the word, which, unlike world events, does not get absorbed into the evolution of the human mind."

Also K. Barth, Confer Church Dogmatics, Vol. I, parts 1 and 2, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955, p. 299.

[118] This has been the classical protestant objection to the mistaken notion of the opus operatum of the sacraments. Confer footnote 119.

[119] A Handbook of Christian Theology, p. 289: "Grace is not, as for Roman Catholicism, a quasi-physical substance, of which the Church is the appointed custodian and which is to be dispensed in accordance with rules of the Church's making. Grace is of the nature of God's own action, who reveals the fullness of His righteousness of being always freely available when men are enabled by faith to receive it." ("Protestantism" by Truman B. Douglass)

[120] Karl Barth felt that the key to understand the structure of Roman Catholicism was the "analogia entis", and that this could in no way parallel the "analogia fidei". By the "analogia entis", Barth felt that the Roman Church compromised God's sovereignty over the world of creatures.

Confer his Church Dogmatics, Vol. I, pts. 1 and 2, x.

[121] Confer The New Hermeneutic, Vol. II, edited by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., "New Frontiers in Theology", Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1964.

[122] Works of G. Ebeling that have been the basis for our exposition: The Nature of Faith, English trans. 1961, Word and Faith, 1963, The Problem of Historicity, 1967, The Word of God and Tradition, 1968, Luther, 1970, Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, 1971.

[123] J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr. (editors), The New Hermeneutic, Vol. II, p. 79: "...the sola scriptura, as opposed to the hermeneutical sense of the Catholic principle of tradition, was itself already a hermeneutical thesis. Holy Scripture, as Luther puts it, is sui ipsius interpres. (G. Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic")

[124] G. Ebeling, Luther, p. 106: "Luther formuliert es darum als hermeneutischen Grundsatz fur seine erste exegetsiche Vorlesung: 'In der Heiligen Schrift ist es das Beste, den geist vom Buchstaben zu unterscheiden; denn das macht einen wahrhaft zum Theologen. Und die Kirche hat dies allein vom Heilgen Geist und nicht aus menschlichem Sinn."

About the catholic position, G. Ebeling says: "When...we learn that alongside the authority of the Word of God there exists, supporting and validating it, the authority of the magisterium laying down what is to be believed, then any possibility of agreement on this point depends on whether the authority of this Church court of appeal commends itself to the conscience, and on how far it agrees with the character of the ἐξουσια of the Holy Spirit revealed in Jesus." (The Word of God and Tradition, p. 179)

[125]Confer G. Ebeling, Word and Faith, pp. 323 and 331.

[126]W. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, translated by John Bowden, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1968, p. 210: "Like the kerygma, the proclamation of Jesus is not interested in any features or characteristics of the person of Jesus but only in the 'fact' of the Word. Insofar as Jesus points to his person, he points to an ambiguous fact, 'the character of which is understood only as it is heard'."

[127]Confer W. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of R. Bultmann, pp. 177-178.

[128]R. Bultmann's Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 62-64.

[129]G. Ebeling, Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, pp. 189-190: "The Bible itself is a living proof that the language of faith is of its nature deeply rooted in the language of the world... Only within this encounter with the language of the world, and indeed only by this means, can faith be uttered at all. And the language of faith exists only because of this encounter."

[130]Confer J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr. (editors), The Later Heidegger and Theology, Harper and Row, New York, 1963, Volume one, "New Frontiers in Theology", especially pp. 11-12. Heidegger accepted the irreducibility of man's facticity and the consequence: man's transcendence leads to nothing. The latter Heidegger is characterized by the 'turn' in terms of which man is called not as "one who stands in nothing's place" but rather as "the shepherd of being" and in virtue of this title there emerges gratitude for being's favour.

[131]J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr. (editors), The New Hermeneutic, "New Frontiers in Theology, Vol. II, pp. 135-136: "God's revelation consisted simply in God letting men state God's own problems in their language, in grace and judgment...Jesus was God's word, if at that time the time for this word had come! And that is what faith in Jesus believes, by believing in the historical Jesus. This alone is the true meaning of "Easter faith'. (Ernst Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem".)

[132]G. Ebeling, Word and Faith, p. 332: "...there can be doctrine of the Word of God only as theological hermeneutics. In view of that the hermeneutic principle could be given various precise definitions. With an eye to the real sphere of the word-event I suggest for consideration the formula: the hermeneutic principle is man as conscience."

[133]It was the recognition of the fact that a person's faith experience of christianity was objective that provoked the history of theology theologians in their examination of the transmission of traditions. W. Pannenberg Explains it thus: "...religion is concerned not only with another world but with a transcendent reality that constitutes the true meaning of precisely this present life and world." Wolfhart Pennenberg, Human Nature, Election, and History, 1977, p. 85.

[134]Even in the understanding of church as fellowship there is need to know that the experience is the same which is present in the word-event as such, and which also takes in one's neighbour.

[135]Confer K. Rahner, TI, Vol. V, 8."Christology within an evolutionary view of the world," pp. 176-177.

[136]K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, pp. 208-212.

[137]Confer K. Rahner, TI, Vol. IV, 2."The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology," pp. 54-55.

[138]The proclamation in Jesus is unique. Any other "making present" of this uniqueness must be symbolic, sacramental. And it is in supplying the conditions for what is validly symbolic or sacramental that the epithet "definitive" is apt.

[139]J. B. Cobb, Jr., Christ in a Pluralisitc Age, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1975, p. 187: "The thesis of this book is that faithfulness to Christ requires immersion in the secular and pluralistic consciousness and that it is precisely there that Christ now works, impeded by our failure to recognize him and by our continuing association of faith with past, particularized expressions of Christ."

[140]That this expression is precarious to conceded. From what we have said about the sacrament (its making present in space and time the Christ event without being identified with the person of Jesus without qualification), we understand to an extent how the sacrament could be the midway point between monism and pantheism in that it gives man a true ontological status while preserving the uniqueness of God (because of the identification with qualification).

[141]G. Kaufman, Systematic theology: a historicist perspective, New York, 1968, p. 5, footnote 2: "The Barthian claim that is is possible to define the meaning 'God' exhaustively in terms of the Christ event overlooks the fact that this term already has a meaning for us when we begin our christological investigations, and it is precisely because of this meaning which it already has that we choose to use this term and not some other in speaking of Christ."

[142]This assertion is made on the basis of scholastic philosophy which assumes that plurality can be predicted only in terms of a pre-existing unity, and also on the basis of the elements of the hermeneutic circle. In the hermeneutic circle, there must be an element of intuition, else one must resign oneself to an endless series of intermediaries that are expected to act as currency in a dialogal situation.

[143]H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 269: "Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of 'situation' by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence an essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of 'horizon'. The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. The word has been used in philosophy since Nietzsche and Husserl to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determination, and the nature of the law of the expansion of the range of vision."

[144]The thrust is positive on two counts: a) it is being realized in the historical future; b) and this historical future must include the world, the non-christian world, or else the mission of the church is in question.

[145]A. Dulles, The Survival of Dogma, Image Book. 1973, p. 190: "Doctrinal statements that are inconsistent with our world view may be susceptible of a 'retrieve' (in the Heideggerian sense) and thus deserve to be retained in dynamic tension with more recent conceptualizations."

[146]Confer Scholion one. The universal salvific will of God is seen in the appearance of Jesus Christ. This appearance we refer to as the Christ event.

[147]The assumption or understanding here is that the language of dialogue is the differentiating factor in the primal oneness of meaning that is 'intuited'. We refer to Paul Ricoeur to clarify this understanding. The discourse that functions in a dialogal situation is an articulation of language. (Confer The Conflict of Interpretations, especially the first section 'I. Hermeneutics and Structuralism'). For Ricoeur, what is considered as the unity referred to is the meta-language state. According to him it is life experience that is able to invest the word (in our case the parametrical notion of eschatology which is the horizon) with the profounder meaning that the experience itself mediates.

[148]H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 325: "...the structure of the question is implicit in all experience. We cannot have experiences without asking questions. The recognition that an object is different and not as we first thought, obviously involves the question whether it was this or that. The openness that is part of experience is, from a logical point of view, precisely the openness of being this or that. It has the structure of a question."

Also, p. 333: "...the hermeneutic phenomenon also contains within itself the original meaning of conversation and the structure of question and answer. For an historical text to be made the object of interpretation means that it askes a question of the interpreter. Thus interpretation always involves a relation to the question that is asked of the interpreter. To understand a text means to understand this question. (Einen Text verstehen, heißt diese Frage verstehen) But this takes place...by our achieving the hermeneutical horizon."

[149] R. E. Palmer, Hermeneutics, Interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, p. 87: "Understanding is a basically referential operation; we understand something by comparing it to something we already know.

"...an individual concept derives its meaning from a context or horizon within which it stands; yet the horizon is made up of the very elements to which it gives meaning. By dialectical interaction between the whole and the part, each gives the other meaning; understanding is circular, then. Because within this 'circle the meaning comes to stand, we call this the 'hermeneutical circle'."

[150] An example of this happening in fact is when a christian and a non-christian both have the same visible commitment to spend themselves in the betterment of their fellowman.

Confer also K. Rahner's TI, Vol. IX, 9."Atheism and Implicit Christianity," pp. 147-161.

[151] An example of a prescriptive decree is found in J. Skorupski's Symbol and Theory, p. 109: "I can appoint you judge not simple because I want to, nor because of my own moral characteristics, but because I have the power to do so in virtue of the position I hold. Equally you become judge not directly because of your personal virtues, but because the appointment has been made by a person with the power to make it."

[152] Confer Vat. II, Nostra Aetate, no. 4; Lumen Gentium, no. 16; Gaudium et Spes, no. 22.

[153] Confer Vat. II, Nostra Aetate, no. 2.

[154] The task of the church is to affirm the presence that is latent and waiting to be discovered, not to vainly attempt 'create' or 'effect' a Christ-presence.

[155] E. Schillebeeckx, The Understanding of Faith, Seabury Press, N. Y., 1974, p. 28: "Communication...only takes place in the act of reinterpretation and, as a passing on of what is said, is always defective if the partners do not share the same presuppositions and the same sphere of understanding."

Also, p. 30: "...theological hermeneutics cannot be practised without the contribution made by the history of ideas and by philosophy,

insofar as these are concerned with the changing spheres of understanding in which repeated attempts have been made by christians to repeat the christian message."

156 'discourse' means articulated meaning. The proclamation as such is always a structure that must be articulated. (This is not meant to imply that the structure as such exists in se apart from the christian experience which is articulated.) It is the articulated meaning as a linguistic phenomenon that becomes a symbol both for the proclaimer and the proclaimee. (Refer P. Ricoeur's The Conflict of Interpretation, pp. 12-13.)

T. B. Ommen, The Hermeneutic of Dogma, Scholars Press, Missoula, 1975, pp. 184-185: "Gadamer provides...a more adequate model for a theological hermeneutic than do the Bultmannians. The linguistic tradition which the Christian theologian reflects is that of Christian faith, especially, although not exclusively, as mediated by the particular Christian community to which he belongs. The prejudgments of the theologian reflect the "dogmatic" assumptions ingrained in the living experience of the Christian community.

"The tradition in which the interpreter stands, whch takes on hermeneutical significances in Gadamer's thought, points to still another dimension of theological judgment -- the importance and validity of the ecclesial context of Christian theology."

157 It was only in Vatican Council II that the Catholic Church called non-catholic christian bodies "communities and Churches" (Unitatis) Reintegratio, no. 3).

158 Our reasoning is that one cannot speak of proclamation without at the same time speaking of the community in which the proclamation is effected: first because of the visibility that applies to the proclaimer and the proclaimee; second, because of the incarnational status of the faith happening.

159 A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Vol. One, John Knox Press, Atlanta, 1975, p. 555: "In all the christological formulas of the ancient church there is a manifest concern not to allow the total demand made on men's faith by the person of Jesus to be weakened by pseudo-solutions. It must be handed on undiminished to all generations of Christendom."

K. Rahner, TI, Vol. V, 6. "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religion," p. 133: "If...the message of the Church is directed to someone who is a 'non-Christian' only in the sense of living by an anonymous Christianity not as yet fully conscious of itself, then her missionary work must take this fact into account and must draw the necessary conclusions when deciding on its missionary strategy and tactics."

[160] The theologians of history would seem to support our affirmation in that they see the total revelation of God as something still happening, yet without prejudice to the status that attaches to the person of Jesus. "If the God of Israel can be revealed as the power over everything and thus be revealed in his divinity only in the totality of all events, but if on the other hand the course of history is not yet complete and all events are not yet gathered up in their totality, then the divinity of the God of Israel is, strictly speaking not yet revealed but still hidden -- assuming that sometime, at the end of all things it will be clear to everyone." (J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr., "New Frontiers of Theology, Vol. III, Theology as History, 1967, p. 239.)

[161] H. R. Schlette, Towards a Theology of Religions, Herder KG, 1966, p. 80: "To the extent, therefore, that religions, at least in principle, can be regarded as social expressions, positively made possible and willed by God on the plane of general sacred history, of human search for salvation and of divine self-giving, and must therefore be judged to be manifestations of a divine proffer of salvation deserving of confidence, they may be termed in a genuine sense 'ways of salvation."

K. Rahner, TI, Vol. X, 2. "Church, Churches and Religions," p. 40: "Christianity and the Church themselves are constantly in process of seeking the final perfection of their own nature. And because of this they are in a position to recognize those tendencies within the spiritual and religious history of mankind which are religiously positive even though not yet explicitly Christian, that which Christianity and the Church must absorb and transform into themselves in order to become fully that which they already are: the manifestation in history of the grace of God now at its eschatological stage in history and in a state of purity which is divinely attested and assured."

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